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Abstract 
This thesis explores the roles of common ground and Theory of Mind in 
processes for definite reference resolution. It examines the proposals due 
to Herb Clark and colleagues that common ground is common-knowledge 
of discourse relevant facts and that it serves as the main constraint on 
definite referential processes. The thesis contrasts that view with an 
alternative where common ground emerges from shared interactions as a 
result of low-level, or automatic memory mechanisms that are constrained 
by what has been in shared attention. The thesis presents two experiments 
that verify the effect of memory-based mechanism on referential processes, 
and also shows that memory-based mechanisms function only where the 
cue to previous shared experience is itself in shared attention.  
Given that common ground only weakly constrains definite referential 
processes, it is argued that Theory of Mind inferences play a critical role in 
on-line referential processes where interlocutors have different perspective 
information. The thesis argues that research using the perspective-taking 
task did not distinguish between the role of common ground and inferences 
about the speaker’s ignorance of certain objects. Experiment 3 shows that 
participants have better perspective taking when the procedure highlighted 
the speaker’s ignorance. This effect is seen within 300ms of the on-set of 
the critical linguistic stimulus, demonstrating very early integration of 
Theory of Mind inferences. Then a follow-up experiment excludes the 
possibility of the effect of simple interactivity in the experiment 3, and also 
explores whether the co-presence of the speaker increased the degree to 
which the existence of private objects was shared attention. Because the 
existence of privately viewable objects are common ground, even though 
their specific identities are not. The results of experiment 4 support the 
proposals about common ground in this thesis by showing that participants 
have better performance when the speaker is not co-present.  
Keywords: common ground, perspective taking, definite reference, Theory 
of Mind,  .  
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Introduction: Social cognition and definite reference 
Cognitive processes for successful definite reference must integrate 
information from a wide number of sources. These sources include 
linguistic knowledge, the utterance situation and general world knowledge. 
In addition, referential processes rely on information about our interlocutors 
as social agents since language use is a highly social activity. In both the 
theoretical literature and the psycholinguistic literature, it has been 
proposed that two constructs play a key role in decision processes for 
definite reference. These are common ground and Theory of Mind. The 
idea of Theory of Mind comes mostly from developmental and ethological 
research (Premack et. al., 1978; Leslie, 1987; Leslie et. al., 1988). It refers 
to a set of abilities that span a wide range of domains of use and involve 
making inferences about agents’ behaviour based on causally active, 
unseen mental states. In particular, these states should include some 
correlate of belief, desire and intention (see Lewis 1994 for a sketch of 
such explanations). The idea of common ground comes from the 
philosophical literature and linguistics literature. Broadly speaking, 
common ground is thought of as a repository of information that 
interlocutors ‘share’, in some sense, and take for granted as shared. As will 
be discussed in the coming sections common ground is normally tied quite 
closely to the idea of ‘common knowledge’ (or ‘mutual knowledge’). 
Common knowledge is a theoretical construct that is used to account for 
how commonly held information could be ‘open’. Common knowledge of 
some fact between two agents requires those agents to be able to 
represent the other agent as capable of holding beliefs or other attitudes to 
states of affairs. Thus, a common assumption in the literature is that 
processes for representing common ground are tied into Theory of Mind 
abilities. In widely discussed psycholinguistic research due to Herb Clark 
and colleagues on how reference is made with definite noun phrases, all of 
these constructs come together: Common ground is common knowledge of 
discourse relevant facts, definite referring expressions are constrained to 
refer to objects in common ground. 
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In this thesis, I will argue for the following position:  
i. that common knowledge plays no role in processes for definite 
reference;  
ii. that common ground is a product of social-cognitive processes 
that are not linked into full-blown theory of mind abilities; 
iii. common ground plays a role in definite referential processes 
only by promoting attention to previously shared referents; 
iv. where perspective-taking is required in referential decision 
processes, inferences based on Theory of Mind abilities are necessary for 
success, common ground plays a peripheral role (as per (iii) above). 
In Chapter 1, I will review the theoretical literature on definite 
reference and common ground. There we will critically evaluate the 
proposal, due to Herb Clark, as well as some philosophers and linguists, 
that common ground is common knowledge of discourse relevant facts and 
that definite referents are strictly constrained to be commonly known. I will 
argue that this position has little support when seen as a proposal about 
actual cognitive processes. Instead, I will follow the majority view in 
linguistics and philosophy that the uniqueness of definite reference is key. 
I will then review research suggesting that mechanisms for tracking 
shared information (common ground) among agents develops in infancy, 
independently of full-blow Theory of Mind. Turning to consider proposals 
about tracking shared information (or common ground), we will see that an 
important set of recent research sees domain-general mechanisms for 
memory and priming as playing a key role. We will consider this as a 
potential basis for maintaining common ground cognitively, but argue that 
the mechanisms are constrained by social-cognitive factors. 
In Chapter 2, I will present a set of studies that test the extent to 
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which memory-based mechanisms for common ground are domain general. 
These studies will demonstrate that memory-based mechanisms are 
constrained at the coding phase to information that was previously in 
shared attention. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to consider the considerable body of research 
on when and how participants take their interlocutor’s perspective in on-line 
referential decision processes. Specifically, I will focus on the referential 
communication game, or perspective-taking task where what participants 
and their interlocutors can see is different. One aim of this chapter is to 
discuss a widely adopted model of how participants might successfully 
determine the correct referent in these tasks, based on the ideas of Herb 
Clark and colleagues. I observe that this model implies that success on 
perspective-taking tasks could be achieved without direct involvement of 
Theory of Mind inferences.  
A second aim of this chapter is to set out what are the respective 
roles of Theory of Mind and common ground in perspective-taking tasks. It 
will be proposed that in the most widely used perspective-taking tasks, 
common ground mechanisms in fact may work against processes for 
adjusting to speaker’s perspective. 
In Chapter 4 I present a series of studies that seeks to disentangle 
the respective roles of Theory of Mind and common ground in perspective 
taking tasks. It will be shown that cues that promote theory of mind 
inferences play a far more potent role than those for common ground, 
although the latter are a factor in such processes.  
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Chapter 1: Common ground as the target of shared 
attention 
1. A role for common knowledge, or mindreading in definite 
reference? 
1.1 Two theories of definite reference, common knowledge and 
common ground 
Consider a scenario where two people are shopping in the supermarket. 
When they walk past a cheese refrigerator, one person says to another 
“please hand me the cheese”. The addressee will be confused about which 
specific cheese the speaker wants. This utterance is less effective in that 
the speaker does not provide a definite description that is as specific as is 
necessary in order for the interlocutor to identify the intended referent 
(Russell, 1919; Neale, 1990). However, if the speaker has just been talking 
about a recipe using Mozzarella, the addressee will understand the 
utterance “the cheese” as, ‘the mozzarella in the cheese fridge’. The 
interlocutor presumes that their partner is a cooperative agent and is able 
to keep their conversation neither over-informative nor under-informative 
(Grice, 1975). In order to communicate an intended referent successfully, 
the speaker and the addressee know that the indicated entity is part of a 
relevant message in the broader context that they share, and presumes 
each other are able to make inference about other's mental states quickly 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986).  
In this case of definite reference resolution, what contributes to the 
addressee searching for the indicated referent within a given domain? It 
seems clear that in conversation, people have to make inferences about 
what is known by the other interlocutor. Many have claimed that we not 
only rely on our interlocutor being able to make a decision about a definite 
reference based on what we assume the other knows, or even what the 
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other knows about what we know but about what we in a sense, ‘know 
together’ (Tomasello et al. , 2005). 
According to a widely adopted theory, both the speaker and the 
addressee constrain the domain for definite reference to what is common 
knowledge or mutual knowledge (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Schiffer, 1972). 
In a related approach to definite reference and presupposition, it is thought 
that the referent of a definite description is ‘given’ or presupposed in what is 
held to be common ground (Jespersen, 1949; Heim, 1982; Clark, 1992). 
Stalnaker (1974, 1975, and 2002) defines common ground in terms of 
common knowledge of discourse relevant facts1. Dynamic approaches to 
definite reference and presupposition (Heim, 1982, 1983) adapt 
Stalnaker’s ideas to model how utterances update a shared information 
state (the dynamic context) which consists of what is taken to be commonly 
known or assumed. Thus common ground is typically analysed in terms of 
common knowledge (see Stalnaker 2002 for an explicit formalisation of 
this). Where this assumption is made, common ground and common 
knowledge (of discourse relevant facts) are interchangeable ideas. 
Common knowledge of some fact is not just a matter of whether 
interlocutors known they both know that fact. Common knowledge is 
typically illustrated as follows (using the above example): we express 
proposition that there is mozzarella cheese available in the cheese fridge 
as p. First people A and B share knowledge of p:  
1) A knows p.  
1’) B knows p.  
 
Second people A and B know they share the knowledge of p  
                                                            
1 In fact, Stalnaker’s discussion of common ground is more carefully cast in terms of what 
interocutors are willing to take for granted as commonly known, for the sake of the conversation. 
But the structure of the commonly held assumptions remains the same in terms of Stalnaker’s 
analysis and can be traced back to proposals in Lewis (1969). 
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2) A knows that B knows p.  
2’) B knows that A knows p.  
 
Finally, according to certain formalisations of the idea of common 
knowledge due to Schiffer (1972), Clark & Marshall, (1978); Aumann (1976) 
and others, people A and B mutually knowing about p implies the following 
infinite sequence:  
3) A knows that B knows that A knows about p. 
3’) B knows that A knows that B knows about p. 
et cetera ad infinitum. 
Formalisations of common or mutual knowledge that have these 
infinite implications at best apply to ideally rational agents with unlimited 
capacity to reason and so have been criticised as being cognitively 
implausible (Skyrms, 1996; Sperber & Wilson1986; Cubitt & Sugden 2003; 
Paternotte 2011). Paternotte (2011) makes the point that even ideally 
rational agents with normal finite capacities for perception, memory and 
inference would not be able to establish common ground in this way, due to 
the fallibility that finite cognitive resources entail. That is, if one knows that 
an agent’s abilities of perception, memory and inference are limited and 
liable to the occasional error, then each level of meta-representation in (3) 
involves more risk that the relevant facts have not been attended to, the 
relevant inferences have not been made, involving the relevant information 
from memory, and so forth. 
Lewis (1969) and Sperber & Wilson (1986) provide more 
psychologically plausible accounts of common knowledge that do not imply 
this infinite series of higher-order beliefs but do allow interlocutors to infer a 
limited series of higher-order beliefs where necessary and where other 
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contextual information about shared mental states allow (see Cubitt & 
Sugden, 2003; Paternotte 2011 for a lengthy discussion). These accounts 
of common knowledge (or mutual manifestness) are cast in terms of 
potential attitudes to situations. Lewis defines common knowledge in terms 
of a notion of ‘reason to believe’ rather than belief. In Lewis’ system, it is 
possible that A and B have common knowledge of p without either having 
any actual beliefs about p at all (Lewis 1969, p.55). This is because some 
external state of affairs can provide two agents with reason to believe that 
the external situation gives both agents reason to believe some fact (that 
becomes, thereby, mutually known). Such situations Lewis calls, ‘reflexive 
common indicators’. Lewis, (1969) gives an example of a reflexive common 
indicator: in a town where the telephone system is unreliable, people 
normally wait for the original caller to call back if the current call is 
interrupted. These past events become salient when a call is interrupted 
and their existence suffices to be a reflexive common indicator for common 
knowledge of the convention that caller calls back in that town.  
Another important reflexive common indicator to be discussed at 
length below involves the visible signs of shared-attentional activity. These 
are signs of triadic attentional behaviour between two agents and the 
object of shared attention. These signs provide evidence that the object of 
attention’s existence is in shared attention, and hence common knowledge 
(Barwise, 1988/1989; Peacocke, 2005). An important point to note here is 
that it may be necessary to rely on Level-1 perspective-taking abilities 
(Flavell et al., 1981) in order to recognise that the situational, or 
behavioural signs of shared attention are present. As widely discussed in 
the developmental literature, such visual perspective taking abilities should 
be considered distinct from Theory-of-Mind abilities, as they are conceived 
of in this thesis (see Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).2  
                                                            
2 A terminological note. The label, ‘Perspective-Taking Task’ seems to derive from a usage that 
began with Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) – see Brown-Schmidt & Hanna (2011). Baron-Cohen et al. 
counterpose visual perspective-taking (as studied in Flavell et al. 1981) with what they call, 
‘conceptual perspective-taking’. The latter, Baron-Cohen et al. argue, is involved in false-belief 
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Thus, according to these proposals, the existence of common 
knowledge is more about external factors, coupled with human cognitive 
abilities, that provide an evidential basis for these potential attitudes. And 
so, according to Lewis’ original proposals about common knowledge, in 
order to confirm that they have common knowledge of p, two people do not 
need to check that an infinite series of ever more complex representations 
of mental representations hold, there simply needs to an evidential basis 
for common knowledge, a ‘reflexive common indicator’. Clark & Marshall 
(1978; 1981) discuss a number of environmental cues that could provide 
such a basis: (i) joint attention to a co-present object, (ii) mention in 
previous discourse, (iii) shared cultural or background knowledge.  
Thus, an account of definite reference that requires the target to be 
common knowledge in the sense defined by Lewis or Sperber & Wilson 
may be cognitively plausible. Since it does not require interacting agents to 
have an infinite series of beliefs about other beliefs, it only requires there to 
be enough evidence that there is a reflexive common indicator to common 
knowledge. 
However, not all approaches to pragmatics or definite reference 
endorse the idea that an object needs to be in common ground in order for 
definite reference to proceed. In fact, in the long history of research into 
definite reference, perhaps the most famous and widely adopted proposal, 
due to Bertrand Russell (see Russell, 1905, 1919; Neale, 1990) specifically 
denies the idea that definiteness is directly related to givenness. Rather, 
Russell’s proposals about definites are that there is a unique object in the 
relevant context that satisfies the description.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
tasks, such as Sally-Anne. They also argue that the description of false-belief tasks should be 
framed in terms of Theory of Mind. Visual perspective-taking concerns a separate ability: to grasp 
that visual perception relies on the spatial arrangements of objects and the functioning of the 
eyes. 
In this thesis, I use ‘Perspective Taking Task’ to refer simply to the experimental tasks of the kind 
reported in the psycholinguistic literature reviewed. In line with Baron-Cohen et al., I sometimes 
use ‘speaker’s perspective’ to refer to their relevant mental states. Whenever visual 
perspective-taking is at issue, I use, ‘visual perspective-taking’.   
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To sum up this discussion, there are two views on definite 
reference. According to Clark & Marshall (1981), and others, definite 
expressions obey the common ground constraint: 
Common Ground Constraint: A definite expression is felicitous only if its 
referent is common ground when it is used. 
According to others, that follow Russell (see Neale, 1990), the 
denotation of a definite expression has to be unique. This leads to an 
identifiability constraint: 
Identifiability Constraint: The referent of a definite description is 
identifiable for the hearer, under the given 
description. 
In this thesis, the aim is not to adjudicate on whether Russell is 
right or whether some version of the givenness hypothesis is correct. Our 
aim is to establish the cognitive mechanisms for establishing the referent of 
a definite expression in on-line processing. In the rest of this section, I 
consider Clark’s motivation for his version of the common ground constraint, 
involving common knowledge of the target referent. I will also consider the 
phenomenon of so-called accommodation, and what that means for the 
use of common knowledge in on-line definite processes. 
 
1.2 The common knowledge constraint and accommodation – 
implications for models of referential processes. 
In the tradition of Russell, Grice (1957, 1982) remained unconvinced that 
common knowledge was necessary at all in communication, pointing out 
that for practical purposes, all that people are liable to make inferences 
about are what the other interlocutor may know or not know, what the other 
person knows about what oneself may know or not know and little more. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, this sentiment is echoed by Lewis himself (Lewis, 
1969: p.32). That is, Lewis recognised that for practical purposes, the 
warrant for a co-ordination decision would rarely involve more than a few 
iterations of what the other expects about what the self expects, what Lewis 
calls, ‘higher-order expectations’.  
So, if Lewis assumes that two agents are only likely to make 
inferences at relatively few levels of metarepresentation, why does he 
include common knowledge in his analysis of games of co-ordination? 3 
The answer is simply that he includes common knowledge only because he 
could not think of a case of such activity that did not seem to involve 
something like common knowledge (ibid: p. 59). In other words, Lewis does 
not argue that common knowledge features in social encounters involving 
co-ordination because it is necessary for common knowledge to be present. 
The claim is that it happens to be an ever-present feature of such 
encounters. In a similar vein, Sperber & Wilson (1986) include their version 
of common knowledge (mutual manifestness) into their definition of 
communication only because intuition suggests that communication 
involves a specific kind of ‘overtness’ or, ‘openness’ of the speaker’s 
informative intention that their notion of mutual manifestness is designed to 
capture. Thus, they propose that in communication, the speaker intends 
that the intention to inform is mutually manifest, but that is all. Regarding 
the intention to inform (and the intention to refer), this is not made mutually 
manifest but merely manifest.4 Lewis and Sperber and Wilson are not 
alone in this kind of view of ‘common knowledge’. Since the work of Grice, 
philosophers and psychologists report the intuition that acts of 
communication (Schiffer, 1972, Harman, 1977), and joint activities 
(Bratman, 1992; Tomasello et. al., 2005) are always accompanied by a 
                                                            
3 The topic of Lewis (1969) is convention, which Lewis analyses in terms of games of 
co-ordination. As Lewis explains, many kinds of social encounters pose problems of co-ordination 
among the agents involved. In communication using definite reference, there is a problem of 
co-ordination which is just the problem of the speaker choosing a definite form with an intended 
referent and the hearer inferring that the form has the same referent that the speaker intends.  
4 So, like Grice, Sperber and Wilson assume that when it comes to co-ordinating on definite 
reference, one takes higher-order thoughts about other’s thoughts into account only where 
necessary. 
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special type of ‘open awareness’, ‘overtness’ or ‘knowing-together’ that the 
Lewis’ theoretical concept of common knowledge, or variations on that 
have been used to describe.5 I will consider why common knowledge or, 
‘overtness’ seems to be an ever-present feature of communicative acts in 
later sections. 
 Lewis’ point of view stands in stark contrast to that put forward in 
Clark & Marshall (1981). There the argument is that common knowledge of 
the relevant facts for establishing a definite referent is necessary since 
otherwise interlocutors could not be certain that they are thinking about the 
same referent. Clark & Marshall argue that certainty about the referent is 
only guaranteed by an infinite sequence of higher order assumptions about 
the relevant facts and that it is natural and rational to require such certainty 
in conversation. But as mentioned above (see Paternotte, 2011) even 
ideally rational agents would not consider such certainty a realistic goal due 
to the known finite limitations of human perception, inference and memory. 
It is interesting that Clark & Marshall (1981) follow Lewis in proposing that 
environmental cues (such as co-presence) are used as the evidential basis 
of common knowledge of some fact. Thus Clark & Marshall (1981) 
proposals about how common knowledge is established and maintained 
are cognitively realistic. However, their motivation for why common 
knowledge should be a feature of definite references rests on assumptions 
that are not. 
So, if we have an account of common knowledge that makes it 
plausible that interlocutor’s keep track of relevant commonly known 
information, does that not mean that The Common Ground Constraint is 
plausible? As we are about to see, the phenomenon of accommodation 
means that the Common Ground Constraint cannot plausibly guide 
referential processes, it only describes their outcome. By contrast, we will 
                                                            
5 Other notable early attempts to define common (or ‘mutual’) knowledge are found in Schiffer 
(1972) and Aumann (1976). 
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see that Theory of Mind abilities are often required to be in play when 
psychological mechanisms for maintaining common ground could not. 
Suppose that Sue buys some cheddar cheese, brings it home and 
puts it in the fridge next to some mozzarella that is already there. Later her 
roommate Jane makes a dish. She asks Sue, ‘Can you pass me the 
cheese from the fridge’. Looking in the fridge, Sue sees two kinds of 
cheese. Since Sue was not there when Jane put mozzarella in the fridge 
and Jane was not there when Sue put the cheddar in the fridge, we can say 
that it is not common knowledge that either cheese is in the fridge. But Sue 
can infer that when Jane put mozzarella in the fridge, there was no other 
cheese in the fridge. So, Sue can see that from Jane’s perspective, ‘the 
cheese’ is felicitous since there is only one cheese in the fridge. These 
inferences, do not rely on what is common knowledge (since nothing is 
actually common knowledge) but they do rely on Sue making inferences 
about Jane’s mental state.  
Examples similar to this kind have been widely discussed in the 
theoretical literature on common ground and presupposition where it is 
proposed that there exists a mechanism of ‘accommodation’ that allows 
one to retrospectively introduce an object into common ground upon the 
use of a definite description (Stalnaker, 1974; 1978), and hence become 
common knowledge. So the proposal is that Jane expected Sue to 
retrospectively accommodate the mozzarella cheese as part of common 
ground when she hears, ‘the cheese’. While it is certainly clear that the 
mozzarella cheese becomes part of common ground (or common 
knowledge) once the utterance is made and understood, from a cognitive 
point of view, it could be argued that any mechanisms employed for 
maintaining common ground or common knowledge play no real role in 
establishing the referent of the noun phrase, since inferential work to 
establish the referent of the definite happens before the accommodation of 
the referent into common ground. At the same time, inferences about the 
speaker’s mental state (what she is likely to believe) including her 
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referential intentions (how the speaker is likely to expect the hearer to 
respond to her utterance) do play a critical role.  
As a rule, it could be argued that where accommodation of a 
definite referent occurs (as it often does), the cognitive process required to 
establish the referent does not call on processes involved in maintaining 
common ground (since the target is not in common ground). Of course can 
still accept that there are mechanisms for maintaining common ground and 
that common ground objects do figure prominently in referential processing 
(for both definite and indefinite descriptions). The point is only that, from a 
cognitive perspective at least, it is not necessary that an object be actually 
represented as common ground (or to be commonly known) to be a definite 
referent.  
There is however a further point about when common ground may 
play a role in referential processes. Consider an alternative scenario to the 
one above where both Jane and Sue put both the cheddar and mozzarella 
in the fridge together. Here it is common ground that both cheeses are in 
the fridge. Still, when making a dish that is known by both to require 
mozzarella cheese, it seems Jane can felicitously ask Sue to, ‘pass the 
cheese from the fridge’. Here, although it is common ground that there is 
no unique cheese in the fridge, there is just one cheese that is relevant to 
Jane’s current purposes. Thus, processes that determine how the 
utterance is relevant seem to further select from common ground. It seems 
then that, from a cognitive perspective, common ground is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for definite reference.  
The first example discussed above involved a case of so-called 
accommodation. In that case, what is accommodated is the existence of a 
specific referent for a definite description. Here the referent is identified by 
the hearer, Sue, via visual perception. Among Clark & Marshall’s 
categories of common knowledge, we also find common knowledge of 
some fact due to membership of some community or culture. For example, 
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common knowledge of the current US President. We can consider another 
example of accommodation in definite reference which involves such a 
‘cultural fact’. Consider now a case where it is common knowledge that 
Jane and Sue placed two cheeses (mozzarella and cheddar) in the fridge. 
Jane is preparing a dish that Sue is unfamiliar with but it seems to be 
according to an Italian recipe. It is not common ground between Jane and 
Sue that the recipe calls for mozzarella cheese. However, when Jane asks 
Sue to pass the cheese from the fridge, Sue can reason that the kind of 
dish Jane is preparing is much more likely to call for mozzarella than 
cheddar and she can see that Jane would expect her to see that. Thus, 
Sue reasons that the intended referent is the mozzarella cheese. In this 
case a piece of ‘background’ information necessary for establishing a 
referent is not in common ground (not commonly known) when the 
utterance is made. Inferences about Jane’s likely intentions and 
expectations are required to establish the relevant background information, 
but these inferences call on information that is not common ground. Once 
communication succeeds, however, the relevant piece of information (that 
the dish Jane is preparing calls for mozzarella) becomes ‘accommodated’ 
into common ground. 
 
In this section, I have argued against the idea that the Common 
Ground Constraint could apply in on-line processes for definite reference. 
That is, viewed in terms of cognitive processes, common ground or 
common knowledge would not be essential to referential processing. At 
best, it would serve only to provide a record of previous shared experience 
in conversation, once the referential and communicative intentions are 
established. Thus there are grounds, based on merely introspective 
evidence to discount common ground or common knowledge as being a 
factor in processes for definite reference. This is not to say, however, that 
something like common ground, at least, has a real presence in social and 
communicative interactions. There is reason to think that ‘common ground’ 
may be underpinned by distinctive cognitive mechanism that develop in 
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infancy and underpin social interactions generally. We turn to review this 
evidence next. 
 
2. The ‘openness’ of social interactions and shared attention 
In the last section, we considered theoretical accounts of common ground 
that attempt to analyse the notion in terms of some form of common 
knowledge, i.e. some form of (potential) mental state that is about the 
(potential) mental states of oneself and others. Thus, from a psychological 
perspective, common knowledge and common ground could be viewed as 
constructs relying on human abilities to represent and reason about others’ 
mental states.6 This ability is often referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) 
ability (Leslie, 1987). It was also mentioned that leading research on the 
place of common knowledge in social interactions diverges on the 
motivation for its presence. On the one hand, Clark & Marshall (1981) 
motivate a need for common knowledge on the basis of an argument about 
certainty: speaker and hearer cannot be certain they are thinking about the 
same referent unless it is common knowledge. But, as suggested in the last 
section, this line of thinking is flawed: Interlocutors can only attain certainty 
about co-ordination if common knowledge is defined along the lines of 
Aumann (1976), implying an infinite series of ever higher-order beliefs 
about the other’s higher-order beliefs. But it is not only not possible for 
cognitively finite individuals to attain such a state, an ideally rational, but 
cognitively limited agent would understand that it is incoherent to expect 
the parties involved to attain such a state. Thus absolute certainty about 
referents is not a goal that rational agents should expect.7 This is not to 
say that if agents have common knowledge, as Lewis defines it, they 
cannot adduce further support for their decision about a referent on the 
                                                            
6 Even if, as Lewis proposes, common knowledge of p by two agents does not require those 
agents to even represent p, it requires the agents to be able to represent the other’s beliefs and 
beliefs about beliefs etc. 
7 Note, this line of thought is consistent both with general skepticism about knowledge and with 
an acceptance that knowledge is possible. The argument is that even though knowledge by an 
individual may be possible, ideal mutual knowledge is not. 
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basis of that common knowledge. As Lewis (1969 pp.28-32) demonstrates, 
each higher-order expectation of the other agent’s higher-order expectation 
can provide a little further support for one’s decision in a co-ordination 
problem. But as we saw in the last section, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the referent of a definite description to be common knowledge 
and in fact, interlocutors rarely go beyond second- or third-order 
expectations in the process of seeking evidential support for a decision.  
In contrast to Clark & Marshall, Lewis (1969), Sperber & Wilson 
(1986) and many others motivate the presence of the ‘overtness’ or 
‘openness’ involved in co-ordination in social interaction based on 
introspective evidence alone. For communication, the idea is that cases 
where the communicator has an informative intention that is not in some 
way, ‘public’ or ‘overt’, are not intuitively felt to be cases of ‘communication’ 
in one key sense of that word. Assuming these philosophers’ and linguists’ 
intuitions are on the right track, the question is raised why we have this 
sense about human communication.  
One important part of the answer to this question comes from 
infant research. Csibra (2010) reviews a number of studies of infants 
between 0-12months. These studies reveal an acute sensitivity to 
‘ostensive cues’, such as eye contact, contingent behaviour (as found in 
turn-taking), and self-directed speech.8 For instance, a series of studies by 
Farroni and colleagues (Farroni et al., 2002, 2004) show that 4-5month old 
infants respond to shifts in eye-gaze only if they are engaged by direct eye 
contact prior to the shift of attention. Similarly, Johnson (2003) and 
Deligianni et al (2011) show that children respond to an agent’s ambiguous 
gesture as being communicative only when the agent engages in 
contingent, rather than independent, behaviour with the infant prior to the 
                                                            
8 Csibra talks in terms of ‘infant-directed speech’ as being an ostensive signal. However, it is not 
clear whether it is the distinctive prosodic properties of IDS that constitute the relevant cue or 
the fact that IDS is understood by an infant as speech directed at the self. Csibra adds to the list 
of cues for slightly older children the child’s name being uttered. Thus it could be it is speech that 
the child discerns as being directed to itself that is the cue, rather than any specific prosodic 
properties of IDS and that the child simply associates IDS prosody with self-directed speech. 
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gesture. Grossman et al., (2008) present a NIRS study revealing that 
regions of the infant brain activated by eye-contact correspond to key 
regions involved in processing communicative gestures. Based on such 
evidence, Csibra (2010) conjectures that infants have an innate 
pre-disposition or bias to process stimuli such as eye-contact as ‘ostensive 
signals’. These would be signals that infants simply decode as meaning 
that the agent of the signal has an informative intention, i.e. wants to 
convey some information. In Csibra & Gergely (2009), it is proposed that 
infants are biased to expect a specific type of relevant information by these 
ostensive signals. Thus for Csibra and colleagues, cues such as 
eye-contact or contingent behaviour stimulate an expectation in infants that 
they will receive relevant information.  
It is possible to question some of the details of Csibra’s proposal. In 
particular, it is an open question whether all of these stimuli are solely 
signals that the agent has a communicative intention. It could be, for 
instance, that contingent behaviour is a cue for shared interactions in 
general. It seems reasonable to wonder whether turn-taking could occur 
without any attendant communication, in for instance so-called joint action. 
This is a question of some interest in the literature on joint action and 
shared attention (see Carpenter & Liebal 2011). An alternative 
interpretation of the results reviewed by Csibra would be to say that these 
are cues to something like what Tomasello et al. (2005) call, ‘shared 
intentionality’. This is a state that applies to all kinds of interaction, 
regardless of whether it is specifically communicative. Tomasello et al. 
(2005) note that it is a feature of all such states that they are open in the 
same way, involving a feature termed, ‘knowing together’ (Tomasello’s 
version of common knowledge). 
But putting aside questions about the details of the theoretical 
proposal, it seems clear that infants do process stimuli differently 
depending on whether the stimuli are accompanied by these specific cues 
and that in many cases infants seem to treat the actions of the carer as 
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communicative. These same cues, or at least eye contact and contingent 
reactivity are present in what is termed joint attention in infants. Joint 
attention is among the earliest forms of ‘triadic’ behaviour where adult and 
infant share experience of a third object or event. It has been argued that 
joint attention is a critical pre-curser to common knowledge (Barwise, 
1988/1989; Peacocke, 2005) having the self-referential properties required 
to allow agents to infer as many levels of higher-order expectations as they 
need. In Barwise’s terms, shared attention among A and B to some object, 
x, involves A and B attending to the situation in which they both attend to x. 
This kind of ‘shared situation’ fulfils Lewis’s definition of a ‘reflexive 
common indicator’ that x is co-present and is, in Lewis’ theory, a basis for 
common knowledge of x’s co-presence. 
Note we assume, following Carpenter & Liebal (2011), Peacocke, 
(2005) among others, that attention in shared attention is an intentional 
activity. This suggests that to recognise an interaction as shared attention, 
one needs an operating Theory of Mind. However, there is a robust body of 
research pointing to the conclusion that infants engage in joint attentional 
activity long before their first birthday. We follow Peacocke and Carpenter 
& Liebal who accept this but assume that joint attentional activity engages 
a limited amount of Theory of Mind in very young infants. We believe that 
this is possible due to the fact that infants are disposed (perhaps innately) 
to respond to cues to shared attention. Csibra (2010) surveys a 
still-growing body of research showing that infants respond to eye contact, 
contingent reactivity and self-directed speech in a manner that suggests a 
bias to process the subsequent object of attention more deeply for 
relevance. In Barwise’s terms (see Barwise, 1988, 1989) when we share 
attention to an object situation, s, we both attend to s and attend to the 
broader situation in which we attend to s. Shared attention yields what 
Barwise terms a ‘shared situation’. It therefore seems to follow from infant 
social-cognitive research that humans have a specific receptivity to shared 
attentional cues that manifests itself in processing biases concerning the 
shared-situational source. It is useful here to draw a distinction between 
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having a concept and having a conception (see Fodor, 1998). To have a 
concept of x is to be able to reliably discriminate x. To have a certain 
conception of x is to be able to draw specific inferences about x. A child 
may have a concept of a car without any conception of the functioning of 
the internal combustion engine. Similarly, a child may have a concept of 
shared attention, be able to apply that concept in recognition of certain 
situations, but may not have a conception of its intentional nature until after 
12 months of age.9 
Thus in infant experience, cues to communication and potentially 
to other joint activities that require co-ordination are bound up with a 
specific joint activity that can explain our sense of openness or publicness 
cited by philosophers as being constitutive of communication and joint 
action. It seems a small step then to conjecture that our sense of what 
communication is stems from our developmental experience. 
Communication being an activity that not only results in a form of shared or 
joint attention to what is being communicated but seems to require joint 
attention to the act of communication itself. 
 
3. The effects of joint engagement on subsequent 
communicative processes 
If we consider research on the results of shared activities in slightly older 
infants, from their first birthday onwards, we can get a sense of the 
cognitive processes that are triggered by stimuli such as eye-contact and 
contingent behaviour. An important study demonstrating toddlers’ 
appreciation of what is shared and what is not is reported in Tomasello & 
Haberl (2003). Here 12-month-old infants share attention to two novel 
objects with an experimenter. In the subsequent absence of the 
                                                            
9 Note that in Section 1.1 above, I clarified that even though recognising the situational signs of 
shared attention may require Level-1 perspective-taking, this ability is distinct from Theory of 
Mind, as that is conceived in this thesis. 
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experimenter, the infant is given a third novel object with which to engage. 
All three objects are then placed together. In the test phase, the 
experimenter returns and gestures excitedly but ambiguously toward the 
three objects using only the singular demonstrative, ‘that’ to refer to an 
object. Tomasello & Haberl report that infants select the third, unshared 
object for the experimenter. This is interpreted as evidence that infants 
appreciate what might be novel for the experimenter. In a follow-up study, 
Moll & Tomasello (2007) used three groups of children in separate 
conditions. A shared interaction condition replicated the procedure of 
Tomasello & Haberl (2003), having the child and experimenter jointly 
interact with the first two objects. An individual engagement condition saw 
the child and the experimenter separately engage with each of the first two 
objects, although in each other’s presence. A third, on-looker condition saw 
the child engage with the first two objects alone while the experimenter was 
simply an on-looker. At test, it was found that for younger infants (14 
months old), only the joint engagement resulted in choosing the third object. 
For older, 18 month-old, infants also individual engagement resulted in the 
choice of the correct object, but not merely the presence of an on-looking 
adult. These results suggest that prior joint engagement plays a key role in 
allowing infants to take perspective. It is not clear from Moll & Tomasello 
(2007) however whether the perspective infants use is that of the 
experimenter them self or the previous ‘joint perspective’.  
That infants use individual agents as a cue to previous joint 
perspective is established in Liebal et al (2010). In this study, an infant 
would interact consecutively with two experimenters in two separate 
activities. At test, one of the experimenters would gesture toward an object 
that could be involved in either of the activities that the child has been 
involved in. Liebal et al. report that 14- and 18-month old infants interpret 
the gesture toward the object relative to the previous joint engagement with 
the experimenter that makes the gesture. This is even the case when the 
relevant activity was not the most recent activity that the child engaged in. 
The interpretation of these results is that infants use previous shared 
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experience as the source of relevance for the interpretation of a 
communicative gesture. This is the case even where that previous shared 
experience happens prior to a more recent, potentially relevant experience. 
The results suggest that the experimenter themselves acts as a very strong 
cue to re-activate the memory of the previous shared engagement, this is a 
phenomenon that is explored also in adult processing literature, to which 
we will return below. 
The results from Liebal et al (2010) and similar results reported in 
Southgate et al (2009) point to a mechanism whereby other agents can 
provide a strong cue to the reactivation of previous shared experience. A 
second follow-up to Tomasello & Haberl (2003) reported in Moll et al. (2011) 
tests the idea that lower-level mechanisms may be an important causal 
factor in the effect of previous joint engagement in providing relevant 
context for subsequent joint engagement. This study again uses a design 
based on Tomasello & Haberl where experimenter engages with the child 
interactively to explore two novel objects. In a second phase, the child is 
given a third novel object that the experimenter cannot see. In one 
condition, replicating Tomasello & Haberl’s procedure, the experimenter 
leaves the room during this second phase. In three other conditions, the 
experimenter remains present (though visual access to the third object is 
excluded) and/or engages with the child verbally whilst visually absent. Moll 
et al. found that two-year old children chose the correct item at a rate above 
chance in the silent absence condition (replicating Tomasello & Haberl 
2003). In the other conditions, children were not above chance, while rates 
of correct choice were significantly below those of the baseline condition in 
both of the presence condition (independently of whether the experimenter 
engaged with the child verbally). 
There are implications of this study for the question raised by the 
original results in Tomasello & Haberl (2003) – whether children succeed 
by considering the experimenter’s individual perspective, or they 
considered the gesture from the previous shared perspective. It seems that 
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the co-presence conditions in Moll et al.’s study provide sufficient cues to 
the child that their experience of the third object is shared with the 
experimenter, even though the child is made aware that the experimenter 
cannot see the third toy. This suggests that younger children succeed at 
this task by utilising previous shared perspective, as supported by lower 
level cues. That is, it would be a shared perspective that does not integrate 
information derivable through Theory of Mind reasoning (for otherwise the 
child knows that the third toy is novel for the experimenter). Thus 
something like shared perspective could be maintained via a lower-level 
system that relies on cues that come with interactions without necessarily 
integrating information that could be inferred using one’s theory of mind. It 
squares with the fact that infants throughout the first year of development 
rely on these cues in order to share experience and to perhaps provide 
access to relevant past experience.  
 
4. The cognitive foundations of common ground 
Csibra (2010) speculates that there is an innate set of biases in infant 
cognition that respond to certain cues (his ostensive signals) by devoting 
attentional resources to process information in the shared situation as 
highly relevant. Thus, any subsequent stimulus involving the agent that 
child has interacted with and that past shared situation is liable to become 
re-activated to a greater extent than information that may not have been 
previously attended to as shared, since unshared stimuli do not receive as 
much attention. Thus, if Csibra’s conjecture is correct, there is a cognitive 
basis for maintaining and prioritising a record of previous shared 
experience. Below, we will review research on memory-based mechanisms 
involved in language processing. We will propose that the cognitive biases 
found even in infancy modulate the functioning of memory mechanisms 
that make previously shared information accessible to language processes. 
The result is memory-based mechanism that priorities information that has 
been in previous shared attention. We term this, ‘cognitive common 
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ground’. Cognitive common ground pre-dates the earliest development of 
Theory of Mind (at the end of the first year) 10  and can function 
independently of Theory of Mind abilities, relying solely at first on 
lower-level biases.11  
In previous sections, we saw that shared, or joint, attention is also 
accompanied by these social (‘ostensive’) cues and that it can be shown 
that shared attention to some fact can serve as a basis for two people 
having common knowledge of that fact (Barwise, 1988/1989; Peacocke, 
2005), where ‘common knowledge’ is as defined in Lewis (1969) and 
assumed in the work of Clark (Clark 1996) and elsewhere. As discussed in 
Peacocke (2005), Tomasello et al. (2005) and Carpenter & Liebal (2011), 
joint or shared attention relies on cognitive abilities for representing 
intentional action but may not call on the full range of theory of mind 
abilities. Thus, shared attention is not only a basis for common knowledge, 
it is premised on more minimal cognitive abilities than common knowledge.  
The proposal then is as follows: there are cognitive mechanisms, 
that may not amount to more than processing biases, that are conditioned 
by certain social cues (eye-contact, contingent behaviour, self-directed 
utterances). These mechanisms are liable to produce a kind of 
proto-common ground independently of any cognitive abilities that are 
conceptually necessary for full-blown common knowledge. These biases 
are present in infants from a very early age and are conjectured to be 
innate. The situational cues are present in shared, or joint, attention and 
also early communicative or referential processes in infants. I conjectured 
                                                            
10 In this thesis, it is assumed that infants from just after the end of their first year are able to 
predict other agents’ actions based on a false belief (see Baillargeon & Scott 2010, Song & 
Baillargeon 2008; Southgate et al. 2010) and thus possess functional Theory of Mind abilities. We 
leave aside the question of the extent to which pre-schoolers are able to integrate Theory of 
Mind reasoning into everyday cognitive processes. 
11 The proposals here differ from two-level approaches to the functions served by ToM, as found 
in Apperly & Butterfill (2009). I do not assume here that there are proto-mental state concepts 
that track some but not all states classified fully fledged mental state concepts (although I do not 
rule it out). According to our view, concepts of shared attention track shared attention (an 
intentional activity) but in infants, those concepts are not associated with a conception of 
intention that allows for the full set of ToM inferences that link intentions with beliefs and 
desires. 
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that the apparent requirement that informative intentions be ‘open’ or ‘overt’ 
arises not because there is common knowledge of the informative intention 
but because there is shared attention to the informative act. It is of course 
possible to infer that a communicator’s informative intention is common 
knowledge on the basis of shared attention to the informative act (since 
shared attention to the informative act is a ‘reflexive common indicator’ of 
the informative intention), however this is not necessary and it is certainly 
not possible for infants before their first birthday, at least. 
This proposal has consequences for how we think of common 
ground and what role it might play in cognition. Before spelling those 
consequences out, the next section considers how Clark and colleagues 
propose that common knowledge of discourse relevant facts is established 
in cognition.  
 
5. Common knowledge in language processing 
As mentioned, there is a long tradition in psycholinguistic research based 
on ideas put forward in by Herb Clark and colleagues (Clark & Marshall, 
1978; Clark & Marshall 1981; Clark, 1996). According to this view, common 
ground is just the set of discourse-relevant pieces of information that are 
common knowledge and definite reference is rooted in what is common or 
mutual knowledge. From its earliest manifestation in Clark & Marshall 
(1978), there have been two important themes to this research. The first 
was discussed at length in previous sections and is the idea that common 
knowledge of a referent is necessary for interlocutors in order for 
successful co-ordination to be achieved, since otherwise interlocutors 
cannot be certain that they are thinking about the same referent. The 
second theme, also mentioned briefly above, has to do with how common 
knowledge is established and maintained. Clark & Marshall (1978, 1981) 
propose a number of heuristics that enable interlocutors to infer that a 
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referent is common knowledge to a reasonable inductive standard. Clark & 
Marshall also note that referents established in communication being 
common knowledge require a different kind of memory representation to 
that standardly assumed in computational circles at the time. Standard 
assumptions held that an object in memory is represented along with a list 
of properties, facts about the object gleaned from experience. Clark & 
Marshall (1978) note that a referent’s being common knowledge requires a 
kind of diary representation for objects in memory, encoding not only facts 
about that object but where given pieces of information were sourced; 
particularly through communicative or social interaction.  
In previous sections we considered at length whether common 
knowledge of definite referents is in fact a necessary standard for 
interlocutors to be sure that they have coordinated on the same object. The 
answer to that is that it is not. While it is often necessary to think about our 
interlocutors’ beliefs and expectations to establish a referent, common 
knowledge of a referent seems to be more a result of referential processes, 
rather than a pre-condition.12 
In the last section, it was argued instead that the presence of 
common knowledge in social interactions that involve co-ordination is due 
to a prior more primitive state of shared attention, supported in turn by 
lower-level cognitive biases triggered by social cues such as eye-contact, 
contingent behaviour and self-directed speech. The standard references 
on common ground in psycholinguistics are Clark &Marshall (1981) and 
Clark & Marshall (1978). They both propose that common knowledge of a 
referent is established through various heuristics. These heuristics are 
inspired by Lewis (1969) and determine what Lewis terms a ‘reflexive 
common indicator’ for common knowledge. They fall into three broad 
categories: co-presence, previous discourse and background or general 
                                                            
12 Note that, as discussed above, a cognitively realistic analysis of common knowledge should be 
understood in terms of potential mental states, rather than actual beliefs etc. Thus even if 
common knowledge, in this sense, is a product of referential processes, it does not follow that 
interlocutors make inferences about each others’ higher order expectations once reference is 
already established. 
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knowledge. In this section we will consider all three heuristics and show 
that in fact common knowledge of discourse-relevant information may be 
merely a bi-product of the maintenance of a common ground by lower-level 
mechanisms for social interactions and by shared attention.  
Let us first turn to co-presence heuristics. Clark & Marshall (1981) 
ask us to consider a scenario where two people face each other at a table 
with a candle standing in between. The idea is that the co-presence of the 
other agent together with salient object makes that object a candidate for 
common knowledge with that agent. However, Clark & Marshall are careful 
to stipulate that a co-presence heuristic would rely on shared attention to 
the salient object (for one of the two people may be lost in thought and not 
notice the candle in front of them). Thus co-presence heuristics really rely 
on there being shared attention to the object or event in the utterance 
situation. Thus the cues in question are really cues to shared attention to 
an object or event and agents need only be inferring shared attention of 
that object or event.13 Once it is inferred that the candle is in shared 
attention, common knowledge would follow.  
The second kind of heuristic relates to previous discourse. Clark & 
Marshall (1981) discuss the example of a speaker uttering a sentence 
containing an indefinite description, ‘a candle’. That utterance is able to 
introduce a new referent (the candle the speaker has in mind) into the 
discourse. Clark & Marshall’s proposed discourse-based heuristics simply 
exploit this kind of process to establish common knowledge of the referents 
so introduced. Again, from a more minimal perspective, we could say that 
utterances involve shared attention to the informative intention. Shared 
attention to the informative intention could subsequently lead to shared 
attention to the content of that intention. Thus, one could argue that the 
heuristic takes the interlocutors from the informative intention that is in 
                                                            
13 To reiterate a point made above, according to most authors, shared attention involves abilities 
to represent intentional states, not merely to recognise behavioural cues to those states (these 
being the cues to shared attention). See Carpenter & Leibal (2011), Peacocke (2005). 
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shared attention to shared attention to the content of that intention and 
hence to the candle introduced by the indefinite description.14 
The third heuristic relies on shared background or culturally 
available knowledge. Clark & Marshall (1981) use the example of a candle 
being introduced in discourse followed by the speaker producing an 
utterance containing the definite phrase, ‘the wick’. The idea is that speaker 
and hearer have shared background knowledge that candles have wicks. 
Heuristics based on such background knowledge allow that objects 
currently active in discourse can be linked to other referents via 
assumptions about the world that can be taken to be common knowledge. 
The problem with this heuristic is that it very often redundant, as where 
accommodation takes place in discourse. This is illustrated in some of the 
cheese examples discussed above and it can be illustrated with examples 
of bridging reference, due originally to Clark. For instance the sentence, 
‘Bill checked the picnic supplies and discovered that the beer was warm’ 
can be used where it is only common knowledge that Bill has picnic 
supplies (not their contents). The point about this example is that it need 
not be common knowledge that picnic supplies can contain beer, before 
the utterance is made. Arguably, the process by which the presence of the 
beer in the picnic becomes common knowledge involves inferences along 
the lines described in the cheese examples above: the hearer infers that 
the speaker expects the hearer to make a connection between picnics and 
beer and see that the utterance is relevant and informative if this 
assumption is made. While such inferences rely on making assumptions 
about the speaker’s expectations, beliefs etc., and hence Theory of Mind, 
the goal is not to infer what might be common knowledge but what the 
speaker might reasonably have intended. That it becomes common 
knowledge that picnics contain beer, or that Bill’s picnics typically contain 
beer, is an effect of the utterance, often intended by the speaker. 
                                                            
14 Note that the informative intention that the speaker introduce a certain candle into discourse 
is a mental state. Joint attention to that state is different from joint attention to the candle that is 
introduced. 
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To sum up, we have considered very influential proposals about 
how common knowledge of discourse-relevant facts is cognitively realised 
using heuristic processes. I have argued that when it comes to 
co-presence and prior discourse, what is established via heuristic 
processes is something closer to shared (or joint) attention to 
discourse-relevant facts. The third kind of heuristic links current referents to 
other referents via common background assumptions. Here I argued that 
this heuristic is largely ineffective since decisions about a referent in these 
cases rely more on inferences about the speaker’s intentions, assuming 
they are being co-operative, relevant and so forth. Background 
assumptions typically emerge as shared only as a result of the process of 
reference assignment. 
 
6. Proposal 
Let us take a step back and consider our ideas of common ground and its 
role in language processing. It is often taken for granted in the 
psycholinguistics literature and in the formal semantics literature that 
common ground is common knowledge of discourse relevant facts (Clark, 
1992; Stalnaker, 2002). Influential work on common knowledge (Barwise, 
1988/1989; Peacocke, 2005) has argued that in many key areas of human 
social interaction, including communication, common knowledge emerges 
as a result of a more basic relation of shared, or joint, attention.15 One can 
accept that it is possible to analyse common knowledge so that it is a 
cognitively realistic notion. This is done for instance in Lewis (1969) and 
Sperber & Wilson (1986). However, I have argued, contra Clark and 
colleagues, that common knowledge plays no effective role in the cognitive 
processes associated with coordinating on a referent for a definite 
description, although Theory of Mind abilities often do feature in such 
processes.  
                                                            
15 These authors are careful to not claim that common knowledge can only arise through shared 
attention.  
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We then considered three kinds of heuristic that Clark & Marshall 
propose enable interlocutors to establish common knowledge of 
discourse-relevant facts. As an aside it should be noted that it is necessary 
to suppose such heuristics exist since it is not cognitively plausible to 
establish common knowledge of some fact by checking each of an infinite 
series of higher-order expectations, i.e. via Theory of Mind reasoning. It 
was argued that two key heuristics (based on co-presence and previous 
discourse) arguably establish shared attention to such facts, as a step on 
the way to common knowledge of such facts. The third heuristic (based on 
background knowledge) is often ineffective, relying on pragmatic inference 
about the speaker’s informative intention based on ideas of co-operation 
and relevance to establish the background information as shared as a 
bi-product of referential processes.  
At this point, it seems reasonable to dissociate the idea of common 
ground from common knowledge. In continuity with the development of 
cognitive processes in infancy, we should view common ground as that 
information which is, or has been, the target of shared attention. Cognitive 
mechanisms for common ground are sensitive to cues to shared behaviour, 
such as eye contact, contingent behaviour and self-directed speech and 
are likely to include simple biases that devote greater attention to 
information made manifest when such cues are present. Rather than being 
a necessary constraint on referential processing, common ground among 
interlocutors emerges as a result of such processes.  
An observation to make here, that will be relevant below, is that 
cognitive mechanisms for common ground do not necessarily call on 
Theory of Mind inferences needed for inferences about higher-order 
expectations. In fact, Theory of Mind abilities are involved in establishing 
common ground only in as far as they are involved in the referential 
processes that feed into determining the pool of shared information in 
common ground, as in the cases of accommodation (the picnic example 
and some of the cheese examples above). Indeed, this is a point on which 
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we can agree with Clark and colleagues. Even Clark & Marshall’s heuristics 
for establishing common knowledge place virtually no burden on systems 
that might be involved in ToM inference. Thus the role of Theory of Mind 
abilities, the abilities for making inferences about higher order beliefs or 
expectations, about what one’s interlocutor knows and does not know, or 
has a false belief about do not play a significant role in maintaining 
common ground, whether common ground is conceived of in terms of 
common knowledge or in terms of more basic shared attention and 
lower-level mechanisms. We shall return to this point below. 
In the next chapter, we turn to consider recent work on 
co-ordination in conversations that takes a more mechanistic approach to 
how it is achieved. These proposals generally invoke domain-general 
mechanisms for memory and priming and may seem to be set against the 
spirit of social-cognitive approaches to conversation, such as that being 
defended in this thesis, and also against the spirit of Clark’s alternative. 
The chapter will explore where the differences may lie. 
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Chapter 2: Memory-based mechanisms for common 
ground. 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we focused on widely discussed ideas about how 
agents co-ordinate on referents in conversation. These ideas stem from the 
philosophical and linguistics literature and make a link between a notion of 
shared information, ‘common ground’, and common knowledge. We saw 
that ‘common knowledge’ as set out in Lewis (1969) is one particular 
description of how a co-ordination process could satisfy our intuitions that 
such processes are ‘open’. We argued that there are more minimal 
accounts of openness in communication in terms of shared, or joint, 
attention (Barwise, 1988/1989; Peacocke, 2005) and that these more 
minimal accounts have a better fit with developmental data, which suggest 
that low-level mechanisms mediate infants’ inferences about novelty and 
familiarity. The sketch provided in Chapter 1 introduced the idea that 
processing biases yielded relatively more attention to the contents of 
shared events than unshared events. My proposal in that chapter assumed 
the existence of memory mechanisms that use the identity of an agent as a 
cue to memories of past shared experience. In this chapter, we will review 
research that explores how memory mechanisms might function to 
promote the salience of previously shared experiences with an interlocutor. 
This research has largely been presented as evidence for the thesis that 
simple domain-general memory mechanisms are responsible for a kind of 
de facto common ground. Thus, memory-based models for common 
ground are similar to the one being proposed in this thesis. One important 
difference however lies in views of the domain-specifity of the mechanisms. 
According to the proposal I am defending here, memory based 
mechanisms are constrained by social-cognitive factors, to do with shared 
attention, and low-level social cues at the memory coding phase. This 
chapter will present two experiments that challenge the domain generality 
of memory-based mechanisms for common ground and provide evidence 
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that these mechanisms are constrained by the relevant social-cognitive 
factors. 
 
2. Shared information in memory and processing 
In Clark & Marshall’s proposals, the triple co-presence (the speaker, the 
addressee, and the referent) is saved in the memory system called 
referential diary. The diary is "our own personal experience, supplemented 
by cultural histories and atlases for cultural co-presence and by various 
reference texts for indirect co-presence" (Clark & Marshall, 1978). The 
interlocutors refer to the diary when they make and interpret utterances. In 
Clark & Marshall’s theory, felicitous conversation based on the common 
ground is mediated by memory mechanisms that code separately the 
source of information, as well as the information itself. During a 
conversation, interlocutors trace their episodic memory to coordinate their 
language use. 
In recent times, various memory-based models of co-ordination in 
dialogue have been proposed that may seem to be strong competitor to 
Clark’s theory. Memory-based models stress the role of an emergent 
property of ordinary memory processes in language use. In this section, we 
will focus on work by Horton, Gerrig and colleagues which proposes that 
assessments of common ground are mediated via low-level automatic 
memory mechanisms, with an occasional strategic communality 
assessment (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b; Horton, 2007).16 In particular, 
a wide range of information, including the identity of the interlocutors, is 
encoded in the memory representation of an utterance event. During a 
conversation the identity of the interlocutors primes the related information 
in the episodic memory. A speaker plans their utterance based on the 
                                                            
16 We acknowledge that similar proposals have been made by Garrod & Pickering (see Garrod & 
Pickering, 2009, Pickering & Garrod, 2004). These are similar in that the see low-level 
mechanisms such as priming as playing a significant role in co-ordination in conversation.   
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activated memory related to their interlocutors, and the audience 
comprehends the utterance based on the memory related with their 
interlocutors as well (Horton, 2007).  
The memory-based model claims that the accessibility of the 
memory plays an important role in language use. Through analyzing the 
CallHome English Corpus, Horton and Gerrig (2005a) explored two 
processes in conversation: commonality assessment, in which information 
is retrieved from memory concerning what information is shared with an 
addressee; and message formation, which decides how to use that 
information in conversation. A well-designed utterance and accurate 
comprehension are established on a basis of memory representation. To 
be specific, when contextual cues largely overlapped with original encoding 
context, the memory retrieval of the overlapped information will occur to 
facilitate language processing. Horton and Gerrig (2005) explored this 
memory association effect. Here, participants were required to map cards 
with two persons. In an Orthogonal card condition each person was 
mapped to separated card categories (eg, person A mapped to all bird 
cards and all dog cards; person B mapped to all fish cards and all frog 
cards), in contrast to an Overlapped card condition where two persons 
were mapped to all the card categories (eg, person A mapped to bird card 
1 and card 2, dog card 1 and card 2, fish card 1 can card 2, frog card 1 and 
card 2; person B mapped to bird card 3 and 4, dog card 3 and 4, fish card 3 
and 4, frog card 3 and 4). In other words, in the former condition 
participants only had to remember the category-partner association, but in 
the latter condition they had to remember the comparatively heavy loaded 
item-partner association. After a few familiarization trials, a test phase 
happened with old combination trials (eg, person A mapped to bird card 1 
and 2) and new combination trials (eg, in the Orthogonal card condition 
person A mapped to fish card 1 and 2, and in the Overlapped card 
condition person A mapped to bird card 3 and 4) (for details, see table 1). 
The results were consistent with the supposition that participants in the 
Overlapping condition would exert more effort, in that they showed a trend 
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for a longer time to initiate their descriptions of new versus old cards. They 
also analyzed the reconceptualization that participants adjusted their 
previous expressions. For example, in this experiment a bird was described 
as “a perched bluejay” in one round, and “a bluejay that’s perched without 
the legs” in a following round. The latter expression was reconceptualized 
by adding “without the legs” to the former one. It was found that in the 
Orthogonal condition directors generated more reconceptualizations for 
new versus old cards than in the Overlapping condition, and it may be due 
to fewer memory burdens in the former condition (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). 
The participants were supposed to be associated with each item equally if 
there was not any character-card association. However, the difference 
between the Orthogonal and Overlapping condition indicated that the 
different accessibilities of memory representation greatly influenced 
people's speech. Although this study is a more memory task than a 
dialogue task, the results revealed a speaker-referent associative effect, 
and it is possible that the effect is widely used in the real-world dialogue.  
 
Table 2. 1. Sample card distribution in Horton and Gerrig 2005 study.  
 
(Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, p. 132) 
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In the memory-based model the accessibility of memory 
representation is highly influenced by partner-based cues. “The ease with 
which speakers could access partner-specific associations would greatly 
influence the extent to which evidence for audience design would emerge 
in their utterances (Horton, 2007).” Speakers design their utterance based 
on the available memory primed by their audience, and the audience 
comprehend the utterance also based on the assumption of partner-based 
audience design. The stronger the association between their interlocutors 
and information is, the easier the retrieval of this particular information is. 
(Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b). For example, supposing a scenario in 
which interlocutors A and B are discussing an event E in which character A 
and B participated. The event E will be easily accessible when A and B 
subsequently interact, because the event E is saved in an episodic memory 
with the character A and B together, and the identity of A and B activated 
the memory of the event E. But when A and another interlocutor C discuss 
the event E, the memory representation of the event E will be less 
accessible, because the conversational partner B provides stronger cues 
than C to retrieve the elements in this event. This character-based memory 
effect can also be found in different forms of language processing. In text 
processing, characters in the text also serve as memory cues to 
information associated with them (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Greene, Gerrig, 
McKoon, and Ratcliff, 1994; Rawson, 2004). In broken precedent research 
in which a familiar precedent is substituted by a novel expression in a 
following conversation, participants are usually slower to respond when the 
same speaker uses a novel expression, compared with a different speaker 
(Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Matthews, Lieven & 
Tomasello, 2010).  
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Figure 2. 1. A sample display of Horton and Slaten 2012’s study.  
This chart illustrates one of the conditions: between-speaker condition, where two 
speakers introduced two different pictures. The study examined whether 
participant linked the pictures to specific speaker in the association phase. 
(Horton & Slaten, 2012, p.115) 
 
It has also been proposed that this cue-based system functions on 
a basis of domain-general memory processing. Regarding the most 
influential cue – the speaker-specific cue, memory retrieval comes from the 
compound voice and visual property of specific interlocutors. Horton and 
Slaten (2012) explored whether speaker-specific information facilitated 
participants' anticipation for a potential referent. In their task, in a first 
47 
 
association phase two different pictures were associated with each 
speaker (e.g., speaker A with "cat that's drinking milk" vs. speaker B with 
"cat that's sitting up"). In a following test phase participants were presented 
the same sentence as the previous phase (e.g., "click the cat that's drinking 
milk"). They analyzed participants' fixations on the target "cat" before the 
disambiguous phrase "that's drinking milk" unfolded. In a same-speaker 
condition the following phrase referred to the old matched object as the first 
phase (e.g., A with "cat that's drinking milk). In a different speaker condition 
it referred to the new switched object (eg, A with "cat that's sitting up") (see 
figure 2.1). The results revealed a partner-facilitating effect in that 
participants largely anticipated the old matched picture when they heard 
the critical ambiguous noun. In the first experiment two speakers were in 
different genders, so it was possible that the shared knowledge (gender) 
was the cue for memory retrieval. It is noteworthy that in the following 
experiment with the same setup, when two speakers had the same gender, 
participants still demonstrated the same performance pattern as the first 
experiment. It indicated that it was the speaker-specific cues, such as the 
voice and facial information, that primed the encoded information. It 
indicates that the gender information did not play a determinative role as 
the specific property of the speaker cue did, even though the gender 
information may assist processing the specific speaker cues.   
Memory-based theory suggests that low-level ordinary memory 
processes mediate common ground, rather than something more like 
explicit memory. The main evidence comes from a lack of correlation 
between an implicit partner-specific memory and an explicit memory 
recognition task (Horton & Gerrig, 2005b; Horton & Slaten, 2012; Horton, 
2007). In Horton’s 2007 first study, participants attempted to generate 
exemplar word (e.g., banjo) under directors' category hints (e.g., a musical 
instrument). Two directors assigned different items (e.g., director A 
assigned items “banjo”; director B assigned items “harp”) in the same 
category. In a following picture naming task, item pictures were allocated 
by either the same director (e.g., director A assigned items “banjo”), or a 
48 
 
different director (e.g., director A assigned items “harp”), or not mentioned 
(e.g., director A assigned a new item) (see Table 2.2). They found a shorter 
naming latency for items with the same partner compared to with the 
different partner, and revealed the partner-based memory influenced the 
language production. In a last partner identification task participants 
attempted to identify whether the item appeared in the first task and with 
which director it was associated. No significant correlation was found 
between the explicit partner-specific memory in the final task and 
partner-specific priming in the picture naming task, which indicated that 
common ground is applied by low-level memory mechanisms (Horton, 
2007). Tasks such as these demonstrate that participants retrieved their 
memory primed by a specific partner, but their performance of specifying 
the specific partner in an explicit recognition task is entirely unrelated 
(Horton & Gerrig, 2005b; Horton & Slaten, 2012). 
Table 2. 2. Sample task phases and items in Horton 2007 study. 
 
(Horton, 2007, p.1120) 
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In summary, the kind of memory-based model proposed by Horton 
and colleagues sees a key process for recovering shared information as 
being based on the memory system. This could be seen to contrast with a 
model built out of Clark & Marshall’s co-presence heuristic, whose 
diary-like representations may be seen to be explicit. Instead the 
memory-based model emphasizes low-level automatic memory 
associations. In this model, an automatic cue-priming process happens in a 
retrieval process, after a wide range of contextual information is resonant 
with an encoding process, and the whole process is implicit. Besides, what 
determined the activation of the memory representation is the contextual 
cue. When it comes to the cue, the most influential one is the identity of the 
conversational partner. A conversational partner may activate a wide range 
of information through a domain-general memory association. The extent 
to which information is employed is determined by the salience and 
relevance of speaker cues. Therefore, when speaker-specific information is 
strong enough to pass a threshold of activation, addressees will employ the 
activated memory representation to make an inference. Similarly, the 
speaker includes audience design in his speech based on the partner-cued 
memory representation. This fast implicit calculation contributes to the 
successful co-ordination in conversation.  
In contrast to how low-level memory mechanisms might make 
available potentially shared information, the standard interpretation of Clark 
& Marshall’s proposals suggests a more resource-intensive and explicit 
process. In Clark’s co-operative heuristics, interlocutors have to establish a 
rich common ground regarding what the interlocutors commonly know, 
what they said, what they can see, and so on. All that information is saved 
into a rich and diary-like episodic memory. To retrieve the information, 
people have to retrieve information from their episodic memory. To 
maintain a felicitous conversation, people need to keep checking the 
memory reservoir. But considering the time pressure of the dialogue, it is 
hard to examine all the information in online language processing.  
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In contrast to the standard interpretation of Clark & Marshall’s 
suggestions, we considered an alternative view of common ground in 
earlier sections which sees social cues and shared attention to previous 
utterance content as providing the basis of a record of previous shared 
information. The proposal relies on the idea that, relatively speaking, more 
attention is devoted to information in the ‘shared situation’ created by 
shared attention. This information includes who the other agent is and what 
is attended to. In terms of verbal communication, this translates as who the 
speaker is and the content of previous utterances.  
Without the constraint of shared engagement, people can establish 
unlimited association between a token and contexts, which is unrealistic for 
the human being. Hence, the conversational partners can be considered as 
one of the most important contexts for establishing common ground, 
because they are easily distinguished from the other domain-general 
contexts due to their social property (Brown-Schmidt, 2015). The 
attentional relevance from the conversational partner determines which 
information is encoded and to which extent it is encoded. The encoded 
information is represented as a gradient way depending on the salience 
and relevance of shared information (Brown-Schmidt, 2012). The more 
salient and relevant the partner-associated information is, the stronger the 
association is formed.  
In sum, the memory-based model proposes a low-level processing, 
which means that the processing is automatic and cognitive resource free. 
It does not propose that people necessarily process the rich and diary-like 
memory, as Clark and Marshall suggested. It also does not propose that 
people need make an inference of mental states. It indicates that 
perspective-taking occurs in an ordinary memory processing during which 
the related information is activated by the contextual cues. In this way the 
extent to which the shared information is used relies on the weight of the 
cue-based memory.  
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What evidence supports the low-level process? In Horton and 
Gerrig’s (2005a) study and Horton and Slaten’s (2012) study, participants 
all demonstrated a speaker-specific memory facilitated their referential 
anticipation in the tasks. However a following explicit memory task did not 
show any correlation between their performance on the referential task and 
the memory task. Participants might activate speaker-related referents 
without explicitly remembering the speaker-referent association. These 
results indicate that memory encoding and retrieval all occurred in an 
implicit way.  
 
3. Speaker-specific cues in memory retrieval 
In memory-based models speaker-specific cues play a vital role. The 
memory-based model suggests associations made in memory between 
interlocutors and specific events become re-activated in subsequent 
interactions. Although it is proposed that this is a result of domain-general 
processing, the speaker is the most influential cue in the memory. This 
speaker-specific cue is also appropriate to explain the complexity of the 
perspective-taking, based on the salience of the cue. However, it brings 
some challenge on the memory-based model. 
First, the evidence did not differentiate the effect of common 
ground and the speaker-specific cue. For example, in Horton and Slaten 
2012’s study, a speaker A was associated with the description "the cat 
that's drinking milk” in an association memory stage. In the following test 
stage participants demonstrated a speaker-specific performance, that is, 
when they were having a conversation with the speaker A, the memory 
representation of "cat that's drinking milk” was automatically retrieved. 
They largely anticipated the old match – speaker A associated with "cat 
that's drinking milk”. The evidence revealed that the speaker is a cue for 
related memory retrieval. However, it is also possible that the referent "cat 
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that's drinking milk" became in the common ground between participants 
and the speaker A in the test stage, in light of the models proposing the 
common ground as a specific entity. It is not clear to distinguish whether 
the common ground or the speaker cue results in the anticipation of the 
target referent. Therefore, how information is encoded in memory and 
retrieved in the processing of perspective taking need to be further 
explored. 
Second, Horton's memory-based model is mostly based on the 
non-conversational memory task, although participants attempt to 
formulate utterance at the word level. As they suggested that the memory 
representation is an ordinary property encoded and retrieved in a same 
manner as other cognitive processes, the experiments they conducted are 
more like a memory task than a language task. In this way, the evidence 
supporting the view that memory representation in the language use is 
implicit and automatic could have better foundations. Putting the model in 
conversation, it is sometimes hard to distinguish the speaker-specific 
association and the referent-expression memory. For example, Kronmüller 
and Barr (2007) showed that previous expressions (conversational 
precedents) prevented people to map new expressions to an old familiar 
referent. Listeners used the speaker information to inhibit the preempted 
expressions -- the speaker effect. But this speaker effect happened later 
and thus it is a distinct process to the precedent recovery. So whether the 
speaker-specific effect is generally applicable to language processing need 
to be further explored.  
Regarding the first point, a way to differentiate the speaker-specific 
effect in a memory-based model and the constraint to Clark’s common 
ground is to manipulate the speaker-specific effect on a basis of consistent 
common ground. As will be reviewed in the next chapter, prominent models 
used to explain behaviour in perspective-taking tasks predict that 
participants should demonstrate a binary performance depending whether 
the common ground information is accessed in referential decision 
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processes. For example, in the perspective-adjustment model proposed by 
Keysar and colleagues (Keysar et al., 2000) people take all information 
available to them into account first and adjust later. In other models 
common ground knowledge can be processed at first. It will be hard to 
explain the evidence that under the same background people demonstrate 
different performance, depending on memory associations cued to the 
speaker. That is to say, when interlocutors shared the same information, 
they should be consistent in perspective taking depending on the 
assessment of the shared knowledge. But the memory-based model 
predicts that if the participants associate privately viewable objects with the 
speaker, this could affect on-line decision processes. In the next sections I 
will present our first set of experiments on this hypothesis. Additionally, the 
studies to be reported below will present a visual-world conversational task. 
This offers an advance in terms of evidence for memory-based models 
since most of the evidence from Horton was based on non-linguistic 
memory tasks or other offline tasks.  
 
4. Experiment 1 
This section will present the first of two experiments exploring perspective 
taking when the common ground keeps consistent across two interlocutors. 
In the present study, a visual-world experiment is based on the design in 
Keysar et al (2000) and many subsequent studies. Participants are asked 
to move objects around a 3*3 grid by an instructing speaker while being 
eye-tracked. Three of the nine grid positions are boxed off on one side so 
that objects in those positions are only visible to the participant. The other 
six positions are in common view. See Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2. 2. The example display for the main game grids in Experiment 1.  
Participants can see any objects in all the nine positions. The instructor sees the 
grid from the opposite side and the three objects in the private grey grids are not 
visible (here, the banana, the orange, and the strawberry). 
 
Three of the common positions contain commonly viewable objects 
and the other three are empty. As in previous studies, critical trials involve 
an instruction like, ‘Move the apple to the bottom middle’ where the target 
object (in this case, the apple) is in common ground. In one condition, there 
is another apple (a competitor) among the three objects viewable only to 
the participant (in privileged ground). In another condition, none of the 
three privileged-ground objects is of the same type as the target 
(non-competitor distractors). As is common in these studies (see Ferguson 
& Breheny, 2011), the dependent variable is a log-transformed measure 
due to the fact that analyzing eye-gaze data directly on a proportion scale 
can lead to a distortion of effects (Barr, 2008). Thus a target advantage 
score which is the natural log of the proportion of fixations to the target 
divided by the proportion of fixations to the competitor/non-competitor 
distractor. I.e. DV = ln(P(Target)/P(Comp). In previous studies, a smaller 
target advantage score has been found in early time windows for the 
competitor condition compared to the distractor condition - suggesting that 
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participants are not entirely able to ignore an object that fits the referential 
description even though it is not in common ground (it is in privileged 
ground). Let us call a smaller target advantage score for the competitor 
condition, competitor interference. According to memory-based accounts 
mentioned above (Horton, 2007; Horton & Slaten, 2012) we should expect 
to find a greater competitor interference to the extent that participants 
associate privileged positions with the speaker. 
To test this hypothesis, we use two ways of referring to objects in 
the grid. In previous studies, reference is normally made using type-based 
descriptions. I.e. descriptions make reference to the type of object (‘the 
apple’, ‘the dog’, ‘the triangle’). Another way to refer to objects in the grid is 
by a location-based description. For example, ‘the object in the top right 
position’. Using location-based descriptions, unlike type-based descriptions, 
a speaker can give an instruction about an object that they cannot see. For 
example, the speaker could refer to the banana in Figure 2.2 as, ‘the object 
in the top left position’ while it is common ground that the speaker does not 
know what that object is. In our study, 24 filler instructions use 
location-based instructions. However, in one condition, all instructions refer 
only to objects in common ground - this includes location-based filler 
instructions. In another condition, two thirds of location-based fillers make 
reference to privileged ground objects. We call the common-ground only 
condition the homogeneous condition. We call the condition where the 
speaker gives instructions about both common ground and privileged 
ground objects the heterogeneous condition. In both conditions, critical 
items are the same and they all involve type-based descriptions of objects 
in common ground, as in previous studies.  
A prediction of the memory based account is that we will see more 
competitor interference in the heterogeneous condition than in the 
homogeneous condition. This is because in the heterogeneous condition, 
the speaker refers to privileged positions and so a greater association will 
build up in memory between the speaker and privileged positions than in 
56 
 
the homogeneous condition where the speaker does not refer to the 
privileged ground positions. This should cue the participant to attend to the 
privileged areas while being given instructions. 
According to a domain-general, memory-based account, we can 
operationalize this design in a number of ways, as long as the 
contingencies that are available in the context of the experiment provide 
the same strength of cue for the participant. To test this hypothesis, we 
introduce a third variable which manipulates the type of contingency. In one 
condition, we use two speakers (one male, one female). One speaker gives 
instructions for the homogeneous condition and one gives instructions for 
the heterogeneous condition. In a second condition, only one speaker 
gives instructions but each instruction is accompanied by one of two sets of 
physical cues (a colour and a sound). For the homogeneous condition 
instructions, the participant sees and hears one set of colour and sound, for 
the heterogeneous condition instructions, the participants sees a second 
set of colour and sound. The prediction is that, to the extent that the 
contingencies in the heterogeneous conditions would provide an equally 
reliable cue for memory retrieval, there should be no effect of cue type. 
As will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter, widely 
discussed models of perspective taking (such as perspective-adjustment 
models and constraint-based models) do not make a prediction about the 
effect of manipulating association (homo- vs. heterogeneous instructions). 
However, without any further assumptions about low-level memory factors, 
these accounts predict no difference between association conditions.  
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4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
43 participants (8 male and 12 female in the human cue condition; 9 male 
and 14 female in the physical cue condition) were recruited from UCL’s 
participant pool. Two UCL students were recruited to play the speaker role. 
These students were blind to purpose of the study. All were paid or given 
course credit for their participation. 
 
4.1.2. Stimuli and design 
Participants were given instructions to move objects around a 3*3 grid as in 
Figure 2.2 above, where three objects were in common ground between 
the instructing speaker and hearer and three objects were placed in grid 
positions so that they were only visible to the hearer (privileged ground). 
Except for the training phase where participants were given a turn at being 
director, all instructions were given by a confederate speaker. These 
instructions were pre-recorded in a single session with each of the two 
confederates who worked on the study. Thus each participant in a given set 
of conditions heard the same pre-recorded instructions. 
For each trial, a new set of objects appeared on the display. Each 
such set contained objects belonging to one of three categories: fruit, 
animals or geometric shapes. There were ten different pictures for each 
category and some were paired in the same subtypes. For example, 
among the fruits, there were two apples, two bananas, and two oranges. 
Six pictures were randomly chosen for each trial of the experiment, except 
for the competitor condition where two pictures from the same subtypes 
were presented. For instance, competitor condition item might contain a 
picture of a banana, cherries, grapes, an orange, and two different apples, 
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while for the matched non-competitor condition one of the twinned objects 
was replaced by a new object, for example, a strawberry (Fig. 2.3). 
A trial consisted of one instruction where the participant was asked 
to move an object to a location. For example, ‘Move the apple to the bottom 
middle’. There were 24 critical trials and 24 filler items in each association 
condition. In 12 critical trials (competitor condition), the privileged objects 
included one that was the same type as (although not visually identical to) 
the target in the instruction (an apple). In the other 12 critical trials 
(non-competitor distractor condition), no privileged object was of the same 
type as the target object. Figure 2.3 below shows initial set ups for a pair of 
trials in competitor and non-competitor conditions. 
 
  
Figure 2. 3. The initial display for the competitor condition (left) and 
non-competitor condition (right) in Experiment 1.  
In this example, the target green apple had competitor with the same subtype, e.g. 
a red apple, (competitor condition) or an irrelevant non-competitor, e.g. a 
strawberry, (non-competitor) in participants' privileged grid.   
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The 24 filler items involved location-based instructions, ‘Move the 
one in the bottom left to the middle right’. In a homogeneous association 
condition, all 48 instructions were targeted at objects in common ground. In 
a heterogeneous condition, 18 of the 24 location-based filler instructions 
were targeted at privileged ground objects.  
Association was operationalized in two different ways in a between 
groups cue-type manipulation. In a social-cue condition, two different 
speakers (one male, one female) gave instructions in the same session. 
One speaker gave instructions that referred to common ground objects 
only (homogeneous condition) and one speaker gave instructions that 
referred to both common and privileged ground objects (heterogeneous 
condition). The gender of the speaker in each condition was 
counterbalanced across the experiment. In a physical-cue condition, one 
speaker gave all 96 instructions for the session. For half the instructions, 
the frame showing the speaker had a yellow border and individual 
instructions were preceded by a ringing sound, while half the instructions 
had the speaker’s image in a green border and a distinctively different 
buzzing sound preceded them. One set of these physical cues 
accompanied homogeneous instructions while the other set accompanied 
the heterogeneous instructions. These were counterbalanced across the 
experiment. 
To sum up, the experiment had a 2 (competitor) * 2 (association) * 
2 (cue type) design. Altogether, each session with a participant involved 96 
trials, 48 delivered in the homogeneous and 48 in the heterogeneous 
condition. The order of presentation of trials was randomised. Cue-type 
was a between subjects manipulation. So a participant either had 
instructions from two different people (social-cue condition) or one person 
but with two sets of colours and sounds (physical cue). 
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4.1.3. Procedure 
In each session, a participant was seated in front of a 17” screen fitted with 
Tobii X60 eye-tracking equipment in a room with only the experimenter. 
They were told that they would be interacting with a person located in 
another part of the college via a video link. Prior to a training phase, 
participants were given some initial instructions. All instructions were given 
verbally by one of the confederate speakers via video appearing on the 
monitor in front of the participant. The speakers told the participants that 
they would play a game where they should follow the speaker’s instructions 
to move objects around a grid. They were then shown how the screen 
would be set up at the beginning of each trial. See Figure 2.4.a.  
In figure 2.4.a, the 3*3 grid appears on the left of the screen. It is 
empty. On the right there is a shelf which contains three objects. In the 
training phase at the beginning of a session, the speaker tells the 
participant that these are their private objects that she/he does not know 
what they are or care what they are. The speaker instructs the participant 
that they should move these objects to the private positions on the 3*3 grid 
and then click on the image of the speaker in the top right hand corner of 
the screen when they are ready. When the participant has completed this 
task, they click on the image of the instructor and a bell sound is hear. The 
instructor then makes three objects appear in common view on the grid. 
The visual display now appears as in Figure 2.4.b. The instructor then 
gives one instruction to move an object to a new location. When this is 
completed by the participant, they click the ‘NEXT’ button on the bottom 
right of the screen and the whole procedure begins again for the next trial. 
In the next part of the training phase, the participant experienced a 
few trials from the instructor’s perspective. They saw the empty grid with 
three blocked-off shelves, as in Figure 2.4c. Then they heard a bell sound 
and clickd “SHOW”. Then the common objects appear. One object is 
marked with a red star and one of the empty grid positions is marked with a 
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blue star. Participants are instructed to tell the other person to move the 
marked object to the marked empty position. This part of the training 
procedure ensures that participants understand that the instructor does not 
see the common objects. 
The participant then returns to the role of the listener and the 
experiment begins. Note that, on each new trial, the three private grid 
positions appeared in different, randomly assigned locations around the 
nine frame grid. After every two or three trials, participants had an 
opportunity to break prior to re-calibration of the eye-tracking equipment. 
Note also that the trial order was fixed across both groups. It was 
constructed using a randomised order except that three location-based 
fillers were placed among the first ten trials, prior to the occurrence of the 
first heterogeneous test trial. 
 
  
a. b. 
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c. 
Figure 2. 4. The initial procedure for each trial in Experiment 1.  
Participants were firstly required to move three objects from their private small grid 
to the three private grey frames in the big grids (a), then three common objects 
were shown in the transparent frames (b.). A prior training phase involved the 
participant taking the instructor’s role. They see the grid as in (c) initially prior to 
hearing a bell sound, at which point they click, ‘SHOW’. 
 
4.2. Analysis and Results 
4.2.1. Data Processing 
Eye-movements that were initiated during the auditory instruction were 
processed according to the critical word (‘apple’) onsets for the purpose of 
aggregating the location and duration of each sample from the eye tracker. 
For analysis, we removed any sample that was deemed ‘invalid’ due to 
blinks or head movements. The spatial coordinates of the eye movement 
samples (in pixels) were then mapped onto the appropriate object regions; 
if a fixation was located within the square surrounding an object, it was 
coded as belonging to that object, otherwise, it was coded as background. 
Target and competitor items were identified on a by-trial basis.  
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Probabilities of fixating the target or competitor/non-competitor 
objects as a function of time were analysed in terms of a target advantage 
score ln(Ptarget/Pcompetitor). Target advantage scores were analysed for 
three time regions. A preview region began 200ms before, and ended 
200ms after, the onset of the critical word (‘apple’). The preview region 
extends to 200ms after the critical word onset in accordance with standard 
assumptions about the time to program and launch an eye movement 
(Hallett, 1986). Following the preview region, our analysis looks at two 
300ms regions, 200-500ms and 500-800ms. Following Hanna et al., (2003) 
the overall 600ms region of interest was chosen to correspond to the 
average critical word length (between five hundred and six hundred 
milliseconds). After this period participants' eye movements were often 
directed toward the mouse curser. The regions were identified and 
synchronised for each participant on a trial-by-trial basis, relative to the 
onsets of the critical word. 
Because this experiment is designed to establish memory-based 
effects, we expect these to emerge over time. That is, any association the 
participant makes with a given cue and the private grid positions are likely 
to build up over time. Thus the ANOVA analysis includes an additional 
factor, Block. This is simply a division of the trials in each condition into 
those occurring in the first half and those occurring in the second half.  
4.2.2. Results 
For each participant (respectively item) and condition, I calculated the 
average target advantage score over the 17ms time slots per analysis 
region. Figure 2.5 shows a plot of the time course of target advantage for 
the two groups. Each graph of Figure 2.6 shows the average target 
advantage score for each of the competitor and non-competitor conditions 
for each of the three windows. And Figure 2.7 shows the proportion of 
fixations to the target and the competitor in eight conditions.  
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Human cue condition 
 
Physical cue condition 
Figure 2. 5. The time course of the average target advantage score in 
Experiment 1 showing the TA score in the human cue condition (upper) 
and physical cue condition (lower) from the 200 ms before the onset of 
the critical word to 800 ms after the onset.  
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a. Human condition 
 
 
 
 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ta
rg
e
t 
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
 
non-comp
competitor
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ta
rg
e
t 
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
 
non-comp
competitor
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ta
rg
e
t 
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
 
non-comp
competitor
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ta
rg
e
t 
A
d
va
n
ta
ge
 
non-comp
competitor
66 
 
  
First block - Homogeneous          Second block – Homogeneous 
  
First block - Heterogeneous       Second block - Heterogeneous 
b. Physical condition 
Figure 2. 6. The average target advantage score for the three time 
windows in Experiment 1 by block.  
The charts show the competitor and non-competitor conditions in the 
human cue (2.6a) and the physical cue (2.6b) conditions. In each case, 
the averages are shown for the first block (left) and second block (right) 
for the homogeneous (upper) and heterogeneous (lower) conditions. 
Error bars indicate standard error of by-participant means. 
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a. Human condition 
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Homogeneous – Non-competitor       Homogeneous – Competitor 
  
Heterogeneous – Non-competitor      Heterogeneous– Competitor 
b. Physical condition 
Figure 2. 7. The proportions of looks to the target and the competitor 
in Experiment 1.  
The charts show the proportions of looks in the 
homogeneous-noncompetitor, the homogenous-competitor, the 
heterogeneous-noncomeptitor, the heterogeneous-competitor 
conditions in either the human (first four) or the physical (last four) 
conditions. 
 
The first thing to notice about these graphs is in Figure 2.5, which shows 
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condition, the overall pattern seems to be what one would expect. Toward 
the end of the time window (i.e. around 200ms after the offset the target 
word), target bias seems greater in trials where there is no competitor in 
private view, for both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous conditions. 
However, in the human cue condition, only in the Heterogeneous condition 
is the pattern as one would expect, with non-competitor trials attracting 
more bias than competitor. By contrast, in the Homogeneous condition, 
bias in the Non-competitor condition looks lower and roughly equal to the 
Competitor. To get some understanding of this unexpected result, we turn 
to figure 2.6, showing the results split across the two halves of the 
experiment. It is noticeable that in the first half of the human condition, 
target bias seems greater in the conditions where there is a private-view 
competitor, compared to where there is not, although this bias peaks 
before the final window. Correspondingly, the Target Advantage when 
there are Non-competitor trials seems very low, even though there is no 
competitor in the private view. It is easy to see both of these results as due 
to participants being strategic, particularly in the early part of a session. 
Since 24 out of 38 dual-objects trials were experimental trials, it is 
understandable that an expectation arose in participants when they saw 
two objects of the same kind, to expect the common view one of those to 
be the target. That this pattern emerged more in the first half of the session, 
suggests that it was a more conscious strategy. It seems participants 
‘figured out’ the pattern after a few trials. Likewise, when a display did not 
have pair of equivalent objects, participants seem to have adopted an early 
strategy to attend to the private objects in the expectation that the target 
would be there. This strategy would have been reinforced by the fact that 
three private-target fillers were included in the first ten trials. It happened 
that these did not have dual objects.  
It is interesting that the strategic behaviour in the first half of the 
session did not occur in the Physical cue group nearly so much as in the 
Human cue group (even though item order was the same for both groups). 
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If this observation is borne out statistically, it would suggest already an 
effect of cue type. We return to the point below. 
The effects of these strategies seem far less prominent in the 
second half of the session where the time course of gaze formation seems 
to follow along expected lines. Nevertheless, the strategies of the first half 
of the sessions would be expected to result in relatively lower overall 
Target Advantage in Non-Competitor trials where they is most in evidence. 
This was in the Human condition, particularly the Human Homogeneous 
condition.  
The results of a 2(competitor vs. non-competitor) * 2(homogeneous 
vs. heterogeneous) * 2(human vs. physical cue) * 2(first block vs. second 
block) mixed ANOVA are as follows. 
Preview Window 
In the preview window, there were no main effects, but a significant 
interaction between competitor and blocks, F1(1,82)=5.248, p<0.05, 
ŋp
2=0.060, F2(1,20)=4.413, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.181. In the first block, there was 
larger TA in the competitor items than the non-competitor items (marginal 
by subjects), F1(1,82)=3.701, p=0.058, ŋp
2=0.043, F2(1,20)=6.489, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.245. In the second block, there was no difference between two 
competitor types.  
A significant interaction was also found among the competitor, the 
association, and the cue conditions in the by-subject analysis, 
F1(1,82)=4.194, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.049, F2(1,20)=1.722, p=0.204, ŋ𝑝
2=0.079. 
Further planned analyses were conducted in the human and the physical 
condition separately. In the human cue condition, no simple interaction 
between the association and competitor types, but there was significant 
interaction between competitor and blocks, F1(1,38)=8.362, p<0.01, 
ŋp
2=0.180, F2(1,10)=6.209, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.383. A larger TA score was found 
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in the competitor items than the non-competitor condition in the first block, 
F1(1,38)=11.104, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.226, F2(1,10)=8.468, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.459, 
but no difference was found in the second block. In the physical cue 
condition no simple effect and simple interactions was found (Fs < 1).   
First Time Window (200-500ms) 
In the first time window (200-500 ms), no main effect was found, but there 
was a significant interaction between competitor and blocks, 
F1(1,82)=10.009, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.109, F2(1,20)=7.179, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.264, 
an interaction among competitor, cue types and blocks, F1(1,82)=4.869, 
p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.056, F2(1,20)=4.741, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.192, and an interaction 
among competitor, association and blocks in the by subject analysis, 
F1(1,82)=4.676, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.054, F2(1,20)=0.911, p=0.351 ŋ𝑝
2=0.044. 
Further analyses were conducted in the first and the second block 
separately. In the first block, there was larger TA in the competitor items 
than the non-competitor items, F1(1,41)=6.518, p<0.05, ŋp
2 =0.137, 
F2(1,10)=7.315, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.422. In the second block, there was an 
interaction between competitor types and the association types in the 
by-subject analysis, F1(1,41)=6.695, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.140, F2(1,10)=1.645, 
p=0.229, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.141. Simple effect analysis showed that in the 
homogeneous condition, there was no difference between two competitor 
types, but in the heterogeneous condition, there was larger TA in the 
non-competitor condition than the competitor condition in the by-subject 
analysis, F1(1,41)=9.046, p<0.01, ŋp
2 =0.181, F2(1,10)=3.948, p=0.075, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.283. In the competitor condition, there was a marginally larger TA in 
the homogeneous condition than the heterogeneous condition in the 
subjects analysis only, F1(1,41)=3.720, p=0.061, 
ŋp
2=0.083, F2(1,10)=1.104, p=0.318, ŋp
2=0.099. In the non-competitor there 
was no difference, F1(1,41)=1.210, p=0.278, ŋp
2=0.029, F2(1,10)=1.009,, 
p=0.319, ŋp
2=0.099. 
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In the Human group, there was a Competitor-by-Block interaction,  
F(1,38)=12.304, p=0.001, ŋp
2=0.245, F2(1,10)=8.568, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.461. 
Follow up analyses revealed that in the Competitor condition, Target 
Advantage was greater in the first block than the second, F(1,38)=9.038, 
p<0.01, ŋp
2 =0.192, F2(1,10)=3.174, p=0.105, ŋp
2 =0.241; in the 
Non-competitor condition, things were reversed: greater TA in the second 
block than the first, F(1,38)=5.037, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.117, F2(1,10)=5.344, 
p<0.05, ŋp
2 =0.348. In the Physical-cue group, no main effects or 
interactions were found, (All Fs < 1.08, ps > 0.30). 
Before discussing the results from these two time windows or later 
windows, we should note that many results are significant by-subjects only. 
Normally in psycholinguistic research, one takes care to establish 
significance both in an analysis that treats subjects as a random variable 
and one that treats items as a random variable because our 
generalisations are across both. By-items analyses ensure that a 
significant effect by-subjects is not due to only some of the linguistic 
materials presented to participants having an effect. Thus we should be 
cautious about drawing strong conclusions from these results. That being 
said, we should note that our items differed very little among each other in 
this study. It may be that terms for shapes may differ in frequency to those 
for fruits or animals and this could be one cause of the difference. However, 
there is a more likely cause of variation among items given that the study 
was designed to induce memory effects. Since items were presented in a 
fixed order for all participants, it could be that an item in a given condition 
that is presented early in the study yields a different eye-gaze pattern to 
one in the same condition presented later in the study, when the effects of 
learning arise or strategies change. So, although we should be cautious 
about some of the results to be discussed, we at least have some reason to 
be a little more confident about by-subject only significance than we might 
otherwise be in a psycholinguistic study, as long as we understand how 
things change in the course of a session. 
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Discussion of results from Preview and 200-500ms:  
Turning now to the results from the preview and 200-500ms windows, we 
can say that these bear out somewhat the observations made from visual 
inspection of the graphs. In the first half of the study in these windows, 
there was a higher target advantage overall in the Competitor condition 
compared to the Non-competitor condition. This is not something that one 
normally expects in Perspective-Taking tasks. But it should be pointed out 
that this is not a standard perspective-taking task in that 18 of 96 trials refer 
to private grid positions. This fact would generally encourage participants to 
attend to the private objects as well as common objects in the process of a 
trial. As discussed above, the effect could be accounted for in terms of two 
kinds of strategy: one of using the presence of two objects to predict the 
target; a second strategy of using the absence of a second object to initially 
anticipate a private-position target. Obviously, this account of the pattern 
found is speculative and calls for further experimental investigation. One 
possible piece of indirect evidence for the account lies in the fact that the 
pattern is most apparent in the first block, whereas the results from the 
second block (to be discussed below) are quite different. If one or both of 
these strategies are born of a more or less conscious impression 
participants gained from early trials, this may have worn off as the study 
went on. 
In considering the graphs for the data above, it was commented 
that the strong ‘reverse’ pattern found in the early time window was more 
apparent in the Human-cue group than the Physical-cue group. The 
analysis of the Competitor-by-Cue-by-Block interaction lends support to 
this observation. Only in the Human group was there more Target 
Advantage for the Competitor trials in the First Block. 
In the second block of the trials, the interaction in the 200-500ms 
time window revealed no difference in target advantage between 
Competitor and Non-competitor conditions in the Homogeneous condition 
but a greater target advantage in the Non-competitor than the Competitor, 
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on Heterogeneous trials. This is the memory-based effect predicted by 
Horton and colleagues. Returning to consider the second time block results 
in Figure 2.6, we can see that the difference between Competitor and 
Non-Competitor TA scores in the 200-500ms widow is more marked in the 
Human cue group than the Physical-cue group. However, this apparent 
difference is not directly supported by any statistical results. One small, 
indirect piece of evidence that more is going on in the Human cue group 
comes if we look at the breakdown of the interaction among Competitor, 
Cue-type and Block conditions by Human- and Physical-cue. This shows 
that there were no significant effects or interactions in the Physical group, 
whereas the Competitor-by-Blocks interaction in the Human group 
revealed higher Target Advantage for Competitor trials in the first block but 
higher TA for Non-competitor trials in the second block. So, it seems that in 
the 200-500ms window, there is a memory-based effect emerging in the 
second half of the experiment. It also seems that this may be driven more 
by the eye-gaze results of the Human-cue group. 
500-800ms Window: 
In the second time window (500-800 ms), there was a main effect in the 
competitor types (marginal by items), F1(1,82)=7.734, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.086, 
F2(1,20)=3.940, p=0.061, ŋ𝑝
2=0.162, due to the target advantage score 
being larger in the non-competitor condition than the competitor condition. 
There was also a significant interaction among competitor, association and 
cue types, F1(1,82)=15.404, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2=0.158, F2(1,22)=6.050, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.232,. Simple effect analyses were conducted in the human and 
physical condition separately.  
In the human cue group, there was interaction between competitor 
types and association in the by-subject analysis, F1(1,38)=7.972, p<0.01, 
ŋp
2 =0.173, F2(1,10)=2.100, p=0.178, ŋp
2 =0.174. In the homogeneous 
condition no difference was found between the non-competitor and 
competitor conditions, but in the heterogeneous condition participants had 
larger advantage scores in the non-competitor condition than in the 
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competitor condition, F1(1,38)=8.678, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.186, F2(1,10)=5.201, 
p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.342. In the competitor condition no difference was found, but 
in the non-competitor condition, there were larger TA scores in the 
heterogeneous condition than the homogeneous condition in the 
by-subject analysis, F1(1,38)=7.931, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.173, F2(1,10)=3.123, 
p=0.108, ŋp
2=0.238.  
In the physical cue condition there was also an interaction between 
competitor and association condition, F1(1,44)=7.542, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.146, 
F2(1,10)=6.023, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.376. Follow-up analyses revealed that in 
the homogeneous condition, participants had larger advantage scores in 
the non-competitor condition than in the competitor condition in the 
by-subject analysis, F1(1,44)=12.063, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.215, F2(1,10)=3.347, 
p=0.097, ŋp
2=0.251, but no difference was found in the heterogeneous 
condition. In the non-competitor condition there were larger TA scores in 
the homogeneous condition than the heterogeneous condition in the 
by-subject analysis, F(1,44)=7.970, p<0.01, ŋp
2 =0.153, F2(1,10)=0.545, 
p=0.477, ŋp
2=0.052, but no different was found in the competitor condition.  
There was also an interaction between the association and blocks 
in the by-subject analysis, F1(1,82)=4.700, p<0.05. ŋp
2 =0.054, 
F2(1,20)=1.440, p=0.244, ŋp
2=0.067. In the homogeneous condition, there 
was larger TA in the second block than the first block in the by-subject 
analysis, F1(1,82)=5.119, p<0.05. ŋp
2 =0.059, F2(1,20)=3.060, p=0.096, 
ŋp
2=0.133, but there was no difference in the heterogeneous condition. In 
both first and second block, there was no difference between the 
homogeneous and the heterogeneous condition.  
Summary of results from 500-800ms window: 
The first thing to notice about the results in the 500-800ms window 
compared to earlier windows is that overall, bias in Non-competitor trials 
was greater than Competitor trials. This is the ‘normal’ pattern of results for 
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this kind of Perspective-Taking procedure and it is the opposite of the 
‘reverse’ pattern found in earlier time windows. 
Next, it is notable that there was only one effect involving Blocks in 
this time window, showing that on Homogeneous trials there was greater 
Target Advantage in the second block than the first, but there was no 
difference in Heterogeneous trials. This result is generally in line with 
Memory-based predictions if we work on the assumption that participants 
should get better at the task as the session progresses. If, as 
Memory-based accounts predict, the Heterogeneous condition engenders 
more attention to the private positions, it would explain why improved 
performance over time only occurs for the Homogeneous group. Again, we 
can return to the Second-Block graphs in Figure 2.6 to compare the 
Heterogeneous trial results in the Human and Physical cue conditions for 
this time window. We see that the difference between Non-Competitor and 
Competitor conditions looks more marked in the Human Cue group than 
the Physical Cue group. However, this difference did not manifest itself 
directly in any statistically reliable effect. 
There were however differences between Physical and 
Human-cue conditions when we break down the three-way interaction in 
this time window. In the both the Human-cue and Physical-cue groups 
there were Competitor-by-Association interactions. However, when 
analysed further they manifest opposite patterns. In the Human group, we 
can view the fact that Target Advantage for the Heterogeneous condition 
was lower in the Competitor trials, while there was not TA difference in the 
Homogeneous condition as yet another manifestation of a Memory-based 
effect. Things are less straightforward though if we compare Target 
Advantage on Competitor trials between Homogeneous and 
Heterogeneous. These were not different, though one might expect them to 
be if there were memory-based effects. By contrast, a comparison of TA on 
Non-competitor trials reveals a larger bias in the Heterogeneous condition.  
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It would be unwise to read too much into these results until further 
testing, or a better designed study were able to clarify the extent to which 
the clearly more strategic behaviour from the first half of the experiment 
affects behaviour in each of the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous 
conditions in the second half. However, returning to Figure 2.7 it seems 
that in the second block of trials, the pattern of results in the Human 
condition does seem consistent with a memory-based effect.. 
The follow up analysis of the Competitor-by-Association interaction 
in the Physical-cue group yields a very different picture. Here TA in the 
Non-competitor trials was greater in the Homogeneous than the 
Heterogeneous condition, meaning that a TA difference between 
Non-Competitor and Competitor trials was found only in the Homogeneous 
condition. One tentative hypothesis about this result could be that 
participants were trying to use the physical cue as a means to generate 
expectations about the target. Because these are not as, ‘natural’ or 
‘salient’ as speaker-based cues, greater memory load was required. When 
this extra load combines with the complexity of the Heterogeneous 
instruction set, it leads to a slower response in terms of identifying the 
target.  
 
4.3. Discussion 
In this experiment, a participant had 96 trials. 18 of those trials referred to 
private-view grid positions. Other things equal, this fact might create in 
participants some expectation that the target will be in a private grid 
position and encourage greater attention to those positions. The design 
also made it possible for participants to associate one of two cues (a 
specific speaker or a specific physical cue) with those 18 private-view trials. 
One unforeseen effect of the experimental design seems to have been that 
it engendered strategies on the part of the participants, particularly in the 
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first half of their experimental session. Our results suggest that these 
strategies were more prevalent in the Human-cue group. This fact in itself 
shows a difference in the effect of the cue-type.  
To the extent that the second-block results were less affected by 
strategic activity, these revealed that in the 200-500ms window there was a 
memory-based effect of the kind one would expect given previous research 
in Horton & Gerrig (2005a), Horton (2007) and elsewhere. Moreover, there 
was indirect evidence in these results that the memory-based effect was 
more pronounced in the Human-cue group. 
More evidence for memory-based effects were found in the later 
time window. In addition, there was a three-way interaction that revealed 
clearly different patterns of behaviour in the Human-cue and Physical-cue 
groups. The follow-on analyses produced results that are not entirely clear. 
One interpretation offered was that in the Human-cue group, something like 
the predicted memory-based effect emerged in the second half of the study. 
By contrast, memory-based effects in the Physical-cue group may have 
been distorted by the fact that the cue used was more difficult to memorise. 
Taken together, these results point to the conclusion that 
memory-based effects can be produced in an experimental procedure that 
is based on Perspective-taking task. More importantly, given the aims of 
the study, we have some evidence that not all memory-based cues are 
equal. Why it is that identity of interlocutor is a better cue than simple 
association between a single interlocutor and colour/sound is not answered 
here. Memory-based research has focused solely on Human-based cues. 
Indeed, Brown-Schmidt et al. (2015) sees interlocutor identity as, “a 
particularly potent source of contextual constraint” compared to other 
contextual cues (ibid, p.61). This could be because an individual’s identity 
may be very easy to process and code in memory, given the frequency with 
humans identify one another and the importance of other-agent identity to 
our daily lives. However, things may not be so straightforward since there 
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are very many facets of identity that can be coded and later used as a cue. 
It is a long-established fact in social psychological research that that people 
use gender, race, professional status and categories like university major 
or birthplace to keep track of information in conversation (Taylor & Falcone, 
1982; van Twuyer & van Knippenberg, 1995; Frable & Bem, 1985). One 
conclusion from this social psychological research is that participants tend 
to code in memory those aspects of another agent’s identity that are 
relevant in the prior context. 
Even if facets of another agent’s identity are in some sense easier 
to code in memory than other contextual cues, there could be other factors 
that make agent-related information more susceptible to cued retrieval at 
later stages. In Chapter 1, I outlined proposals about how the social cues 
involved in conversational interactions trigger processing biases that would 
integrate situational information more deeply for relevance. A by-product of 
this process would be that information shared with another agent is 
integrated more thoroughly in memory and is thus more susceptible to 
cued retrieval at a later point. In Experiment 1, the stimuli in the physical 
cue condition were salient for the participant alone. They were not in 
shared attention for participant and speaker. The speaker gave instructions 
by video link and did not acknowledge them or show any sign of awareness 
of them; and indeed the confederate speakers were completely unaware of 
these stimuli. By contrast, in our social-cue condition and previous studies 
supporting a memory-based account, the cue, being the speaker alone, 
was in shared attention at the coding and retrieval stage. To see this, recall 
Barwise’s description of shared attention to an utterance event as involving 
attention to the situation in which both agents attend to that event. Thus the 
speaker was in shared attention when the previous utterance was made. 
Experiment 2 would provide a further test of the domain-general 
memory-based hypothesis and my own, socially constrained 
memory-based hypothesis. That study was designed to explore to what 
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extent memory-based processes were constrained to encode and retrieve 
information previously in shared attention.  
 
5. Experiment 2 
The previous study provided evidence for the memory-based model, and 
demonstrated that participants had less interference from their privileged 
knowledge when the speaker had a stronger association with the 
common-ground referents. But this cue-based process seems not 
unconstrained because when physical cues were matched with the referent 
participants were less liable to establish any association, even though the 
salience of the physical cues seems rich enough. An explanation proposed 
by the memory-based model suggested that the association is only 
successfully made when the memories associated the highly salient cues 
are ready, that is, the stronger the cue is, the easier the association 
between the speaker and the referent is to make. The partner-specific 
association will not influence the subsequent language processing if it is 
too weak to reach the threshold (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). However the last 
study indicated that how to define the strength of the cues is not only based 
on the perceptual salience, but also in terms of the likelihood that the cue 
receives attention and is integrated into memory together with relevant 
information. My proposal about the role of previous shared experience in 
common ground suggests that social factors are critical in any 
memory-based maintenance of common ground. 
If joint attention influences the employment of the low-level cues in 
the memory-based mechanism as I conjecture in the last experiment, we 
should expect to find greater competitor interference to the extent that 
participants jointly attend to the cues for the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous conditions. As in the first experiment the present study also 
used the type-based and location-based descriptions to refer to objects in 
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the grid. Two association conditions were operationalized through the 
different distribution of these two types of instructions. Like the last 
experiment, the homogeneous condition has all the instructions referring 
only to objects in common ground, including the location-based filler 
instructions. The heterogeneous condition has three quarters of 
location-based fillers making reference to privileged ground objects, so that 
the speaker gives instructions about both common ground and privileged 
ground objects. In each session, the participant receives the full set of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous instructions in a random order. Based 
on the results of the last experiment, we can predict that more competitor 
interference would be found in the heterogeneous condition than in the 
homogeneous condition, to the extent that the participant responds to the 
different cues for each instruction set. 
In the present study both conditions used a physical cue to each of 
the homogeneous and to the heterogeneous set of instructions. The 
physical cues were simplified as only colours instead of colours and 
sounds, so it would be easier for participants to encode their memory. I.e. 
participants saw one colour (e.g. red) when they were hearing an 
instruction from the homogeneous set and another colour (e.g. blue) when 
hearing an instruction from the heterogeneous set. In order to make the 
colour cue more prominent, we coloured the private grid positions rather 
than the border of the image of the speaker. See Figure 2.8. 
To test the hypothesis that joint attention influences the memory of 
the association between the speaker and the referent, a variable regarding 
the shared attention to cues was manipulated in a between-groups design. 
For both groups, participants had to click on the name of the colour of the 
background appearing with a given trial, from a choice of two (blue and red) 
on the centre of their screen (see Figure 2.9). In a shared cue condition, the 
speaker also asked what colour is the participant’s side, and repeated the 
answer after the participant replied. In a non-shared cue the choices were 
presented with a text question on the screen only. The participants viewed 
82 
 
the question and made the choice all by themselves, so that the speaker 
never showed his attention of his partner's privileged information. Thus, in 
the shared-cue condition, on each trial, a colour cue to homogeneous or 
heterogeneous instructions was in shared attention. In the non-shared cue 
condition, they were not.  
According to the memory-based model, the present study should 
show the effect of the association as the first experiment (homo- vs. 
heterogeneous instructions). What's more, if memory-based model is 
constrained by the shared knowledge, there should also be an effect of the 
shared attention. Specifically, in the shared cue condition, participants 
should get less interference from their privilege ground in the 
homogeneous condition. But in a non-shared cue condition, the association 
effect should be weaken, because an associated memory representation 
could not be established when the information was not jointly attended. 
However, if the fact that participants cannot build up the memory of 
association under the physical cue in the first experiment is simply due to 
the property or salience of the cue itself, the manipulation of the shared 
attention should not make any difference. According to this prediction, the 
physical cue itself does not vary between conditions, so there should be no 
difference between both the shared and non-shared cue conditions. 
 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants 
40 participants （10 male and 10 female in the shared cue condition; 
11 male and 9 female in the non-shared cue condition) were recruited from 
UCL’s participant pool. One UCL student from the Department of 
Linguistics was recruited to play the speaker role. This recruit was blind to 
purpose of the study. All were paid for their participation. 
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5.1.2. Stimuli and design 
As in Experiment 1, participants were given instructions to move objects 
around a 3*3 grid. The set of objects in each trial was chosen from the 
same pictures as in Experiment 1 from the three categories: fruit, animal or 
geometric shape. To reduce the possibility that participants attended to the 
common ground object which had the same subtype competitor in their 
privileged ground, all the trials, except the non-competitor condition, had 
two objects with the same subtype, one in the common ground and one in 
the privileged ground. All the instructions were pre-recorded by the same 
person, thus each participant in a given set of conditions heard the same 
instructions. The instructions consisted of type-based and location-based 
instructions as Experiment 1.  
There were 20 critical trials and 20 filler items in each association 
condition. As in the first experiment, 20 critical trials consisted of 10 
competitor trials and 10 non-competitor distractor trials, and they all 
involved type-based instructions. The 20 filler items involved 
location-based instructions. In a homogeneous association condition, all 40 
instructions were targeted at objects in common ground. In a 
heterogeneous condition, the 20 critical instructions and 5 of the 20 
location-based filler instructions were targeted at the common ground 
objects, but 15 of the 20 filler instructions were targeted at privileged 
ground objects.  
In order to lessen the presence of strategic effects found in 
Experiment 1, the proportion of filler trials containing dual objects was 
changed. In the first experiment 14 out of 48 fillers had dual objects. Now, 
all location-based filler trials had dual objects. This means that a participant 
would have a total of 60 dual-object trials. On 20 of these trials (the 
Competitor experimental trials) the target would be the common-ground 
token of the dual object (e.g. the commonly viewable apple). On 40 dual 
object trials, the target would another one of the objects. On 15 of the latter 
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40, the target would in fact be a private-view object. Thus, 1/3 dual object 
trials has the common dual object as target. Given that there are three 
common object, this represents a chance distribution. 
In order to distinguish the association conditions, the participants' 
side of the shelves had two colours. Half the instructions had the 
participants' side of the shelves in red, while the other half had the side in 
blue. See Figure 2.8. One colour accompanied homogeneous instructions 
while the other accompanied the heterogeneous instructions. These were 
counterbalanced across the experiment.  
 
  
Figure 2. 8. The initial display in Experiment 2.  
Two colours accompany a Homogeneous or a Heterogeneous condition 
respectively. Participants were presented both colours.   
 
The shared-attention condition was operationalized in a between 
groups design. Participants were presented a question about the colour on 
the screen before the speaker gave instructions. In a shared-cue condition, 
the speaker asked what colour is the participants' side, then repeated the 
answer after participants clicked on the choices. In the non-shared cue 
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condition participants received the question and chose the answer on the 
screen silently, while the speaker remained ignorant of the answer.   
To sum up, the experiment had a 2 (competitor) * 2 (association) * 
2 (shared attention) design. Altogether, each session with a participant 
involved 80 trials, 40 delivered in the homogeneous and 40 in the 
heterogeneous condition. In each association condition, 10 trials referred to 
the non-competitor targets and 10 referred to the competitor targets. Two 
types of critical instructions were matched and used the same recordings. 
As was the case in Experiment 1, the trial order was fixed across both 
groups. It was constructed using a randomised order except that three 
location-based fillers were placed among the first ten trials, prior to the 
occurrence of the first heterogeneous test trial.  
Shared attention was a between subjects manipulation. So a 
participant either selected the answer after the speaker's question (shared 
cue condition) or the screen prompt (non-shared cue condition). 
 
5.1.3. Procedure 
In each session, participants were seated in front of a 23” screen fitted with 
Tobii TX300 eye-tracking equipment in a room with only the experimenter. 
They were told that they would be interacting with a person located in 
another part of the college via a video link. They were then shown the same 
initial display at in Experiment 1.  
The training phase was the same as in Experiment 1 with both a 
participant and the speaker taking an alternate role of an addressee or an 
instructor. Firstly, the 3*3 grid appeared on the left of the screen. On the 
right there was a shelf with three objects which were not visible to the 
speaker. The participant was required to move the objects to the coloured 
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grids of the right shelf, and then three common objects were presented. 
After that a new step was added on the original procedure. Participants 
were presented a question, "What colour is your side?", either from the 
speaker or on the screen. They were required to click the answers on the 
prompt in both conditions. See Figure 2.9. Finally participant moved a 
target object according to the speaker's instruction and clicked the ‘NEXT’ 
button on the bottom right of the screen. After every two trials, participants 
had an opportunity to break prior to re-calibration of the eye-tracking 
equipment. 
 
  
a. Shared attention condition         b. Non-shared condition 
Figure 2. 9. The question sessions in both conditions in Experiment 2.  
When the speaker asked the colour verbally, participants were only 
presented the answers (Shared attention condition. see the left.). In 
order to indicate that the speaker shared the knowledge of the colour, 
he also repeated the answer after they made choice. When the 
question were shown silently, only participants knew the colour 
because the speaker would not receive and repeated their answer 
(Non-shared condition, see the right.)  
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5.2. Results 
The same eye-movement analysis was conducted as in Experiment 1. The 
target and competitor items were identified on a by-trial basis. Target 
advantage score, ln(P(target)/P(competitor/non-competitor)), was analysed 
for three time regions from the onset of the critical word: a preview region 
(-200ms to 200ms), the first time window (200ms to 500ms), and the 
second time window (500ms to 800ms). As the study investigates 
memory-based effects, Blocks are again included as a factor. 
Figure 2.10 shows a plot of the time course of target advantage for the two 
groups. Figure 2.11 shows the average target advantage score for each of 
the competitor and non-competitor conditions for each of the three windows. 
And Figure 2.12 shows the proportion of fixations to the target and the 
competitor in eight conditions.  
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Non-shared cue condition 
Figure 2. 10. The time course of average target advantage score in 
Experiment 2.  
It shows the TA scores in the human cue condition (upper) and 
physical cue condition (lower) from the 200 ms before the onset of the 
critical word to 800 ms after the onset.  
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First block - Heterogeneous          Second block - Heterogeneous 
a. Shared condition 
  
First block - Homogeneous          Second block – Homogeneous 
  
First block - Heterogeneous          Second block - Heterogeneous 
b. Non-shared condition 
Figure 2. 11. The average target advantage score for the three time 
windows in Experiment 2 by block.  
The charts show the competitor and non-competitor conditions in the 
shared cue (2.11a) and the Non-shared cue (2.11b) conditions. In 
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each case, the averages are shown for the first block (left) and second 
block (right) for the homogeneous (upper) and heterogeneous (lower) 
conditions. Error bars indicate standard error of by-participant means. 
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Homogeneous – Non-competitor      Homogeneous – Competitor 
  
Heterogeneous – Non-competitor      Heterogeneous– Competitor 
b. Non-shared cue condition 
Figure 2. 11. The proportion of looks to the target and the competitor 
in Experiment 2. 
They show the homogeneous-noncompetitor, the 
homogenous-competitor, the heterogeneous-noncomeptitor, the 
heterogeneous-competitor conditions in either the shared (first four) or 
the non-shared (last four) conditions. 
 
Before turning to consider the statistical analyses let us consider 
the graphs in these figures. The first thing to note, in the context of 
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Target-Advantage scores again, particularly in the Shared-cue group, 
Homogeneous condition. Recall that in Experiment 1, the reverse pattern 
was strongest in the Human cue, Homogeneous condition. There is a 
difference to Experiment 1 in that the ‘reverse’ pattern seems stronger here 
in the second block of trials, although it is somewhat present in the first 
block also, but only for the Shared-Homogeneous condition. It was noted in 
Section 5.1.2 above that the counterbalancing for Experiment 2 was 
changed from how it was in Experiment 1. Here we included proportionally 
more dual-object trials (i.e. trials where the display had two apples, one in 
common and one in private view). The rationale was to make the chances 
one in three that when a dual object display occurred, the target would be 
the common-view token of that pair (i.e. the target in Competitor conditions). 
Given that there are three common-view objects, the idea was that 
dual-object displays would not be a cue to the target in Competitor trials. It 
seems that this change in the balance of visual displays has been 
counter-productive. Either the strategies participants developed in 
Experiment 1 have been reinforced by this change or the change has led to 
a new strategy, manifesting itself in the second half of the experiment.  
One speculation that can be offered here is that some participants 
developed a ‘process of elimination’ strategy. Symeonidou et al. (2015) 
report on a perspective-taking task similar to that employed in Keysar et al. 
(2000) where participants first looked at object that they were not going to 
choose before forming a bias to the target that they eventually choose. If 
participants adopt this strategy here, it would be to the disadvantage of 
Non-competitor trials since it would take longer to establish that there is not 
a dual object in private view, than to find the second object when it is there. 
If we assume that participants are looking for a dual object unsuccessfully 
in Non-Competitor trials, it would explain why there is a negative or zero 
bias in these trials where the ‘reverse’ pattern is manifest – i.e. in the 
Shared Homogeneous and Heterogeneous trials.  
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At this stage, we can only offer speculations as to what explains 
‘reverse’ patterns. For the time being, we turn to the statistical results. 
5.2.1. ANOVA analyses 
A mixed 2(Competitor vs. Non-Competitor)*2(Homogeneous vs. 
Heterogeneous)*2(Shared vs. Non-Shared)*2(First Half vs. Second Half) 
ANOVA revealed the following results. 
Preview window: 
In the preview window, there were no main effects. There was an 
interaction between the competitor types and the cue types, 
F1(1,76)=5.008, p<0.05, ŋp
2 =0.062, F2(1,16)=6.359, p<0.05, ŋp
2 =0.284. 
Simple effect showed that for the non-competitor items there was larger TA 
in the non-shared cue condition than the shared cue condition in the 
by-subject analysis, F1(1,76)=5.907, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.072, F2(1,16)=3.752, 
p=0.071, ŋp
2=0.190. But in the competitor items there was no different TA 
score between two cue types.  
200-500ms Window: 
In the first time window (200-500 ms), no main effects were found. There 
was a two-way interaction between association and the cue in the 
by-subject analysis, F1(1,76)=4.764, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.059, F2(1,16)=2.584, 
p=0.128, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.139. But follow up analyses revealed no effects or 
interactions. There was also an interaction between the association and 
blocks (marginal in the by-items analysis), F1(1,76)=5.943, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2 =0.073, F2(1,16)=4.195, p=0.057, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.208. Follow up analyses 
showed in the heterogeneous condition, there was larger TA in the second 
blocks than the first blocks, F1(1,76)=6.672, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.081, 
F2(1,16)=9.351, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.369, but in the homogeneous condition, 
there was no different TA between two blocks, F1(1,76)=0.331, p=0.567, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.004, F2(1,16)=0.482, p=0.497, ŋ𝑝
2=0.029. In the two blocks there was 
no difference between two association types (Fs < 3.17, ps >0.1).  
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Summary of results in 200-500ms window: 
In these  time windows, there was only one significant effect that involved 
Blocks as a condition. This showed only that Target Advantage increased 
in the Heterogeneous condition from the first to the second block but no 
difference between the first and second half was found in the 
Homogeneous condition. This is in some ways the opposite of a 
memory-based effect. If we assume that performance improves over the 
course of the experiment, we would expect Target Advantage in the 
Homogeneous condition to increase more than in the Heterogeneous, if an 
association between Heterogeneous trials and private-view targets is made. 
It may be that this effect results from the fact that in the Shared 
Heterogeneous condition, the ‘reverse’ strategy discussed above only 
develops in the second half of the experiment, leading to better 
performance on Competitor trials. 
500-800ms window: 
In the second time window (500-800ms), there were no main effects. A 
three-way interaction among competitor type, association and cue types 
was found, F1(1,76)=5.413, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.066, F2(1,16)=8.823, p<0.01, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.355. Follow-up analyses showed that in the shared-cue condition 
there was no simple effect but a significant simple interaction between 
competitor type and association type, F1(1,38)=5.238, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2 =0.121,F2(1,8)=5.764, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.419. Simple effect analysis 
showed that in the non-competitor condition there was no difference 
between the heterogeneous and the homogeneous condition, 
F1(1,38)=0.564, p=0.457, ŋ𝑝
2=0.015, F2(1,8)=0.023, p=0.883, ŋ𝑝
2=0.003, 
but in the competitor condition a larger TA score in the homogeneous 
condition than the heterogeneous condition, F1(1,38)=4.500, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.106, F2(1,8)=9.839, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.552. In both the homogeneous 
and heterogeneous condition, there was no difference between the 
competitor and non-competitor conditions.  
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In the non-shared cue condition no main effect or interaction was 
found (Fs < 3.2, ps > 0.1). 
Summary of results in 500-800ms window: 
On the face of it, the results in this window confirm the predictions made 
here in the thesis. On competitor trials in the Shared group, Target 
Advantage is higher in the Homogeneous than Heterogeneous, while there 
is no difference in the Non-Competitor condition. Additionally, no such 
interaction is in evidence in the Non-shared cue group. However, we 
should be cautious about these results in the context of the apparent 
strategy that seems to be used, particularly in the Shared group. Still, if 
whatever strategy is at play both in the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous 
trials, one could argue that the eye movements have been modulated in 
the Heterogeneous trials by attraction of the Private-view competitor object. 
If we consider the graphs in Figure 2.12, showing proportion of looks to 
target and competitor objects separately, we can see that in the Shared, 
Heterogeneous Competitor condition, a strong bias forms to the competitor 
object, in a way that it does not in the corresponding Homogeneous 
condition. This contrast is not apparent in the Non-shared graphs.17 Thus, 
there is some evidence that the memory-based effect is more prominent 
here in the Shared group than the Non-Shared group. 
Finally, although there were no significant effects in the 
Non-Shared group, a 2*2*2 ANOVA (excluding Blocks as a factor) reported 
in the first submission of this thesis did show a significant two-way 
interaction also in the Non-shared group when the three-way interaction in 
this 500-800ms window was followed up. As in Experiment 1, follow up 
analyses on this interaction showed the opposite effect compared to the 
shared group, where a difference in Target Advantage between 
Non-competitor and Competitor only occurred in the Homogeneous 
condition. As with the first experiment, we speculate on this result that there 
                                                            
17 This impression is backed up by statistical analysis that takes looks to the competitor as the DV. 
This is reported in Zheng & Breheny (under review).  
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is a memory effect here but it is weaker due to the greater memory load, 
perhaps because it arises from a more conscious strategy. 
5.3. Discussion 
Although not entirely conclusive, the results indicated that in the shared 
cue condition participants demonstrated a memory-based effect. In 
particular, during the period 500-800ms after the actual word onset 
participants demonstrated larger interference from their privileged 
distracter when the speaker had previously referred to participants' 
privileged ground. Since the average length of the critical word was around 
600ms, this time period corresponds only to the point where participants 
will have processed the critical word (allowing 200ms as the time between 
making a decision and launching an eye movement). 
The results suggested that a greater association in memory was 
created between the physical background colour and the patterns of 
instructions (homogeneous/heterogeneous) and this association influenced 
the subsequent referential processing. It is noteworthy that the cue effect 
was greatly enhanced when the speaker created shared attention to this 
cue through a question.  
 
6. General discussion 
The memory-based model proposed an automatic domain-general 
association process for prioritising previously shared information in 
conversation (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, Horton, 2007). The two experiments 
reported above demonstrate the operation of a memory-based mechanism 
in the context of a perspective-taking task. Participants received two sets of 
instructions associated with two different cues. One set of instructions 
frequently made reference to private grid positions. We found that, for 
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some cues, participants suffered more interference from privately viewable 
objects when the cue was to the heterogeneous instructions, compared to 
when the cue was to the homogeneous instructions. It seems then that the 
association between the cue and the past references to privileged grid 
positions led to more attention to these positions and thus more 
interference from competitor items held there. This is arguably an effect of 
memory mechanisms of the kind described in the literature as being 
responsible for making previously shared information salient.  
However, in both experiments, the increased interference effect 
was modulated by the cue. In both experiments, we found one type of cue 
to be more effective than another. For the first experiment, we compared 
the effect of speaker identity as cue with speaker-plus-physical cue and 
found that speaker identity was more effective. This difference may have 
been due either to simple salience of the respective cues, or, as I argued, 
to the fact that cues are more effective when in shared attention. The 
second experiment directly tested the hypothesis that cue needs to be in 
shared attention at the coding phase. We found the predicted increase in 
interference when the cue was in shared attention. When the cue was 
privately attended by the participant, we found no memory-based effect. 
On reflection, it may seem obvious that memory-based processes 
could not operate unconstrained and still properly serve the function of 
supporting the processing of referents in common ground. After all, one 
could be interacting with a speaker whilst attending to private thoughts, or 
one could simply be co-present with another agent while attending singly to 
an object or event, and in neither case would the object of attention be 
common ground. If memory-based mechanisms indiscriminately reflect 
memories of past events in which the current speaker was co-present, then 
the extent to which their output aligns with true common-ground information 
would be much diminished. Our results show that memory-based 
mechanisms do not operate unconstrained, and seem to reflect a selection 
from what is in shared attention at the point of encoding. The results thus 
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support my proposals in two ways. First, we have established that decision 
processes about referents are affected by low-level memory based 
processes. Our position is similar to that of Horton and colleagues, that 
these mechanisms can provide rapid, implicit and relatively low-cost 
access to previously shared information. But unlike other memory-based 
models, it seems that information previously in shared attention is 
prioritised. This latter result provides support to a second element to my 
proposal – that information in shared situations, what is shared attention, 
receives differentially more attention and is processed more thoroughly for 
relevance and so is integrated more deeply with context. 
Casting our mind back to the review of research on toddlers we 
found that the operation of a common-ground mechanism can sometimes 
work against the optimal functioning of decision processes for definite 
reference (cf. Moll et al. 2011). When the cues to shared information were 
strong, children seemed unable to treat an unseen object as novel for an 
adult experimenter, in spite of the fact that the adult clearly could not see 
the object. Something similar has happened in the studies I report in this 
chapter. We developed a procedure wherein cues to common ground 
result in increasing the salience or activation of objects that the director 
cannot see. Thus, in perspective-taking tasks, where a participant needs to 
consider what the director knows about objects in privileged ground, it 
could be that mechanisms for promoting common ground objects work 
against referential decision processes. This is a possibility that we will 
explore in the next set of experiments. Before that, we will consider in detail 
previous studies of perspective-taking. 
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Chapter 3: Perspective-taking on-line 
 - What on-line research tells us about the use of 
common ground and Theory of Mind in referential 
processing. 
 
In this chapter we will consider research that applies time-sensitive 
visual-world methods to investigate referential processes during what have 
become known as referential game or perspective-taking tasks. 
Perspective-taking tasks have grown out of a long line of research on 
interaction in dialogue (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Garrod & Anderson, 1987) where interlocutors’ knowledge and 
beliefs diverge from one another but where they have to co-ordinate on 
some facts in order to perform the task. In perspective-taking tasks, 
participants are typically faced with a situation where the speaker is not 
able to see a set of objects that they can see themselves but where there 
are other objects that are jointly visible.  
 
1. The Perspective-taking Task - Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner 
(2000) 
An important early study of this sort is reported in Keysar et al. (2000). 
Participants were presented a grid of 4 by 4 slots containing objects and 
required to reorganize these objects around the grid with the help of a 
director (an experimental assistant) (see Figure 3.1). Some slots were only 
visible to participants, while others were visible to both sides. The director 
instructed participants to move objects in the task. In a test condition, two 
unequal sized objects (e.g., a large and a medium candle) were presented 
in shared slots so that both director and participant could see them, and a 
third, competitor object with a different size (e.g., a small candle) was 
presented in a participant privileged slot - only visible to participants. In a 
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control condition, the participant privileged competitor (the small candle) 
was replaced by an irrelevant object different to the shared objects (not a 
candle), so both participant and director were presented only two 
contrastive objects. Participants' reactions were coded and analyzed after 
hearing utterances containing the critical phrase “the small candle”. In the 
test condition, the referent of this phrase was not the smallest one from the 
participant’s perspective, although it was the smallest one from the 
director’s view. Thus participants had to ignore the fact that a visible object 
best fit the description and consider how the director viewed the grid in 
order to determine the correct reference. Results showed that participants 
had more fixations and a longer looking time to the participant-privileged 
competitors in the test condition compared to the irrelevant objects in the 
same privileged positions in the control condition. Participants also reached 
and grabbed the privileged competitor more in the test condition compared 
to the irrelevant objects in the control condition. These results indicate that 
participants consider the privileged competitors as referents in the test 
condition. Besides, the looking time latency showed that participants had 
faster initial eye movement to the privileged competitor than the shared 
target in the test condition. And both their initial and final fixation on the 
shared target in the test condition was delayed compared to the control 
condition. These results indicate that when a private competitor existed, 
participants took it into consideration initially.  
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Figure 3. 1. The sample setup in Keysar et al. 2000’s study.  
Addressee and director were sitting in each side of the shelf. The white slots were 
visible to both the addressee and the director, but the black slots were only visible 
to the addressee. (Keysar et al. 2000, p. 33.) 
 
2. Perspective-Adjustment Model 
As Keysar et al. argue, if the commonly viewable objects are considered to 
be in common ground and if the privately viewable objects are not, then the 
results of this study challenge the theory of referential processing found in 
Clark & Marshall 1981 and elsewhere, which says that definite referents 
are constrained to be common ground. Participants clearly find it difficult to 
ignore the object which is the best fit for the description, ‘the small candle’, 
in so-called privileged ground.  
The results of the study also provide support for Keysar et al.’s 
proposed, ‘perspective adjustment’ theory according to which 
comprehenders initially process referents from an egocentric perspective, 
only to later adjust where information about the speaker’s perspective is 
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integrated into the decision process. The perspective adjustment theory is 
motivated by the idea that keeping track of what the speaker knows and 
does not know is a cognitively costly process and, as such, makes the 
strategy of ignoring that perspective temporarily worthwhile since one’s 
egocentric perspective and the correct, speaker-adjusted perspective are 
frequently aligned.  
The Perspective-adjustment model first proposed by Keysar and 
colleagues assumes two operations: an unrestricted search and a 
monitoring process (Keysar, Barr & Balin, 1998; Keysar, Barr & Horton, 
1998; Keysar, 2007). Through the former operation the addressee 
searches potential referents unrestrictedly, while this search process is 
monitored by an adjusting process with higher-level and meta-knowledge 
memory structures. This monitoring role is attributed to common ground by 
Keysar and colleagues (Keysar, Barr & Balin, 1998; Keysar, Barr & Horton, 
1998; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar 2004; Keysar, 2007).  
 
3. The role of common ground mechanisms in 
perspective-taking tasks 
In setting out the operation of the perspective adjustment model, Keysar 
and colleagues typically assign the role of the costly higher-level 
mechanisms to be that of monitoring what should be common ground. 
However, as discussed in previous chapters, keeping track of common 
ground information does not involve making inferences about the speaker’s 
mental state for this kind of study. In particular, the common assumption 
among researchers who use the perspective-taking paradigm is that the 
commonly visible objects in these studies are established as being 
common ground in virtue of their co-presence. In terms of Clark & 
Marshall’s proposals, this means that a co-presence heuristic is applied to 
the scenario to determine the common object as being in common ground. 
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This heuristic does not call on higher-order inferences, according to Clark & 
Marshall. As mentioned above, the co-presence heuristic requires 
evidence for shared attention to co-present objects. Specifically, the 
heuristic could not apply to objects that are not commonly visible to rule 
them out from common ground. There are two reasons for this. The first is 
that it would be entirely inefficient to continuously monitor an utterance 
situation for objects that are not jointly visible so as to rule these out of the 
common ground. Common ground is a positive construct only. As a 
constraint on definite reference it would contain a pool of possible referents 
for interlocutors to refer to with definite forms. It is incoherent to conceive of 
common ground processes yielding information about what is not in 
common ground.  
The second reason for a co-presence heuristic to not exclude 
objects from common ground would be that objects can enter common 
ground via other means, such as through prior discourse. Just because an 
object is not co-present, it does not mean that it could not be common 
ground. 
In terms of the proposal made in Chapter 1 about common ground, 
I would similarly argue that keeping track of common ground via cues to 
joint or shared attention would be relatively low in cost.  
So, if success on this perspective-taking task is difficult due to the 
interference that the privately viewable objects create, then this is not due 
to any difficulty maintaining common ground, by any theory of common 
ground, but more likely to due to other factors. One such factor is that the 
best match for the description that the speaker uses (‘the small candle’) is 
to the privileged object. Another is that the procedure adopted in Keysar at 
al.’s experiment does not ground the commonly viewable objects 
sufficiently well. For example, by simply viewing the objects, people may 
not share their attention on the target objects. A third is that, in this context 
it may be difficult to integrate information about the speaker’s ignorance of 
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the third candle in the on-line decision process about the referent. Indeed, 
the application of theory of mind abilities in this context seem to be critical 
to success, even though these abilities are largely inert here in keeping a 
record of common ground.18  
One further point to consider about the experimental procedure in 
Keysar et al. (2000) and many subsequent studies using similar 
procedures is that it is not entirely clear that the privately viewable objects 
are not in common ground, at least according to the theory of common 
ground being proposed in this thesis. To see this, consider that at the 
beginning of a session, the participant and director are told about the set up 
of the grid, involving private slots for the participant and critically, both 
director and participant are instructed that there will be objects in the grid 
visible only to the participant. Thus, via verbal instruction, it becomes 
common ground that there will be objects in the participant’s private slots. 
So, it is common ground that there are objects there when the director 
gives instructions. What is not common ground, of course, is the identity of 
the objects (whether there are any candles there, for instance). A strict 
application of Clark’s theory would mean that these privately viewable 
objects are not in common ground under the description used by the 
director (‘the small candle’, for instance) and are thus not available for 
definite reference under that description. However, a theory of common 
ground that does not serve as a necessary pre-condition for definite 
reference but is a construct that promotes potential referents to the extent 
that they have been previously shared, would say that even privately 
viewable objects are common ground to some extent, perhaps less than 
the commonly viewable objects. We will take up this point further below. 
To sum up this discussion, we have reviewed an influential study 
which seems to show that common knowledge of definite referents (under 
                                                            
18 Recall the observation made in the first chapter that it is impossible to apply ToM reasoning 
abilities to establish a referent as common knowledge since it would involve an infinite series of 
every higher-order inferences about the other agent’s higher-order inferences. Clark & Marshall 
are aware of this problem and that is why they propose heuristic processes for inferring common 
knowledge. 
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the description provided) is not a hard constraint on referential processes. 
These results add indirect support to the conceptual arguments put forward 
in Chapter 1 that, from a cognitive perspective, it is not necessary that a 
target definite referent’s identity be common knowledge. We have however 
taken issue with the idea that an egocentric heuristic procedure is 
motivated by the cost of maintaining information on what is common 
ground.  
 
4. Graded Salience Models and the Cost of Perspective-Taking 
Stepping back from the specifics of the perspective-taking task, even when 
considered in terms laid out by Clark and colleagues, common ground is 
not necessarily costly to maintain. One could perhaps argue that a diary 
representation of previous encounters requires extra resources over and 
above those needed to access encyclopedic memory for discourse 
processing.19 For example, one could claim that diary representations 
require an explicit form of episodic memory of previous encounters. 
However, no argument for such a requirement exists and it is difficult to 
conceive of why explicit memory would be essential to maintain common 
ground. Instead, it seems sensible to allow that Clark & Marshall’s 
heuristics could be implemented via implicit memory mechanisms, of the 
kind assumed in memory-based models.  
Brown-Schmidt (2012) in fact proposes something along these 
lines. That paper demonstrates a graded effect of cues to common ground. 
In one condition, an experimenter asks about the identity of an object 
privately viewable for the participant. At test, this context elicited greater 
visual bias to that object as a potential referent than in the case where the 
                                                            
19 Keysar et al., (1998) seem to make such a suggestion but it is unclear what they have in mind 
as being required to maintain common ground, as they make frequent reference to ‘higher-order’ 
processes. This suggests that, like many researchers in this field, they merge the functioning of 
theory of mind in perspective-taking tasks with the maintenance of a diary representation for 
common ground. 
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participant was prompted to announce the identity of the object to the 
director. This result seems echoic of the result in Moll & Tomasello (2007), 
reviewed above, that showed different degrees of interaction yielded 
different degrees of awareness of sharedness at test. In another paradigm, 
Metzing & Brennan (2003) demonstrate a partner-specific association 
between a referring term and target referent. Metzing & Brennan’s account 
of their results is cast in terms of Clark & Marshall’s theory but assuming 
that associations between speaker and referring form are made in memory, 
becoming available later via automatic cue-based activation. 
Thus, there is an idea abroad that maintaining common ground, 
even as envisaged by Clark & Marshall, could be integrated into normal 
memory processes for discourse interpretation in general. However, this 
idea is found together with the idea that success in perspective-taking 
tasks is achieved simply by constraining referents to common ground. Here 
we have taken issue with this idea. To exclude a privately viewable object 
as a possible referent requires more than mechanisms for maintaining 
common ground. It requires an inference about the speaker’s ignorance of 
the identity of the private object. That is, it requires a Theory of Mind 
inference. 
To return to the question of costs involved in perspective-taking 
tasks, we are left with the question why participants have difficulty with the 
task presented in Keysar et al. (2000). Above we mentioned three kinds of 
factor that are commonly discussed in the literature. Two of these are 
specific to the design of Keysar et al.’s task and are addressed in 
subsequent literature, to be reviewed in coming sections. The third factor 
that is considered concerns the cost of theory of mind inferences. We will 
also review literature that bears on whether access to ToM inferences 
on-line are necessarily costly. We shall see that subsequent research in 
this area finds an early effect of perspective-taking, calling into question the 
specific of Keysar et al.’s proposal. Finally, we identified a fourth possible 
factor in this section that is yet to be explored experimentally. This is the 
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possibility that, to some extent, the privately viewable objects are common 
ground, in the sense that their existence is shared information, even though 
their specific identities are not. If social cognitive mechanisms for discourse 
generally promote the activation of potential referents that are shared, then 
it could be that these mechanisms work against the participant in this task. 
We will explore this idea in the next set of experiments, presented in the 
following chapter. 
 
5. Constraint-based research 
In language processing research, the constraint-based model proposes 
that all relevant and available information, including both linguistic and 
non-linguistic information, is continuously integrated into language 
processing (e.g., McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998; 
MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; MacDonald, 1994). The 
theory is also extended to information that is relevant in perspective-taking 
tasks. In this way, perspective information is just one of the general 
constraints on language processing. All the constraints compete with each 
other, and the one with stronger weight will overcome others to determine 
the favoured interpretation.  
According to proponents of the constraint-based model, ground 
information and perspective information are processed in parallel with 
linguistic information and other contextual information, so it can be 
employed without delay in language processing (Hanna et al., 2003; 
Brown-Schmidt, & Hanna, 2011). Numerous studies have demonstrated 
eye gaze patterns which suggest that perspective information is taken into 
account early. In Hanna and colleagues’ 2003 first experiment, they 
explored how definite reference was disambiguated through an 
incremental language process (see Figure 3.2). In the task participants 
attempted to put a shape (e.g. a triangle) on another particular destination 
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shape which was depicted by a definite noun phrase such as “the red one”. 
Two identical destination shapes were always present at the same time, 
with a target shape being in the common ground and a competitor shape 
being either in the common ground or addressee's privileged ground. The 
colour of two destination shapes were also manipulated as same vs. 
different. Accordingly, the utterance would be ambiguous only when the 
same colour competitor was in the common ground (the left upper chart in 
Figure 3.2), rather than the different colour competitor (the lower charts in 
Figure 3.2) or the same colour one in addressee's privileged ground (the 
right upper chart in Figure 3.2).  
 
 
Figure 3. 2. Sample displays in Hanna et al., 2003’s study.  
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Participants were required to move the blue triangle on a destination triangle 
which had a competitor with a same/different colour in the privileged/common 
ground. The left upper display illustrates the same colour common ground 
condition, the right upper is the same colour privileged ground condition, the left 
lower is the different colour common ground condition, the right lower is the 
different colour privileged ground condition (Hanna et al., 2003, p.46). 
 
The results showed that when the competitor was in the different 
colour, the looking time to the competitor was not different to any other 
irrelevant objects. When the same colour competitor was in the common 
ground, a bias in eye gaze formed equally on both the target or the 
competitor. A critical point was, when the same colour competitor was in 
addressee's privileged ground, whether the looking pattern would be more 
analogous to the same colour/common ground condition, or the different 
colour condition. Results showed that participants mostly looked at the 
target initially, and the looks rose steadily and quickly, which was not 
different to the different colour condition. So it indicated that perspective 
information was integrated in the same time course as other information. 
However, similar to Keysar and colleagues' experiment results (see Keysar, 
Barr & Balin, 1998, Keysar et al., 2000), this study also replicated the 
finding that privileged ground somewhat interfered with referent search. 
When the same colour competitor was in addressee's privileged ground, 
although previous target advantage analysis revealed the same pattern as 
the different colour condition, a competitor fixation analysis showed the 
same manner as the same colour/common ground condition, that is, 
participants looked at the competitor more and longer than any other 
irrelevant objects. In short, the analysis on the target revealed an early use 
of speaker’s perspective, but the analysis on the addressee-privileged 
competitor shows a continued attraction to these referents.  
Notwithstanding the continued attraction of the privately viewable 
object, these results directly challenge the proposals of the 
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perspective-adjustment model. According to that model, perspective 
information is integrated into on-line processes at a secondary phase, 
preceded by the deployment of an egocentric heuristic that equally 
considers all potential referents from the participant’s perspective. Hanna 
et al. report results that show a clear early sensitivity to perspective. 
Constraint-based models blend Hanna et al.’s two contrasting 
findings by proposing that different weighted constraints compete with each 
other to compute an optimal interpretation on-line. In particular, 
compositional language processes involved in these tasks require 
comprehenders to identify a contrast set (a set of candles in Keysar et al.’s 
study, a set of triangles in Hanna’s study) due to the modification of the 
description. For instance, ‘the small candle’ makes implicit reference to a 
contrast set of candles. Comprehenders need to find a referent for this set. 
It is reasonable to assume that there is a strong bias to assign all candles 
in the visual array as the referent of this implicit variable, in the absence of 
strongly constraining factors. Keysar et al.’s argument could be that 
perspective information is just such a constraining factor and should block 
the private candle from membership of this set. However, the argument 
from the constraint-based camp would be that the set-up of Keysar et al.’s 
study does not make perspective information sufficiently salient or relevant 
to the task. The procedure in Hanna et al. (2003) involved a set up phase 
where director and participant jointly established the common-ground 
objects via a verbal process. In addition, the participant was given their one, 
‘secret’ object to place where they wished. In this way, the procedure 
reinforced perspective information, providing more shared attention to the 
common-ground objects, but more attention to the speaker’s ignorance of 
the private object. Thus, the difference in terms of time-course of the use of 
perspective information between the two studies could be attributed to 
procedure.  
Another factor, mentioned above, has to do with the fact that in 
Keysar et al.’s study, the description, ‘the small candle’ best fits the private 
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object, while in Hanna et al.’s study, both private and common objects are 
equally good fits to the description. But this aspect of Hanna et al.’s design 
has led to a criticism of its value to show the normal time course of 
deployment of perspective information. For instance Barr (2008) notes that 
in Hanna et al.’s design, there is one condition where there are two red 
triangles in common ground. This procedure creates a global ambiguity in a 
number of trials. As global ambiguities do not get resolved without further 
recourse to the speaker (e.g. by asking), participants might be prompted to 
be generally more strategic in the task, employing otherwise costly 
perspective-taking abilities from the outset. Thus a follow-up study 
eliminating this feature, reported in Heller et al (2008) is relevant. Here, the 
design is such that there is never a global ambiguity, only a temporary one. 
The pattern of gaze data reported in Heller et al. is similar to that in Hanna 
et al. Generally, there is a clear early effect that participants integrate 
perspective information (by excluding the privileged object as a member of 
a contrast set for a modifier), but there is also a greater proportion of looks 
to the privileged competitor compared to a non-relevant distractor in 
privileged view. Heller et al. interpret this latter finding somewhat differently 
to Hanna et al. in that they propose that participants do not exclude all 
attention to private objects in pursuit of a common-ground-only heuristic, 
but monitor objects in private as well as common ground. Heller et al. cite a 
study in Wardlaw Lane et al. (2006) showing that speakers can be over 
informative in their descriptions, integrating private objects into the contrast 
set for a modified description (i.e. they describe a single triangle in common 
view as a ‘the small triangle’ when there is a larger triangle in private view). 
However, it is unclear why participants should monitor private objects in 
performing these tasks. We return to this question below when we consider 
the idea that privately viewable objects are, to some extent, common 
ground. 
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a.                                 b  
 
c. 
Figure 3. 3. Sample displays in the three conditions in Nadig and Sedivy 2002’s 
experiment.  
The common ground condition is displayed the upper left, the privileged ground 
condition at the upper right, and the baseline condition at the bottom. The write 
area is shared between the speaker and the addressee, and the black area is only 
visible in the participant-addressee’s view (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002, p.331).  
 
 
The evidence of early integration of common ground is also 
provided in a child study. Nadig and Sedivy (2002) used the similar, but 
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smaller, visual display as Keysar and colleagues' 2000 study. They 
presented to 5- to 6-year-old children an array of 2 by 2 slots with four 
objects. Two identical objects were presented but with unequal sizes (e.g., 
a tall and a small glass). In a common ground condition both objects were 
shared (Figure 3.3.a), whereas in a privileged condition the competitor 
object was participant-addressee privileged (Figure 3.3.b). A baseline 
condition was also performed with all four objects were in different kinds 
(Figure 3.3.c). When a confederate-speaker asked children to pick up the 
target (e.g. the glass), it is ambiguous in the common ground condition but 
not in the baseline condition. The critical examination focused on children's 
behaviour in the privileged condition. A target advantage analysis (the 
fixation duration to the target (the bigger glass) subtracted the fixation 
duration to the contrasting (or control) object) (the small glass or the apple) 
demonstrated a significant difference between the privileged ground 
condition and the common ground condition, but not between the privileged 
ground condition and the baseline condition in an early time window from 
the onset of the critical word. This result indicated that children initially 
looked at their privileged competitor to the same extent as the privileged 
control object. Children did not refer to their privileged knowledge despite 
of the presence of the competitive object. Therefore, as early as five years 
old children are competent with integrating the common ground in the early 
stage of comprehension. The experimental display is similar with Keysar 
and colleagues 2000’s study, and children are supposed to be less 
competent in perspective taking than adults in that study. But the result 
contradicts the late monitoring role of common ground as Keysar and 
colleague’s study suggests. In their study more objects are involved, and 
the privilege competitor is the best fit of the description (e.g. the small 
candle). In contrast in this study the display is simpler and the description is 
equally matched with both shared and privileged objects (e.g. the glass). It 
indicates that the complexity of information and the burden for memory 
resource may influence the effect of common ground. The constraint-based 
model can better explain the results in both studies, because this model 
predicts different degree of deployment of perspective information based 
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on the different competition between the perspective constraints and other 
language constraints.  
 
6. A role for mental-state information in perspective-taking 
tasks? 
In previous sections, we have taken care to distinguish between 
mechanisms for maintaining common-ground information, via various 
heuristic processes, and mechanisms for inferring information about the 
speaker’s individual perspective (i.e. their mental state) and integrating that 
information into the referential decision process. The latter mechanisms 
would deploy theory of mind abilities in on-line processing. In 
perspective-taking studies where it is shown that participants do not simply 
include all visible objects in their initial search, such as reported in Hanna 
et al. (2003) and Heller et al. (2008), it is unclear whether this is achieved 
by the deployment of a strong common-ground constraint only, or whether 
information about what could not plausibly be a referent also plays a role. 
To clarify this question, consider that in the constraint-based (C-B) model, 
common ground is a strong constraint on referential processes. In 
probabilistic terms, this means that whatever referents are common ground 
are promoted as highly likely referents. According C-B models, the more 
cues there are to common ground, the greater the likelihood that common 
ground objects are referents. Likewise, the greater the linguistic cues are to 
a referent, the greater the likelihood that is assigned to that object as 
candidate referent. We could thus consider the results of the studies 
reviewed thus far in this chapter as demonstrating the trade-off between 
constraints created by common ground and constraints created by 
bottom-up linguistic processing. It may be that information about the 
speaker’s perspective, what they know about and are ignorant of plays a 
peripheral role, or no role at all - at least not initially.  
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There are alternatives however. These would see a greater role for 
actual perspective information, in the form of what the speaker does not 
know about, in referential decision processes.  
According to my proposals about the nature and function of 
common ground in on-line language processing, common ground 
mechanisms are insufficient to exclude the competitor object in private view. 
Information from Theory of Mind inferences would be needed for 
successful, early target bias in these tasks. Recall that my proposal about 
common ground is that it is a mechanism that promotes the salience of 
information previously shared with the interlocutor. In common with the C-B 
model, the degree to which this mechanism plays a role in 
perspective-taking tasks depends on the degree to which objects are 
processed in shared attention. But there are significant points of contrast 
between my proposals and current proponents of the C-B model, all of 
whom endorse Clark & Marshall’s theory of definite reference, for whom 
common ground is the main constraint.  
The first point of contrast is that, contrary to Clark & Marshall’s 
theory, we do not believe that referential processes are strictly constrained 
to choose among common-ground objects. The standard 
perspective-taking paradigm developed in Keysar et al. (2000) and 
employed frequently since is unable to determine whether this is the case 
since the target is always in common ground prior to the utterance. But in 
Chapter 1, we discussed a number of examples of accommodation where 
the referent is not in common ground prior to the utterance and where the 
audience is required to make inferences about the speaker’s mental state 
in order to determine reference. One such example involved Jane placing 
mozzarella cheese in the fridge and her flatmate later placing cheddar 
cheese in the fridge. When Jane later asks for ‘the cheese’, Sue infers that 
Jane is referring to the mozzarella, even though the mozzarella is not 
common ground prior to the utterance being made and even though there 
are two cheeses in the fridge. To get the right referent, Sue has to make 
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inferences about Jane’s false belief about the contents of the fridge (that 
there is just one kind of cheese there). Such examples differ from the 
set-up of the standard perspective-taking experiment since they combine 
the phenomenon of so-called accommodation into common ground with 
the presence of a competitor that the speaker is ignorant of.  
As alluded to in Chapter 1, there is a tradition in pragmatics in line 
with the approach founded by Grice, that sees referential processing as 
intimately involving inferences about the speaker’s mental state in order to 
determine their informative intentions (see Sperber & Wilson, 1986; 
Thomason, 1990 i.a.). According to this tradition, Theory of Mind inferences 
should be integrated routinely into referential processes.20 The approach 
to definite reference adopted in this thesis is aligned within this tradition. By 
contrast, Clark (see Clark, 1996) relies more on external cues to common 
knowledge of discourse-relevant facts. Apart from the common-ground 
heuristics discussed above, research in this tradition has focused on the 
role of features of discourse such as grounding signals (‘uh-huh’) and 
signals for lack of grounding (‘huh?’). It is consistent with this tradition that 
Theory of Mind inferences are peripheral to definite referential processes, 
playing perhaps a monitoring role along the lines envisaged by Keysar and 
colleagues.  
The second point of contrast lies in the way the common-ground 
status of an object is viewed. In Clark & Marshall’s theory, an object is in 
common ground for a given definite description, ‘the F’, only if it is common 
ground that the referent is an F. This is so since Clark & Marshall’s 
common-ground constraint exists to ensure certainty for interlocutors that 
they have coordinated on the same referent. In my proposal, by contrast, 
common ground is more a bi-product of the normal functioning of memory 
mechanisms combined with domain-specific biases in attention triggered 
by socially relevant cues. Thus a referent would be common ground for an 
                                                            
20 We also endorsed the alternative to Clark & Marshall’s Common Ground Constraint. This was 
the Identifiability Constraint. This is a cognitive constraint on definite reference that follows from 
the proposals of Russell (see Neale 1990). 
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utterance to the extent that it has been processed as an object of shared 
attention up  to the point that the utterance is made. Something which has 
been shared attention is liable to be salient when an utterance is made by 
the agent with whom attention was shared, more than an object that has 
not been shared attention, other things equal. An important consequence 
of my more mechanistic view of ‘common ground’ is that an object is in 
common ground when an utterance of, ‘the apple’ is made even if its 
identity as an apple is not common ground. This point is relevant to the 
observation made above that in perspective-taking tasks the privately 
viewable objects are in common ground, to some extent. If such is the case, 
then these objects become salient as referents when the director is giving 
an instruction. Thus referential processing in Perspective-Taking tasks 
would rely more heavily on inferences that exclude privately viewable 
objects (ignorance inferences). 
In brief, according to the proposals set out in this thesis, we should 
expect an important role for Theory of Mind abilities in the standard 
perspective-taking task. The extent to which participant’s bias to the correct 
target forms in early phases of processing and the degree of competitor 
interference will depend to a significant degree on the extent to which 
Theory of Mind inferences, specifically about the speaker’s ignorance of 
the identities of the private objects, are facilitated for the participant. My 
position contrasts with that of C-B theorists that adopt Clark & Marshall’s 
theory of definite reference. This more widely endorsed approach does not 
rely heavily on the integration of Theory of Mind inferences in successful 
completion of the perspective-taking task. Although the C-B view does not 
rule out the possibility that ToM inferences can support and complement 
the deployment of the Common Ground constraint, it predicts that success 
on the task is not reliant on the deployment of ToM inferences.  
We turn therefore to consider whether there is any evidence 
relevant to these differing predictions. Recall that, in the standard versions 
of the perspective-taking task, of the kind presented in Keysar et al., (2000), 
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Hanna et al., (2003), and Heller et al., (2008), one is not able to tell whether 
success on this task is conditioned by Theory of Mind inferences since, at 
least according to Clark’s theory as it is adopted in the C-B framework, 
success could be solely due to the Common-Ground constraint. In the next 
section, we review what evidence there is for a role for ToM inferences in 
perspective taking tasks and on-line language processing generally before 
we move to a general recap of the questions we take forward to the next 
set of experiments. 
 
7. Evidence for Theory of Mind inferences in on-line language 
processing 
An important piece of evidence that participants integrate information about 
what the speaker is ignorant of comes in Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & 
Tanenhaus (2008) (see also Brown-Schmidt, 2009a). The study worked 
with the idea that if a speaker asks a question about what is in a grid 
position, they do not know the identity of the object in that position. The 
design was set up so that, if participants could integrate information about 
what grid positions the speaker is ignorant about, then they could anticipate 
the target before a critical point in the question. In a reference game 
participants were faced with a display that indicated what speaker and 
themselves could both see, what only they could see and blacked-out grid 
positions containing objects only the speaker could see (see Figure 3.4.) 
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a. Early Condition                 b. Late Condition 
Figure 3. 4. Sample displays in Brown-Schmidt et al. 2008’s study. 
Participants either (a) have one object above the cows in private view and one in 
common view (Early condition); or (b) both objects above the cows are in private 
view (late condition). Commonly viewable positions are white, privately viewable 
positions are grey and blacked-out positions are viewable only to the other player. 
 
There are two conditions. In each condition there are two 
commonly visible animals of the same species (cows in Figure 3.4). The 
speaker will ask about the identity of an object that is above (or below) one 
of these objects. In both conditions the object of inquiry will be privately 
viewable to the participants – i.e. the speaker is ignorant of that object. In 
one condition, only one of the animals above these  two known animals is 
unknown to the speaker (early condition – Figure 3.4.a). In a late condition, 
both animals above the known animals are unknown to the speaker (Figure 
3.4.b). When the speaker asks, ‘What’s above the cow with the glasses?’ in 
the late condition, the participant would be unable to anticipate the target of 
the question until ‘glasses’ since both objects above the two cows are 
unkown to the speaker. In the early condition, however, if the participant 
can integrate the fact that the speaker asks about the object he does not 
know, they can anticipate the target after ‘cow’. Accordingly, from the 
earliest time period after the onset of the noun, ‘cow’, Brown-Schmidt and 
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colleagues found a significantly greater target bias in the early condition. 
Thus, participants’ eye gaze shows clear evidence that they are able to 
integrate information about speaker ignorance, at least when being asked 
a question. 
It is interesting to note that in discussion, Brown-Schmidt et al. 
frame their results in terms of integrating ground information.21 Could it be 
that participants approach this task relying on ground information only? For 
example, could participants use a heuristic that maps questions onto 
information that is not common ground? It seems somewhat implausible 
that this is the case. It is not true that the target of questions (at least, 
genuine requests for information) is the same as information that is not 
common ground. Typically, a genuine request for information is made by 
someone who is ignorant of that information. Information that does not 
happen to be common ground does not include only information that one’s 
interlocutor is ignorant of. Much information may be known by two people 
without that information being common ground. Still, it is perhaps possible  
that participants in this study adopt a strategy to equate the domain of an 
inquiry with what is not common ground, as suggested by Brown-Schmidt 
and colleagues. In that case we need to see if there is any other evidence 
that Theory of Mind inferences are integrated into on-line language 
processing.  
Ferguson & Breheny (2011, 2012) present a series of studies that 
show participants anticipate targets by integrating information about either 
a character’s beliefs and desires or about a live speaker’s false belief. In 
neither of these studies is ground relevant to the task. In the case of 
Ferguson & Breheny (2011), participants here a story about a character 
who wants to keep a particular desire secret and so acts in a way that 
would not lead others to think she has this desire. In Ferguson & Breheny 
(2012), the speaker has an out of date belief about the location of a target 
object and is answering a question asked by a third party about that object, 
                                                            
21 See, for example, page 1132. 
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according to that out of date belief. These studies demonstrate the 
integration rich Theory of Mind inferences into incremental language 
processing.  
 
8. Questions Moving Forward 
The two main models proposed to account for results in the 
perspective-taking task both assume that there are automatic processes 
and corrective, monitoring processes. They differ only in what information 
can be integrated in the automatic phase. The perspective-adjustment 
model of Keysar and colleagues proposes that initial processes are from an 
ego-centric perspective and are not affected by information about what is 
common ground. These processes are monitored by a system that has 
access to ground information, among other sources, and can be corrected 
where necessary. Constraint-Based proposals, found in Hanna et al. 
(2003), Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008) and elsewhere counter that ground 
information does get integrated in initial, automatic processes. The idea 
here is that perspective-taking tasks give rise to a trade-off between 
common ground constraints and bottom-up constraints that attempt to 
match linguistic input with targets in the visual context. Corrective 
processes are necessary where cues to ground information do not 
sufficiently constrain the set of potential referents to common ground. 
It is easy to read the literature on perspective taking and come to 
the conclusion that Theory of Mind abilities are fundamental to the 
derivation of ground information. For instance, in a widely cited review of 
perspective taking literature, Brown-Schmidt & Hanna (2011) say in their 
introductory section, “In this chapter, we focus on the use of one type of 
non-linguistic information in incremental language 
comprehension—information about others’ knowledge and beliefs.” 
(Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011 p. 12) but the rest of the paper exclusively 
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reviews work that explicitly sets out to test whether common ground 
information influences incremental referential processing. That review 
paper also explicitly points to the work of Clark and colleagues as providing 
the theoretical underpinning for ideas about  common ground in referential 
processing. As discussed at length in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Clark (1992, 
1996) views common ground as common knowledge of discourse-relevant 
information, in line with prominent views in linguistics and philosophy (e.g. 
Stalnaker 2002). Dating from the work of Clark & Marshall (1981) there is a 
proper awareness in this work that one cannot establish what is common 
knowledge in via an infinite series of inferences about ever higher-order 
beliefs.22 Clark & Marshall propose that common knowledge has to be 
established via heuristic means. Thus while it may be true that ground 
information is information about knowledge or beliefs, because it is 
common knoweldge that is in question, cognitive processes that establish 
ground information are not liable to call on Theory of Mind abilities. 
Thus, both of the widely discussed sets of proposals about 
behaviour in perspective-taking tasks are compatible with the idea that 
Theory of Mind information is only available to be integrated at the 
monitoring and corrective stage of referential processes. It seems fairly 
clear that it is the view of Keysar and colleagues that Theory of Mind 
information is integrated at the secondary stage. For instance, Keysar, Lin 
and Barr (2003) present a version of the perspective-taking task and 
explicitly argue that the errors incurred in that task are due to the difficulty 
in integrating Theory of Mind inferences into language processes. As we 
have seen above, however, other studies show an effect of early 
integration of Theory of Mind information in language comprehension 
(Ferguson & Breheny 2011, 2012). We have also seen apparent evidence 
in Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008) for integration of ignorance inferences in a 
taks very similar to the standard perspective-taking task, involving 
questions. However, Brown-Schmidt and colleagues present their results 
                                                            
22 Of course, one can establish that something is not common knowledge by an inference that 
one’s interlocutor does not believe some proposition. But the focus here is what is in common 
ground (hence, what is common knowledge). 
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as yet more evidence that ground information is integrated on line, 
extensively citing the work of Clark as providing the theoretical 
underpinning for their design. This is the case in Brown-Schmidt et al. 
(2008), Brown-Schmidt (2009), and Brown-Schmidt & Hanna (2011). The 
proposal seems to be that interrogative forms are processed using ground 
information - questions only ask about information that is in privileged 
ground. 
It is of course compatible with Constraint-Based views that Theory 
of Mind inferences, being just another source of contextual knowledge, are 
integrated into automatic language processes. However, it was argued 
above it is in the spirit of Clark’s work on dialogue that Theory of Mind play 
a peripheral role, perhaps along the lines envisaged by Keysar and 
colleagues. This is so since common ground (i.e. common knowledge of 
discourse-relevant facts) is for Clark the focus of dialogue and common 
ground is maintained in Clark’s work via external cues (see especially Clark 
& Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996). It is really the forms of behaviour that 
are exploited in the process of moving pieces of the ‘dialogue game-board’ 
around.  
So, moving forward into the next chapter, we have an open 
question about the specific role for theory of mind inferences in the 
perspective-taking task. To date, no research has explicitly studied the role 
of Theory of Mind inferences in the standard perspective-taking task. More 
broadly, we are interested in the extent to which processes that maintain 
common ground play a role in language processing and the extent to which 
processes that integrate theory of mind inferences play a role. Work in the 
spirit of Clark sees the lion-share of the constraints coming from 
common-ground processes. By contrast, my own proposals see a lesser 
role for common ground and a greater role for Theory of Mind processes. 
Specifically, regarding the perspective taking task, we have raised a 
second question about whether common ground processes in fact create 
some interference in this task.   
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Chapter 4: The role of common ground and Theory of Mind 
in perspective taking tasks 
1. Common Ground 
Throughout this thesis, I have used the term, ‘common ground’ to refer to 
what is shared information among interlocutors. I have tried to show that it 
is possible to take two perspectives on this phenomenon. On the one hand, 
Clark’s perspective and that of many other theorists is that common ground 
involves common knowledge of discourse relevant facts. For this to be a 
psychologically plausible perspective on common ground, Clark and others 
recognise that it is necessary to adopt something like Lewis’ theory of 
common knowledge. According to that theory, it is possible to recognise 
information as common ground if there is a ‘reflexive common indicator’ 
available to the interlocutors. Two key such indicators are the basis of 
Clark’s co-presence and previous-discourse heuristics. On closer 
inspection, however, it was argued that both of these heuristics rely on 
cues for shared attention to relevant information. Shared, or joint, attention 
is a more basic triadic relation than common knowledge. It has been 
argued in the literature that shared attention provides the basis for shared 
information in communication (Barwise, 1988; Peacocke, 2005). The 
alternative perspective, proposed in this thesis, is that common ground is 
what results from shared attention in current or previous interactions, 
including previous discourse.  
Two further points of contrast between my thesis and the more 
widely held perspective of Clark’s inform the experiments in this chapter. 
On the one hand, Clark and Marshall’s original argument for a role for 
common knowledge in definite reference had to do with the need for 
certainty in reference. This necessity results in the common ground 
constraint on definite reference: definite referents’ identities have to be 
common ground. By contrast, we argue that, from a cognitive processing 
perspective, mechanisms for common ground would often be unable to 
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provide the right referent of definite expressions due to the phenomenon of 
accommodation, as shown in one of the cheese examples discussed in 
Chapter 1. Instead, we motivate the presence of common ground in 
communicative interactions on the basis of research in communicative 
development. This research shows that linguists and philosophers’ 
intuitions about the ‘openeness’ involved in communication (what 
Tomasello et al. (2005) terms, ‘knowing together’) likely stem from how 
infants’ concept of communication develops, supported by cognitive biases 
for processing information in shared situations. These biases yield a 
greater integration of shared information in memory as such information is 
processed more deeply for relevance (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).   
Thus our alternative perspective on common ground links in with a 
mechanistic approach involving domain-general memory mechanisms, 
constrained by social-cognitive cues. Common ground mechanisms then 
promote the salience of any previously shared referents when it comes to 
decision processes for definite noun phrases. However, since there is no 
common-ground constraint on definite reference, we made the observation 
that, in perspective-taking tasks at least, the privately viewable objects are 
common ground, to some extent. But all that this means is that objects in 
private view become salient to some degree whilst the director and 
participant interact in the task. However their identities are not common 
ground.  
One aim for this chapter is to explore this hypothesis in the 
experiments, taking our cue from research on children’s use of cues to 
interaction to determine what is shared information. One study in particular, 
reported in Moll et al., (2011) has an experimenter first interact with a 
two-year old child and two novel objects. In a second phase, the adult 
either leaves the room while the child is given a third object to play with, 
replicating the procedure of Tomasello & Haberl (2003), or remains only to 
have her view of the third object blocked by a barrier. Moll et al. found that 
when the Experimenter remained in the room, the child was no longer able 
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to infer that the third toy was novel for her at the test phase. It seems that 
the continued presence of the Experimenter created in the child the 
impression that the third object was in shared attention as well. This is the 
case whether the Experimenter continued to communicatively engage with 
the child about the object from behind a barrier or whether they sat silently 
behind a barrier, close to the child but without an ability to make eye 
contact.23  
The experiments reported in this chapter will test to see whether 
shared engagement relating to the privately viewable objects in a 
perspective-taking task makes the task more difficult for participants. 
 
2. Theory of Mind in on-line referential processes 
Recall that in our review of child research in Chapter 1, we noted that the 
result in Moll et al. (2011) answered a question raised by the earlier result 
reported in Tomasello and Haberl (2003), about whether children succeed 
in the task by considering the experimenter’s individual perspective or their 
shared perspective. Moll et al.’s result suggest that children at this young 
age rely more on shared information than information about what a person 
may know or not know. We assume that through development, people get 
better at integrating information about other’s beliefs and desires, in some 
cases overriding the salience effect of common ground.  
As discussed at length in the last chapter, we see a critical role for 
the integration of Theory of Mind inferences (about what the speaker is 
ignorant of) in perspective-taking tasks. We argued that this position differs 
from the standard Constraint-Based view (see Brown-Schmidt & Hanna 
2011), which follows Clark (1996) where conversation is transacted via 
                                                            
23 See Knoblich et al. (2011) for a review of research on how co-presence itself can lead to a form 
of contingent reactivity. 
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what is common ground and what is not. Definite referents are constrained 
to be in common ground, and new information is constrained to be outside 
of common ground. At best, information about what an interlocutor may 
know or not know plays a supportive role in maintaining a representation of 
ground information. 
To date, no study had directly explored the role of Theory of Mind 
inferences in the perspective-taking tasks. Beginning with the study 
reported in Keysar et al. (2000) and many subsequent studies from 
Keysar’s lab and others (such as Hanna et al. (2003) and Heller et al. 
(2008)) perspective taking tasks can be successfully completed by a 
participant that focusses their attention on what is established as common 
ground via a co-presence heuristic (Keysar et al., 2000; i.a.) or a previous 
discourse heuristic (Hanna et al., 2003; i.a.). Although it is open for a 
participant to infer that if the director does not know the identities of the 
private objects (e.g. that there is a candle in private view), then they cannot 
use those identities in a definite description of those objects, it is not 
necessary for participants to use this kind of ignorance inference to 
successfully complete the task. 
The idea for Experiment 3, reported below, is that if we manipulate 
the cues to the director’s ignorance of the identities of the common ground 
objects, then we should see an effect of this manipulation in on-line 
processing, to the extent that participants are able to integrate cues to 
speaker’s ignorance in the perspective-taking task. That is, if participants 
largely rely on common-ground heuristics to complete the task, there 
should be no effect of a stronger cue to the speaker’s ignorance. However, 
if participants rely on Theory of Mind inferences, then when there is more 
information in the interaction about the director’s ignorance, we should see 
better performance. 
Thus, in the first experiment reported below, we manipulated cues 
to the speaker’s ignorance of the privately viewable objects. To do this, we 
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adapted the procedure employed in the first two experiments (see Chapter 
2). In that procedure, the participant’s private objects appear on a side shelf 
prior to the appearance of the commonly viewable objects. The participant 
is asked to move the objects to private grid positions of their own choosing 
and then signal that they are ready to view the common objects. In 
Experiment 3 below, we included a phase of the procedure between the 
appearance of the private objects and the appearance of the common 
objects where the participant is presented with a statement about the 
superordinate category of the objects (it would be one of either animals, 
shapes or fruits). In one condition, the director guesses the category and 
the participant replies whether their statement is True or False. In another 
condition, a statement about the categories appears on the participant’s 
screen. Again the participant is required to judge the statement True or 
False. In both cases, the rate of True statements is at chance (1/3). Thus in 
one condition, the director’s behaviour (guessing the superordinate 
category) highlights their ignorance about what kinds of objects the 
participant can see. In another condition, although the participant responds 
to the same statements in the same way, coming from the computer 
program that controls the experiment, the statements appear more as tests 
set by the experimenter.  
 
3. Experiment 3 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
40 participants (7 male and 13 female in the guess condition; 9 male and 
11 female in the test condition) were recruited from UCL’s subject pool. 
They were blind to purpose of the study. All were paid or given course 
credit for their participation. One UCL student was recruited to play the 
speaker role.  
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3.1.2. Stimuli and design 
Participants were given instructions to move objects around a 3*3 grid as in 
Figure 4.1, where three objects were in common view between the 
instructing speaker and hearer and three objects were placed in grey 
positions so that they were only visible to the hearer (privileged view). 
Except for the training phase where participants were given a turn at being 
a director, all instructions were given by a confederate speaker.  
 
 
Figure 4. 1. The example display for the main game grids in Experiment 3.  
Participants could see any objects in all the nine positions. The instructor could 
see the grid from the opposite side and the three objects in the private grey grids 
are not visible (here, the banana, the orange, and the strawberry). 
 
For each trial, a new set of objects appeared on the display. Each 
such set contained objects belonging to one of three categories: fruits, 
animals or geometric shapes. There were ten different objects for each 
category and some were paired in the same subtypes. For example, 
among the ten fruits, there were two apples, two bananas, two oranges, 
and for other different fruits. A set of four pictures from different subtypes 
130 
 
plus two pictures from the same subtype was randomly chosen for each 
trial of the experiment, except for the non-competitor condition. In the 
non-competitor condition all six pictures were from different subtypes. For 
instance, a non-competitor condition trial might contain a picture of a 
banana, cherries, grapes, an orange, an apple and a strawberry, while for a 
matched competitor condition the strawberry was replaced by a paired 
apple (Figure 4.2). All filler items contained similar objects as the 
competitor condition where two objects were paired. 
A trial consisted of one instruction where the participant was asked 
to move an object to a location. For example, ‘Move the apple to the bottom 
middle’. There were 20 critical trials and 20 filler items in each association 
condition. In 10 critical trials (competitor condition), the privileged objects 
included one that was the same type as (although not visually identical to) 
the target in the instruction (an apple). In the other 10 critical trials 
(non-competitor distractor condition), no privileged object was of the same 
type as the target object. Figure 4.2 below shows initial set ups for a pair of 
trials in competitor and non-competitor conditions. For 20 filler items, 
although privileged objects included one that was the same type as a 
common objects, neither of the twinned objects were the target in the 
instruction (an apple) ‘Move the grapes to the middle right’.   
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Figure 4. 2. The initial displays for the competitor condition (left) and 
non-competitor condition (right) in Experiment 3. 
In this example, the target green apple had competitor with the same subtype, e.g. 
a red apple, (competitor condition) or an irrelevant non-competitor, e.g. a 
strawberry, (non-competitor) in participants' privileged grid.   
 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, each trial begins with the main frame 
empty and participants’ private objects appearing on a shelf at the side. 
The procedure was for the participant to first move those private objects 
onto the blocked-off private grid positions on the main frame prior to the 
appearance of the commonly viewable objects. At this point in the 
procedure, a between-groups question manipulation was designed. For the 
Test-question group, participants were asked to make a true/false 
judgement on a statement provided by the program on the screen (eg. Your 
private objects are animals. True/False). They were required to click on the 
true/false button on the screen (Figure 4.3.a). In a Guess condition, the 
director had been instructed to guess the category of the private objects 
verbally and participants need to both click on either ‘True’ or ‘False’ on the 
screen (as in the Test question condition) but also give a verbal reply to the 
speaker including both saying ‘True/False’ and what categories they were 
(Figure 4.3.b). The trial order and categories in questions were the same in 
both conditions, so in the Test-question condition the program pre-set the 
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questions and in the Guess condition the speaker read the questions from 
a list. One third of the questions required a ‘True’ answer and two thirds, a 
‘False’ answer. This ratio corresponded to a chance guessing pattern since 
there were three categories: fruits, animals, and shapes.  
 
  
a. Test Condition               b. Guess Condition 
Figure 4. 3. The displays for question types in Experiment 3.  
In the Test condition, participants judged the statement by clicking on the 
true/false button. In the Guess condition, participants received the guess question 
from their interlocutor and replied both by clicking on the screen and answering 
verbally.  
 
To sum up, the experiment had a 2 (competitor) * 2 (question type) 
design. Altogether, each session with a participant involved 40 trials: 20 
critical items and 20 fillers. The order of presentation of trials was 
randomised. Question type was a between subjects manipulation, so a 
participant either had only written questions (Test condition) or verbal 
questions (Guess condition). 
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3.1.3. Procedure 
Eye-tracking Study:  
At the beginning of the experiment, a participant was seated in front of a 23” 
screen fitted with Tobii TX300 eye-tracking equipment in a room. An 
experimenter brought into the room a confederate who pretended to be 
another participant. They were told that they would be co-operating a game 
with one being an instructor and another being an operator, and the 
instructor should direct the operator to move objects in a shelf presented on 
each screens. The director sat in front of a 15-inch laptop placed at the left 
side of the Tobii eye-tracker, so both the participants and the confederate 
could not see each other’s screen, but they can see each other’s face and 
body (see Figure 4.4). The experimenter sat at the corner to introduce and 
monitor the task. 
 
 
Figure 4. 4. The experimental setup in Experiment 3.  
S represents the subject, who was the operator. C represents the confederate, 
who was the director. E represents the experimenter. 
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During a training phase, participants were assigned as instructors 
and the experimenter helped them to give instructions to the operator. The 
participants were then shown the back of two shelves (see Figure 4.5.a), 
and the confederate pretended to see the front side. During this phase, 
participants either showed a programmed Text question or asked a Guess 
question on the category of operators' private objects, then gave their 
partner an instruction to move objects according to their star hints. The 
confederate pretended to move their mouse. After a few trials they 
switched their roles, and participants were shown the front of the shelves 
(see Figure 4.5.b). 
 
  
a.                           b. 
  
c.                           d. 
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e.                           f.    
Figure 4. 5. The procedure for each trial in Experiment 3.  
When the participants were the instructors they were shown the back of the shelf 
(a). When they were the operators they were initially shown the front of the shelf 
(b), and moved the objects from the small column to grey position of the 3*3 grid 
(c). The confederate always pretended to see the opposite side of the shelf but in 
the fact they were watching the same side of the screen. She guessed the 
category of participants' private objects (d), and then presented three objects in 
the transparent common positions (e). Finally participants moved an object into a 
different position according to the confederate's instruction (f). 
 
In Figure 4.5.b, the 3*3 empty grid appeared on the left of the 
screen. On the right there was a column which contained three objects. In 
the formal test, the experimenter told participants that the three objects are 
their private objects that the confederate did not know what they were. The 
experimenter instructed the participants that they should move these 
objects to the private grey positions on the 3*3 grid and then clicked on the 
image of the bell in the top right hand corner of the screen when they are 
ready (Figure 4.5.c). The confederate then presented the questions (Figure 
4.5.d). In the Test-question condition the participants read the question 
on-screen and just clicked on the answers, without any interaction with the 
director; in the Guess condition the participants listened to the director’s 
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guess about the category of their private object and answered the question 
interactively. It needs to be stressed that the participant plays the role of 
director in the training phase. In that phase, in the Test-condition group, 
they learn that the director does not see the question appearing on the 
addressee’s screen, nor do they know of the answer. This contrasts with 
the Guess-condition, where it is the director that makes the statement 
about the superordinate category, as a guess. 
When participants completed this phase, the confederate showed 
them three objects in common view on the shelf (Figure 4.5.e), then 
participants rang the bell again to indicate that they have seen the common 
objects. Speaker then gives one instruction to move an object to a new 
location (Figure 4.5.f). When this was completed by the participant, they 
clicked the ‘NEXT’ button on the bottom right of the screen and the whole 
procedure began again for the next trial. Note that, on each new trial, the 
three private grid positions appeared in different, randomly assigned 
locations around the nine frame grid. After every two trials, participants had 
an opportunity to break prior to re-calibration of the eye-tracking 
equipment. 
 
Autism Quotient Questionnaire:  
The Autistic-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) developed by Baron-Cohen et. al. 
(2001) was administered to explore whether the individual autistic traits 
predicted the task performance. The motivation for using this comes from 
Nieuwland et al. (2010) that reports an early effect of pragmatic sensitivity, 
as measured by N400 ERP measure, only for a group with a low AQ score. 
I include the measure here since, according to my hypothesis, the ability to 
ignore the occluded distractor in on-line processing would involve access to 
a Theory-of-Mind inference concerning the instructor’s ignorance. It is 
widely assumed that there are individual differences in abilities to integrate 
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Theory-of-Mind inferences. To the extent that AQ score reflects Theory of 
Mind ability, information about this score may enable us to identify at least 
a sub-group for whom the manipulation here has an effect. 
The questionnaire consisted of 50 questions assessing five areas: 
social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communication, and 
imagination. Score 1 point is aggregated if the subject choose an answer 
with autistic property, so the total score ranges from 0 to 50, and a higher 
score represented more autistic traits, implying less social ability. The AQ 
score is not diagnostic but the score 32+ is suggested to be a clinically 
significant standard of the autistic traits. 
 
Effects of Strategies or Learning: 
An aim of this study is to examine the role of two factors in automatic, 
on-line processes. We saw in Experiments 1 and 2 that participants may 
adopt strategies or that behaviour can change over time. There were 
specific factors involved in those experiments that are not involved here, to 
do with there being instructions to the private objects, encouraging 
attention to those areas during the instruction. Nevertheless, we included 
Blocks as a factor in the analysis to check if eye-gaze patterns change over 
the course of the experiment. 
 
3.2. Analysis and Results 
3.2.1. Data Processing 
Eye-movements that were initiated during the auditory instruction were 
processed according to the critical word (‘apple’) onsets for the purpose of 
aggregating the location and duration of each sample from the eye tracker. 
For analysis, we removed any sample that was deemed ‘invalid’ due to 
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blinks or head movements. The spatial coordinates of the eye movement 
samples (in pixels) were then mapped onto the appropriate object regions; 
if a fixation was located within the square surrounding an object, it was 
coded as belonging to that object, otherwise, it was coded as background. 
Target and competitor items were identified on a by-trial basis. In 
competitor trials, the competitor was the privately viewable object that was 
of the same type as the target (e.g. the privately viewable apple in the 
frame on the left side of Figure 4.2). In the non-competitor trials, the target 
was the object that occupied the same position as the competitor (e.g. the 
privately viewable strawberry in the frame on the right side of Figure 4.2). 
Probabilities of fixating the Target or Competitor/Non-Competitor 
objects as a function of time were analysed in terms of a target advantage 
score, (ln(Ptarget/Pcompetitor). Target advantage scores were analysed 
for three time regions. A preview region began 200ms before, and ended 
200ms after, the onset of the critical word (‘apple’). The preview region 
extends to 200ms after the critical word onset in accordance with standard 
assumptions about the time to program and launch an eye movement 
(Hallett, 1986). Following the preview region, our analysis looks at two 
300ms regions, 200-500ms and 500-800ms. Following Hanna et al. (2003) 
the overall 600ms region of interest was chosen to correspond to the 
average critical word length (between five hundred and six hundred 
milliseconds). After this period participants' eye movements were often 
directed toward the mouse curser. The regions were identified and 
synchronised for each participant on a trial-by-trial basis, relative to the 
onsets of the critical word. 
The average AQ scores in Test condition was 17.7, with a 
maximum 32 and a minimum 1; the Guess condition average was 18.15, 
with a maximum 28 and a minimum 7. Those who had a score less than 19 
(median of the AQ scores) were allocated into Low AQ group, while others 
were High AQ group.  
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3.2.2. Analyses 
For each participant (respectively item) and condition, we calculated the 
average target advantage score over the 17ms time slots per analysis 
region. Figure 4.6 shows a plot of the time course of target advantage for 
the two groups. Figure 4.7 shows the average target advantage score for 
each of the competitor and non-competitor conditions for each of the three 
windows. And Figure 4.8 shows the proportion of fixations to the target and 
the competitor in conditions.  
 
 
Figure 4. 6. The time course of the average target advantage score in Experiment 
3. 
The show the TA scores in the guess and test condition from the 200 ms before 
the onset of the critical word to 800 ms after the onset.  
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Test condition                     Guess condition 
Figure 4. 7. The average target advantage score for the three time windows in 
Experiment 3. 
The charts compared the competitor and non-competitor conditions in the Test 
(left) and Guess (right) conditions. Error bars indicate standard error of 
by-participant means. 
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Guess – Noncompetitor            Guess – Competitor 
Figure 4. 8. The proportions of looks the target and the competitor in Experiment 
3. 
 
 
Looking at the graphs in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, we can see an interactive 
pattern emerge, particularly in the 500-800ms time window. 
The results of a 2(competitor vs. non-competitor) * 2(guess vs. 
test) * 2(high AQ vs. low AQ) * 2(first block vs. second block) mixed 
ANOVA are as follows. 
 
Preview and 200-500ms window: 
In the preview window there were no main effects or interactions among 
the competitor types, question conditions, AQ scores and blocks (All Fs < 2, 
all ps > 0.2).  
In the 200-500ms window, there was only an effect of AQ due to 
larger TA in the high AQ than the low AQ group in the by-item analysis, 
F1(1,72)=2.683, p=0.106, ŋp
2=0.036, F2(1,32)=6.488, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.169. 
No other main effects or interactions were found (All Fs < 3, all ps > 0.1). 
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This is a perhaps unexpected result since a higher AQ score 
means lower ‘sociability’. We return to this below. 
 
500-800ms window: 
In the second time window (500-800ms), there was significant effect in the 
competitor types, F1(1,72)=20.872, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2=0.225, F2(1,32)=9.900, 
p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.236, due to the target advantage score being larger in the 
non-competitor condition than the competitor condition. There was also a 
significant effect in the AQ scores, F1(1,72)=8.480, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.105, 
F2(1,32)=21.058, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2=0.397, due to the larger TA scores in the 
high AQ groups than the low AQ groups.  
There was an interaction among the competitor types and the 
question types in the by-subject analysis, F1(1,72)=4.027, p<0.05, 
ŋp
2=0.053, F2(1,36)=2.076, p=0.159, ŋp
2=0.061. Simple effect analyses 
revealed in the test condition participants had larger target advantage 
scores in the non-competitor condition than in the competitor condition, 
F1(1,72)=21.617, p<0.001, ŋp
2=0.231, F2(1,32)=10.521, p<0.01, ŋp
2=0.247, 
but no significant difference was found in the guess condition, 
F1(1,72)=3.282, p=0.074, ŋp
2=0.044, F2(1,32)=1.454, p=0.237, ŋp
2=0.043. 
There was also an interaction between AQ scores and the 
question conditions, F1(1,72)=4.416, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.058, F2(1,32)=12.014, 
p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.273. Simple effect analyses showed that the low AQ group 
had larger TA scores in the Guess condition than the Test condition, 
F1(1,72)=5.442, p<0.05, ŋp
2=0.070, F2(1,32)=12.709, p=0.001, ŋp
2=0.284, 
but the high AQ group have same TA scores in both question conditions, 
F1(1,72)=0.408, p=0.525, ŋp
2=0.006, F2(1,32)=1.787, p=0.191, ŋp
2=0.053. 
To sum up these results, the first thing to note is that there were 
no effects by Block at all. This contrasts with the first two experiments but 
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was expected since the procedure here was closer to the normal 
Perspective-taking procedure and was not designed to induce 
memory-based or strategic effects. 
Next, in the 500-800ms window, the Competitor-by-Question type 
interaction revealed the predicted positive effect of making the speaker’s 
ignorance salient: Target Advantage score in the Guess condition did not 
differ between the Competitor and Non-Competitor conditions, whilst the 
there was a difference in the Test condition, with Competitor trials giving 
rise to lower Target Advantage. 
In line with the surprising result in the 200-500ms time window we 
again find an unexpected main effect of AQ score in the 500-800ms time 
window. In addition, we find an AQ-by-Question type interaction, showing 
that the Low AQ group had worse performance on the Test-question 
condition. To make sense of these surprising results, it is worthwhile 
considering the graphs in Figure 4.9 below which show the average TA per 
time window broken for each of the Low- and High-AQ groups. 
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Guess - Low AQ                Guess - High AQ 
Figure 4. 9. The average TA scores for two AQ groups in Experiment 
3.  
The charts compared the competitor and non-competitor conditions in 
the Test (upper) and Guess (lower) conditions, and Low AQ (left) and 
High AQ (right) group. Error bars indicated standard error of 
by-participant means. 
 
Inspection of the graphs in these figures suggests that the more ‘socially 
able’ Low AQ group has more difficulty in the Test condition than the High 
AQ group.  
One hypothesis for this somewhat surprising result lies in the 
nature of the AQ test itself. Rather than being a direct test of 
Theory-of-Mind abilities or relevant Executive-Function abilities like 
Inhibition control, the AQ survey looks at a more rounded picture of the 
sociability that is appropriate for assessing for Autistic Spectrum 
tendencies. It is widely known that Autistic Spectrum individuals are able to 
pass False-Belief tasks, standardly administered to test Theory of Mind 
(Happe, 1994) but it now becoming clear that implicit social-cognitive 
abilities differ from neurotypical adults (Schneider et al., 2013). If our 
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ability, this could explain why both groups show comparable Target 
Advantage in Competitor and Non-Competitor conditions in that experiment. 
But this does not explain why socially more able individuals find the 
baseline Test procedure more difficult than the socially less able group. 
This thesis’ conjecture about the perspective-taking procedure, to be 
developed in more detail below, is that even though the specific identities 
of the private objects are unknown to the speaker, their presence is shared 
information, in shared attention. As discussed throughout the thesis, 
processing biases makes objects that are, or have been, in shared 
attention more salient or available for referential processes. But this is likely 
to be a graded phenomenon and it could be that individuals differ in the 
extent to which they process information as shared. In fact, it could be part 
of the repertoire of more implicit social cognitive abilities to process 
information as shared, using low-level social cues. Thus, one explanation 
for why the Low AQ group had more difficulty on the Test condition is that 
the private-view objects are more ‘shared’ for them and hence more salient 
as potential referents in the instructions. We return to this discussion after 
Experiment 4. 
 
3.3. Discussion 
We adapted the standard perspective-taking procedure to include a phase 
where the director and participant could interact and share attention to the 
private objects, or not. This happened in the guess question, where the 
director’s guess about the superordinate category of the objects makes 
salient the director’s ignorance of what type of object they are. In the 
non-interactive condition, the participant simply had to respond True/False 
to a statement on screen.  
We analysed eye-gaze data within a 600ms time window. As the 
mean length of the critical noun is about 500ms, this window is little more 
than the time it takes to process the noun. We found that within this 
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relatively short time window, participants showed a differential effect of 
condition. In the Guess condition participants were better able to ignore the 
distractor object in private view, to the extent that there was no difference in 
bias formation compared to when only irrelevant distractors were in private 
view. In the Test condition, by contrast, participants’ gaze data revealed a 
competitor distraction. Compared to the non-competitor distractor condition, 
participants had achieved significantly less Target Advantage in the Test 
condition.  
It is important to note that the interactive, guess condition did not 
involve making the identities of the private objects common ground (i.e. 
whether they were apples or grapes etc.). So, according to the common 
ground constraint proposed by Clark & Marshall and widely adopted in the 
literature, these objects are not common ground for definite descriptions 
used in the experiment (‘the apple’), since information about these 
identities is not common ground. Our conjecture is that there is no common 
ground constraint on definite reference that requires the descriptions of the 
objects already be common ground, but that common ground is a result of 
cognitive biases triggered by social-cognitive cues. Common ground 
information based on prior interaction becomes salient for interlocutors as a 
result of low-level memory mechanisms (Horton & Slaten, 2012) and is a 
graded phenomenon (Brown-Schmidt, 2012).   
In contrast to Constraint-Based models, we see a central role for 
Theory of Mind inferences in perspective taking tasks. That the speaker is 
ignorant of the identities of the objects in private view, although their 
existence is, to an extent, common ground, is a fact that needs to be 
integrated into referential decision processes. By contrast, a proper 
implementation of Clark’s framework (see Clark, 1996), would see 
inferences about ignorance of objects being included into decisions about 
common ground. I.e. one would infer that what is not known by an 
interlocutor could not be common ground. 
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In this experiment, we have illustrated the rapidity with which 
information about the speaker’s ignorance can be integrated into decisions 
about reference. In the Guess condition, the director’s guessing behaviour 
is a strong cue to their ignorance of the private object’s identities. 
Compared to the baseline Test condition, we see the effect of this cue in a 
time window beginning a mere 300ms after the onset of the critical word.24 
To compare this timing it is instructive that in the study reported in Keysar 
et al (2000) the average first looks to the target occur at 1463ms. In a study 
employing similar materials, a similar sized grid but a simpler task, Hanna 
et al. (2003) report a significant difference between target and competitor 
bias from 400ms; but a continued interference from the competitor 
compared to the non-competitor distractor across the same 200-800ms 
time frame we examined here. These latter results are comparable to our 
Test condition results. Thus, although it is difficult to compare timings 
across different experiments, it seems that highlighting speaker’s 
ignorance of private objects clearly improves performance in a time window 
that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that so-called higher-order Theory 
of Mind information is costly and/or time-consuming to integrate. 
Experiment 3 thus provides further evidence against the 
perspective-adjustment model, which assumes that information about the 
speaker’s ignorance is costly to compute and integrate into referential 
decisions. In fact, Experiment 3 demonstrates precisely that the integration 
of Theory of Mind inferences is a graded phenomenon, being something 
that is supported by contextual information, as proposed in Ferguson & 
Breheny (2011). 
In sum, Experiment 3 shows that cues to speaker ignorance leads 
to improved performance on a perspective-taking task. This is the first 
experiment to directly test the effect of such cues on performance. The 
results thus indicate an important role for Theory of Mind inferences in such 
tasks. The results are also counter-indicative of proposals set out by 
                                                            
24 Recall that it takes 200ms to launch an eye movement having processed some linguistic 
stimulus (Hallet, 1986), so gaze data recorded at 500ms after the absolute onset reflects 
processes 300ms after the onset of the word. 
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Constraint-Based theorists that tracking cues to common ground is 
sufficient for good performance on this task. 
An alternative account of the effect of guessing in this experiment 
would turn on a second difference between the Test and Guess conditions. 
Recall that in the Test condition, the participants simply respond to a 
statement that appears on their screen. They are aware the Director does 
not see this statement or their response. By contrast, in the Guess 
condition, there is a full interaction about the superordinate category of the 
private objects. From the Constraint-Based perspective, it could be argued 
that the simple fact of greater interaction between the participant and 
director on each trial leads to better performance. In the only other study of 
the effect of interaction on performance, Brown-Schmidt (2009a) reports 
that participants were more responsive to ground information when they 
interacted with a live director compared to when they were instructed via an 
audio recording. It is important to consider Brown-Schmidt’s studies in 
detail to see that in fact the results are not only consistent with the results 
reported here but with the overall thesis that ground information and ToM 
information are separate. 
Brown-Schmidt (2009a) reports on studies that explore the 
phenomenon of so-called entrainment or conceptual pacts (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Garrod and Anderson, 1987). The paradigm exploits the fact 
that in conversation, people tend to re-use descriptions for an object, rather 
than change. Thus, if one speaker calls an object a metal pipe, both 
interlocutors will tend to continue to use that description, other things equal. 
In studies of the type that Brown-Schmidt reports, one tests the effect of 
changing the description. E.g. from, ‘metal pipe’ to ‘silver tube’ and/or 
changing the speaker. In a visual-world study using a live confederate, 
Brown-Schmidt finds that when the speaker changes but the description 
does not, bias to the target does not form as quickly as when the original 
speaker re-uses the entrained upon description. But when the original 
speaker changes the description, target bias is slower to form than when a 
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new speaker uses the same novel description. These effects were found in 
an early time window, 200-600ms after the onset of the critical linguistic 
input. Thus Brown-Schmidt’s results disconfirm the claim in Kronmüller & 
Barr (2007) that partner-specific effects should take time to emerge, whilst 
ego-centrically derived precedence effects should be evident at the earlier 
time windows. When Brown-Schmidt conducted the same study using 
audio recordings (as Kronmuller & Barr had done) instead of live directors , 
the effects disappear at the early time windows and only re-emerge at later 
times, comparable to those reported in Kronmuller & Barr (2007). 
Brown-Schmidt’s conclusion from these results is that greater live 
interactivity between speakers provides a greater resource for establishing 
ground information, leading to the early effects of discrimination among 
speakers.  
Could it then be the case that greater interactivity in Experiment 3 
above was the cause of the better performance? Interactivity is not 
something that is controlled for in Experiment 3, over and above the design 
providing evidence for the director’s ignorance of the private objects. Thus, 
we require a follow-up study that can serve as a control for this factor. This 
will be presented as Experiment 4 below.  
Before we come to the details of Experiment 4, it is worth saying a 
few words about the studies in Brown-Schmidt (2009a) and how their 
results could be accounted for in the framework advocated in this thesis. 
The first thing to note about entrainment research is that it examines a 
phenomenon that can be accounted for simply in terms of a common 
ground mechanism of the kind proposed in this thesis. The first effect 
reported, where maintained description/maintained speaker leads to 
greater early bias than maintained description/different speaker, can be 
explained simply in terms of cued memory mechanisms. The compound 
cue of speaker and description provides a stronger activation of the target 
than the simple cue of description. The second effect can be explained in 
terms of common ground plus a phenomenon discussed at length in 
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Pickering and Garrod (2013) whereby production can influence 
comprehension. In the entrainment task, participants would be liable to 
pre-label objects according to previously used descriptions, using the 
speaker of those descriptions as a cue. Thus, the ‘pre-emption’ effect seen 
in early time windows in Brown-Schmidt’s study could be the product of a 
low-level common ground mechanism and the fact that production 
processes feed into comprehension. 
While greater interaction can improve performance on entrainment 
tasks, our discussion of the role of common ground in the last chapter led 
us to propose that interaction, per se, might lead to worse performance on 
the perspective-taking task. Our proposals about how social-cognitive 
mechanisms operate separate out mechanisms for Theory of Mind 
inferences and mechanisms for maintaining common ground, based on 
cues to shared attention or shared experience. In Experiment 3, the kind of 
interaction we introduced highlighted the director’s ignorance of the types 
of objects in private view for the participant. However, we conjectured in 
Chapter 3 that the general procedure for the perspective-taking task makes 
the objects in private view common ground, to some extent. Thus, an 
interaction between director and participant that increased the amount of 
shared attention to these private objects but that did not highlight the 
director’s ignorance of their identities, would, according to the proposals in 
this thesis, increase competitor interference, relative to a comparable 
non-interactive condition.  
 
4. Experiment 4 
In the Experiment 4, we intend to explore whether only social engagement 
affects people’s perspective taking. In the Experiment 4 we adapt the 
procedure from Experiment 3 to test this hypothesis, and manipulate the 
social engagement in three dimensions: Interactive, Low-interactive, and 
151 
 
Non-interactive. In the pre-test phase of the guess trial in Experiment 3, the 
director makes a guess about the superordinate category of the private 
objects (making their ignorance salient). In an Interactive condition in 
Experiment 4, the director is allowed to select the superordinate category 
of the objects and announces their selection. In a Low-interactive condition, 
there is no verbal communication between interlocutors but participant and 
director are co-present and each given a message about the superordinate 
category of the private objects at this preliminary phase. This condition is 
comparable with the Test condition in the Experiment 3 due to a similar 
degree of the social engagement. Physical co-presence can convey some 
social cues. Simple co-presence has been shown to induce shared 
representations and forms of contingent behaviour (see Knoblich et al. 
2011 for a review). Hence a third non-interactive condition was established 
with no verbal conversation at this preliminary phase, no shared message 
and no co-presence.  
It has been shown that the social engagement facilitates young 
children to recognise other’s knowledge (Moll & Tomasello, 2007), but the 
co-presence of conversational partners can also lead to an overestimation 
on their mutual knowledge, because the privately viewable objects are in 
common ground to some extent (Moll et al., 2011). So the results of the 
present experiment will be considered as a control study of Experiment 3. 
Our prediction is made based on the graded dimensions: participants may 
resort more to their privileged knowledge when their partner is present than 
absent, and when they have a conversation with their partner than without 
communication.  
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4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
60 participants (12 male and 8 female in the interaction condition; 9 male 
and 11 female in the low-interaction condition; 11 male and 9 female in the 
low-interaction condition) were recruited from UCL’s participant pool. They 
were blind to the purpose of the study. All were paid or given course credit 
for their participation. One UCL student was recruited to play a role of a 
confederate.  
 
4.1.2. Stimuli and design 
Experiment 4 presented the same shelves and object pictures as 
Experiment 3. In the present one, instead of guessing the object category, 
the category was assigned by either the instructor or the computer. 
Participants heard or read a statement before their private objects were 
presented. The type of interaction was operationalized in a between group 
manipulation. In an Interactive condition, the confederate director verbally 
assigned the categories, for example, ‘I’ll show you fruits, ok?’ Participants 
were required to acknowledge their agreement. Then the director clicked 
on one of the choice shown in Figure 4.10.a. In a Low-interactive condition, 
a notice of the category appeared on both sides' screens. Thus both the 
director and participant could to see the notice, for example, “fruit” shown in 
Figure 4.10.b, but there was no verbal interaction about this. In an 
Non-interactive condition, the director sat in a different room, and no notice 
appeared on her screen. In this way there was neither interaction nor even 
a shared message about the participant’s privileged objects prior to the test 
phase. The trial order and categories were the same for all conditions.  
There were 10 competitor trials, 10 non-competitor trials and 20 
filler trials in each condition. Competitor trials had three privileged objects 
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which included one that was the same subtype (although not visually 
identical to) as a common object, and the common object would be a target 
object. Non-competitor trials had six objects in different subtypes. Filler 
items also had twinned objects as competitor items, but neither of them 
was the target.  
 
  
a.                               b. 
 
c. 
Figure 4. 10.  The initial displays in the instructor's screen in Experiment 4.  
Participants were shown the above display in practice trials where they played the 
role of instructors. The upper left figure (a.) represented the Interactive condition, 
where the instructor needed to read and click the notices to demonstrate objects 
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in the participant’s shelf. The upper right figure (b.) represented the 
Low-interactive condition, where a statement about the category of objects 
appears on both the instructor’s and participant’s screen. The lower figure (c.) 
represented the Non-interactive condition, where the director had no information 
about the objects.  
 
To sum up, the experiment had a 2 (competitor) * 3 (interactivity) 
design. Altogether, each session with a participant involved 40 trials: 20 
critical trials and 20 fillers. The order of presentation of trials was 
randomised. Interactivity was a between subjects manipulation. So a 
participant was given prior notification of the category of objects (animal, 
shape, fruit) either via verbal notices (Interactive) from a co-present director 
or via a shared written notice while the director was co-present 
(Low-interactive condition) or via a private (unshared) notice and the 
director was stationed in a separate room (Non-interactive condition). This 
announcement coincided with the presentation of the participant’s private 
objects and thus prior to the trial task. 
 
4.1.3. Procedure 
The present experiment was performed in the same lab as the first 
experiment. The confederate pretended to be a participant. At the 
beginning of the experiment, a participant was seated in front of a 23” 
screen fitted with Tobii TX300 eye-tracking equipment in an eye-tracking 
lab. An experimenter brought into the room a confederate who pretended 
to be another participant. They were told that they would be co-operating a 
game with one being an instructor and another being an operator, and the 
instructor should direct the operator to move objects in a shelf presented on 
each screen.  
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In the Interactive and Low-interactive condition, the confederate sat 
in front of a 15-inch laptop placing at the left side of the Tobii eye-tracker, 
so both the participants and the confederate could not see each other’s 
screen, but they could see each other’s face and body (see Figure 4.11). 
The experimenter sat in the corner to introduce and monitor the task. In the 
Non-interactive condition, after introducing each other, the confederate was 
brought out of the room to perform the task in another room. During the 
Non-interactive sessions, the experimenter sat in front of the laptop as the 
confederate in the other two conditions. 
 
 
a. Interactive and Low-interactive conditions 
 
b. Non-interactive condition 
Figure 4. 11. The experimental setups in the three conditions in Experiment 4.  
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S represents the subjects, C represents the confederate, and E represents the 
experimenter. The upper display demonstrates the setup of the interaction and 
non-interaction conditions, and the lower display demonstrates absent condition. 
 
Once testing began, after the training phase, the confederate was 
an instructor and directed the participant to move objects around a shelf. 
But they both had opportunity to experience the other's role during a 
training phase. Similar to previous experiments, in the training phase 
participants were give three trials as director. They first saw the back of two 
shelves (Figure 4.12). Then they chose (Figure 4.12.a), or be assigned with 
(Figure 4.12.b), or no idea about the category of objects (Figure 4.12.c) on 
their partner's screen, depending on the conditions. Then, participants 
gave instructions to move objects around the grid, playing the Director role 
for the training phase.  
 
  
a.                         b. 
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c.                               d. 
  
e.                                f.    
Figure 4. 12. The procedure for each trial in Experiment 4.  
The participant first sees both shelves empty (a), then a category label appears 
(b), having been announced or not by the Director. This is followed by the 
appearance of private objects on the smaller shelf to the right of the main shelf (c). 
The participant then moves their private objects to blocked-off grid positons on the 
main shelf (d) and rings the bell. At this point, the commonly viewable objects 
appear (e) and when the participant signals that they are ready, they are given 
one instruction to move a commonly viewable object by the director (f). 
 
Once roles were swapped, the confederate took over as director 
and the participant took on the role of operator. In the Interactive condition 
the director announced to the participants, "this time I'll make it fruit. Ok?", 
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clicking on the label on their screen and then the participants had to 
verbally acknowledge the decision. Both the Low-interactive and 
Non-interactive condition lacked communication during this stage. 
However, in the Low-interactive condition, the participant is aware that the 
director sees the category of the private objects just as the three private 
objects appear in the side shelf, according to the pre-announced category. 
They moved them to the grey privileged positions on the 3*3 grid and then 
clicked on the image of the bell when they were ready (Figure 4.12.d). 
When the participant had completed this phase, the confederate presented 
them three objects in the common view on the shelf (Figure 4.12.e). The 
participant then clicked on a bell to acknowledge that they saw the common 
objects. At this point the director gave an instruction to move an object to a 
new location (Figure 4.12.f). The object was either the target in critical trials 
or an irrelevant object in fillers. When this is completed by the participant, 
they click the ‘NEXT’ button on the bottom right of the screen and the whole 
procedure begins again for the next trial.  
 
4.2. Analysis and Results 
4.2.1.  ANOVA analyses 
Eye-movements were initiated and analyzed in the same way as 
Experiment 3. The same acoustic onsets and spatial coordinates were 
coded. Target and competitor items were identified on a by-trial basis. A 
target advantage score was calculated as dependent variables. Figure 4.13 
shows Target Advantage scores over time.  
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Figure 4. 13. The time course of the target advantage scores in 
Experiment 4. The solid line indicates the non-competitor items and 
the dashed line indicated the competitor condition. The same colour of 
the line represented the same condition.  
 
As with previous experiments, we considered gaze data across 
three regions: a -200ms-200ms preview region, and two 300ms windows 
(200-500ms, 500-800ms). Figure 4.14 shows average Target Advantage in 
the three regions for the six conditions. Figure 4.15 shows the proportion of 
fixations to the target and the competitor in conditions. 
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Non-interactive condition 
Figure 4. 14. The average target advantage scores for the three time windows in 
Experiment 4.  
The charts compared the competitor and non-competitor conditions in the 
Interactive condition (upper left) and the Low-interactive condition (upper right) 
and Non-interactive condition (lower). Error bars indicate standard error of 
by-participant means. 
 
The results of a 2(competitor vs. non-competitor) * 3(interactive vs. 
low-interactive vs. non-interactive) * 2(high AQ vs. low AQ) * 2(first block vs. 
second block) mixed ANOVA are as follows. 
Preview window: 
In the preview window, there were no main effects, but there was an 
interaction between competitor types and blocks, F1(1,108)=5.004, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.044, F2(1,48)=4.950, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.093, and an interaction among 
competitor, AQ and blocks, F1(1,108)=7.419, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.064, 
F2(1,48)=8.421, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.149. Simple effect analyses showed that in 
the first block, there was simple interaction between competitor types and 
AQ, F1(1,54)=4.996, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.085, F2(1,24)=5.000, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.172. Simple effect showed that the low AQ group had the same TA 
scores in both competitor and non-competitor conditions, but the high AQ 
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group had larger TA score in the non-competitor than the competitor 
condition, F1(1,54)=11.112, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.171, F2(1,24)=11.526, p<0.01, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.324. In the second block there was no simple main effect and 
interactions. 
200-500ms window: 
In the first time window (200-500ms), there was a significant effect of the 
competitor type, F1(1,108)=6.173, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.054, F2(1,48)=9.180, 
p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.161, due to the target advantage score being larger in the 
non-competitor condition than the competitor condition. There was 
significant interaction between the competitor type and interactivity, 
F1(2,108)=3.617, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.063, F2(2,48)=5.451, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.185. 
Simple effect analysis showed that in both the Interactive and 
Low-interactive condition, there were significant simple effects of the 
competitor types. In the Interactive condition, there was a larger TA score 
in the non-competitor condition than the competitor condition, 
F1(1,108)=7.372, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.064, F2(1,48)=10.777, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2=0.183. 
In the Low-interactive condition, there was also a larger TA score in the 
non-competitor condition than the competitor condition, F1(1,108)=5.372, 
p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.047, F2(1,48)=8.425, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.149. But in the 
Non-interactive condition, no simple effect of the competitor types was 
found, F1(1,108)=0.559, p=0.456, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.005, F2(1,48)=0.879, p=0.353, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.018. There was also an interaction between competitor types and 
blocks, F1(1,108)=6.764, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.059, F2(1,48)=10.370, p<0.01, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.178. Simple effect showed that in the first block, participant had larger 
TA scores in the non-competitor condition than the competitor condition, 
F1(1,108)=12.929, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.107, F2(1,48)=19.532, p<0.001, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.289, but in the second block, there was no difference between 
competitor types.  
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500-800ms window: 
In the second time window (500-800ms), there was a significant effect of 
the competitor types, F1(1,108)=23.345, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.178, 
F2(1,48)=41.402, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2=0.463, due to the target advantage score 
being larger in the non-competitor condition than the competitor condition 
The effect of interactivity was also significant, F1(2,108)=3.240, p<0.05, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.057, F2(2,48)=3.979, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.142. Post hoc analysis showed 
that compared to the Non-interactive condition, there was a larger TA score 
in the Low-interactive condition, F1(1,78)=6.529, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.077, 
F2(1,38)=6.210, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.140. No difference was found between the 
High-Interactive and Low-interactive condition, F1(1,78)=3.016, p=0.086, 
ŋ𝑝
2 =0.037, F2(1,38)=3.276, p=0.078, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.079, and between the 
Interactive and Non-interactive condition, F1(1,78)=0.792, p=0.376, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.010, F2(1,38)=0.606, p=0.441, ŋ𝑝
2=0.016. It indicated that compared 
to the Non-interactive condition, participants found the target more quickly 
and looked longer generally in the Low-interactive condition. 
There was also an interaction between competitor types and 
blocks, F1(1,108)=5.234, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.046, F2(1,48)=9.606, p<0.01, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.167. Simple effect showed that in the first block, participant had larger 
TA scores in the non-competitor condition than the competitor condition, 
F1(1,108)=25.344, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.190, F2(1,48)=45.447, p<0.001, 
ŋ𝑝
2=0.486, but in the second block, there was no difference between 
competitor types.  
There was interaction between the competitor type and interactivity, 
F1(2,108)=4.209, p<0.05, ŋ𝑝
2=0.072, F2(2,48)=41.402, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2=0.463. 
Simple effect analysis showed that in the Interactive and Low-interactive 
conditions, there's a significant effect of the competitor types. Specifically, 
there was a larger TA score in the non-competitor condition than the 
competitor condition in the Interactive condition, F1(1,108)=23.782, 
p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.180, F2(1,48)=39.021, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.448, and in the 
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Low-interactive condition, F1(1,108)=7.398, p<0.01, ŋ𝑝
2 =0.064, 
F2(1,48)=14.004, p<0.001, ŋ𝑝
2=0.226. But no simple effect of competitor 
types in the Non-interactive condition was found, F1(1,108)=0.599, 
p=0.441, ŋ𝑝
2=0.006, F2(1,48)=1.336, p=0.253, ŋ𝑝
2=0.027. 
As we will discuss below, these results tend to support the 
prediction that lesser interactivity concerning the private objects would yield 
less competitor interference. However, it is possible that the lack of 
difference between competitor and non-competitor conditions might have 
arisen due to a much smaller overall bias to the target in the 
Non-interactive condition – consistent with the main effect of interactivity in 
the second time window. Figure 4.15 below shows a plot of proportions of 
looks separately for the target and competitor/non-competitor distractor in 
each of the three interactivity conditions. Visual inspection of these graphs 
suggests that the bias to target did not differ drastically between the 
Non-interactive and the two present conditions. Nevertheless we explored 
this possibility by a series of t-tests. 
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Low-interactive – Non-competitor      Low-interactive – Competitor 
  
Non-interactive– Non-competitor         Non-interactive– Competitor 
Figure 4. 15. The proportion to fixation to the target and the competitor in 
Experiment 4.  
 
First we compared the proportion of looks to the target and the 
other four irrelevant objects across the 200-500 and 500-800ms time 
windows. First t-tests showed that in all six conditions, participants have 
larger proportion of fixation to the target than the other irrelevant objects in 
the two time windows (p’s < 0.05). Then the proportions of fixations to the 
target were compared with the chance (one sixth). Proportions of fixations 
to the target were larger than chance in the second time window across all 
conditions (p’s < 0.01). In particular, in the Non-interactive non-competitor 
condition: t=7.708, p<0.01; the Non-interactive competitor condition: 
t=5.125, p<0.01. Thus, the bias to target formed at broadly the same rate 
across all three conditions. This means that the interaction reported above, 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
-200 0 200 400 600 800
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
Fi
xa
ti
o
n
s 
Time from onset of the critical noun 
competitor
target
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
-200 0 200 400 600 800
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
Fi
xa
ti
o
n
s 
Time from onset of the critical noun 
competitor
target
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
-200 0 200 400 600 800
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
Fi
xa
ti
o
n
s 
Time from onset of the critical noun 
competitor
target
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
-200 0 200 400 600 800
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
Fi
xa
ti
o
n
s 
Time from onset of the critical noun 
competitor
target
165 
 
showing a lack of competitor interference in the Non-interactive conditions 
was not a result of some kind of floor effect. 
Summary of Results: 
To sum up the results of the ANOVA analysis, let us first consider the effect 
involving Blocks found through the two main time windows. In both cases, a 
Block-by-Competitor type interaction revealed that Non-Competitor trials 
attracted more Target Advantage than Competitor trials in the First half of 
the experiment, but there was no difference in the second half of the 
experiment. This is the kind of pattern we expect in a Perspective-Taking 
study where participants ‘improve’ performance in the more difficult trials 
involving a competitor distractor in private positions, relative to the baseline 
condition involving no competitor.  
Let us now turn to effects involving AQ score. Recall that in 
Experiment 3, we found a surprising interaction between AQ and 
Question-type revealing that the Low-AQ group had lower TA scores in the 
baseline Test-question study. The account of that result given above was in 
terms of implicit vs. explicit social-cognitive ability. Here we found an 
interaction only in the Preview window showing that in early trials in the 
study, the more socially able group did not differ between Competitor and 
baseline Non-competitor trials, while the low social group had lower TA 
scores when a competitor was in private view. This interaction was not 
present in the second half of the study. It is difficult to relate this result to 
that mentioned from Experiment 3. 
Next we turn to the Competitor-by-Interactivity interaction that was 
found in both the 200-500ms and 500-800ms windows. In both cases, 
when broken down, results revealed that Target Advantage on Competitor 
trials was lower than the baseline Non-Competitor trials in Interactive and 
Low-Interactive conditions but there was no difference in the 
Non-Interactive trial. This result is in line with the predictions outlined at the 
beginning of the study, that interactivity in relation to the private objects can 
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create interference when a competitor is present. The reason for this is that 
an interaction between instructor and participant about the private objects 
makes those object more salient or more available to be considered as 
potential referents by low-level memory-based processes. When one of 
those private objects fits the description (‘apple’) that the instructor uses, 
then it is harder to ignore those objects, compared to the baseline case 
where no apple is present. 
Before resting our conclusions too heavily on these results, we 
should consider the fact that the basis of these interactions seems to be 
that Target Advantage on Interactive and Low-Interactive conditions is 
relatively high, compared to the No-interactive  condition, while TA on 
Competitor conditions seems to be similar across the different 
sub-experiments. This observation is borne out by post-hoc tests on 
Non-Competitor and Competitor  conditions separately. A three-way 
ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference in TA for the 
non-competitor items among three interactivity conditions (200-500ms: F(2, 
59)=4.055, p<0.05; 500-800ms: F(2,59)=6.721, p<0.01). Follow-up 
analyses showed that there are larger proportions of looks to the target in 
the Interactive and Low-interactive condition than the Non-interactive 
condition (p’s < 0.05), but no difference between the Interactive and 
Low-interactive condition. By contrast, for the competitor items there was 
no different proportion of looks to the target among three interactivity 
conditions (200-500ms: F(2, 59)=0.850, p=0.433; 500-800ms: 
F(2,59)=1.751, p=0.183). 
These results tell us that when participants sat in the same room as 
the instructor and in close proximity to her (see Figure 4.11), their 
performance on the baseline No-Competitor trials was better than when the  
instructor was not present in the room at all. This is entirely consistent with 
our hypothesis since salience or availability of an object for reference 
depends on the extent to which attention is shared. When the instructor is 
co-present, there is much more direct evidence available that participants 
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share attention with the instructor to the objects on the screens than when 
the instructor is absence. For example, the participant sees the co-present 
instructor is looking at the screen when the common objects appear. Thus 
they have more situational evidence that attention is shared to the 
appearance of the common-view objects. This fact in itself should result in 
the greater salience or availability of the common-view objects for the 
Interactive and Low-Interactive conditions than the Non-Interactive 
condition. Thus it should result in the kind of improved TA scores for 
co-present groups that we see in the Non-Competitor condition. However, it 
should also lead improved performance in the Competitor condition for the 
co-present groups. That it does not would be a result of the interaction 
concerning the private objects. To put this point another way, the 
co-presence of the instructor on the Interactivity and Low-Interactivity result 
in a higher baseline Target Advantage score. The experiment was 
designed to see if the different procedures concerning interactivity (whether 
instructor and participant share attention to the private objects) would lead 
to relatively lower Target Advantage score on Competitor trials, relative to 
the baseline. The prediction was that more interaction about the private 
objects would lead to a lower Target Advantage, compared to the baseline 
Non-competitor condition. This is what we found.  
The interpretation of these results could be investigated further by 
the inclusion of another condition where there is interaction about the 
private objects but the instructor is not co-present. The prediction would be 
that in this condition, Target Advantage on Non-Competitor trials would be 
lower than in the Interactive and Low-Interactive (i.e. co-present) conditions 
here. Relative to the No-Competitor baseline, Target Advantage on 
Competitor trials in this fourth condition would be lower.  
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4.3. Discussion 
The procedure in this experiment allowed for interaction between the 
director and participant at a time when the participant was required to pay 
attention to their private objects. In the Interactive condition, attention 
toward a property of these objects was shared via a communicative 
interaction between director and participant. In the Low-Interactive 
condition, no communicative interaction took place between the director 
and the participant. However, in this condition, the director was present, 
sitting close by to the participant and the participant was aware that the 
director was being informed of the category of the objects at the same time 
as they were. Thus, there was to some extent, shared attention to a 
property of the private objects. In contrast, in the Non-interactive condition, 
the director is not present in the room for the session and the participant is 
aware that the message about the private objects is not shared with the 
director. Another feature of the manipulation in this experiment concerns 
whether the instructor is present in the same room or not. When instructor 
is present, participants have more situational evidence that she shares 
attention to both the common objects and the private ones. In the case of 
the common objects, attention is shared to their identities (whether they are 
apples, grapes etc.), in the case of private objects, attention is optionally 
shared to superordinate properties (being fruit, shapes etc.).  
Critically, the form of the interaction differed between this 
experiment and Experiment 3. In the interactive Guess question condition 
of Experiment 3, the director makes a guess about the category of the 
participant’s objects. Compared to the non-interactive version of that 
procedure (where participants silently answer a Test question about their 
category) interactivity improved performance in Experiment 3. We 
attributed that improvement to the fact that making a guess about objects 
highlights the director’s ignorance of their type rather than simple 
interactivity itself. In the current experiment, we see in fact that the more 
interactive conditions yielded a greater change relative to the baseline 
Non-Competitor condition than a non-interactive condition. Thus, we can 
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conclude that improved performance in Experiment 3 was due to how 
participants processed the interaction in a way that reinforced ignorance of 
the type of objects in the participant’s private view.  
The results of Experiment 4 are in line with the predictions based 
on my proposals about common ground: when participants were likely to 
be attending to their private objects, cues to the fact that attention was 
shared to these objects caused participants to suffer relatively more 
distractor interference than when there were no cues to interaction at this 
phase. We attribute this result to the fact that objects to which attention has 
been shared are common ground objects and such objects become more 
accessible for definite reference subsequently. Thus participants are more 
liable to consider such objects, even though they have evidence that the 
speaker could not know their identities. 
An alternative account of our results could point to the fact that in 
the Interactive condition of Experiment 4, the director’s dictating of the 
superordinate category may create an impression of more knowledge 
about the objects than the director in fact has. It could thus be that the 
interaction has an opposite effect to that in Experiment 3 and that is why 
participants suffer interference. While we cannot rule out that some 
participants may have been susceptible to this illusion, we point out that in 
the Low-Interactive condition participants also suffered competitor 
interference. In the Low-Interactive condition, the director sits passively, 
like the participant, while the category information appears on the screen. 
There is no interaction. Thus, any misapprehension about what the director 
knows about the private objects that is created by the director’s behaviour 
in the Interactive condition of Experiment 4 is unlikely to be created when 
the director is passive, as in the Low-Interactive condition. 
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5. General discussion  
In Experiment 3 and 4, we explored two levels of cognitive processing in 
the perspective taking: a lower-level memory bases system for ‘common 
ground’ based on previous shared experience and a system that integrates 
information about speaker’s mental states into referential decisions. 
Experiment 3 demonstrates that more salient information about the 
director’s ignorance improves the extent of perspective taking. This is the 
first reported experiment that directly tests the role of Theory of Mind 
inferences in on-line perspective-taking tasks. 
The results from Experiment 4 rule out the possibility that simply 
the degree of interactivity led to the better performance in the Guess 
condition of Experiment 3. In Experiment 4, participants in the interactive 
conditions were less able to ignore the competitor in private view than 
participants in the non-interactive condition. 
The results of Experiment 4 lend support to the proposals about 
common ground in this thesis. When the director was in the same room, 
participants were less able to ignore objects in privileged view, because the 
co-presence and other cues to shared interaction increase the degree to 
which the existence of private objects are processed as shared attention 
and thus the degree to which their salience makes them candidates for 
definite reference.  
It may seem surprising that more interactivity between director and 
participant leads to poorer performance. However, as predicted by the 
proposals in this thesis, it depends on the nature of the interactivity. When 
interactivity makes information about the speaker’s mental state more 
salient, then this can improve performance on perspective taking tasks. 
When interactivity only serves to increase the shared attention to the 
existence of private objects, then it makes performance worse.  
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Our proposals imply that on-line perspective-taking tasks of the 
form first reported by Kesyar and colleagues can be made more difficult, to 
some extent, by the operations of the low-level common ground 
mechanism. We can compare the results from this chapter to those of other 
results showing that performance on similar tasks is modulated by social 
factors. 
Adult participants in Experiment 4 behaved in a similar way that 
two-year olds did in the study reported in Moll et al. (2011). In that study 
2-year olds were unable to treat as novel the identity of an object for which 
only cues only to shared attention to the existence of the object were 
available. 25  In both cases we explain the results in terms of two 
social-cognitive mechanisms being involved in decisions about definite 
referents - a lower-level memory bases system for ‘common ground’ based 
on previous shared experience and a system that integrates information 
about speaker’s mental states into referential decisions.  
Taken together, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 are relevant to 
how we can interpret results reported in Savitsky et al., (2011) and Wu & 
Keysar (2007a). For example, Savitsky and colleagues (2011) 
demonstrated that the familiarity of the interlocutors influenced the 
establishment of common ground. In that study, participants demonstrated 
more egocentric behaviours when they perform the game-board task 
based on Keysar and colleague 2000’s study with their friends, compared 
to strangers. Savitsky and colleagues interpreted this effect in terms of 
Keysar’s Perspective-Adjustment model, using the idea that friends tend to 
put in less effort to complete the task. While this may be the case, to some 
extent, it could also be the case that people who are more familiar with 
each other are better able to, or more liable to, attend to cues to shared 
interactions.  Without any more specific cues to director ignorance, this 
factor may have led to a greater salience for privately viewable objects 
when social distance is lower. 
                                                            
25 This experiment is summarised in Chapter 1. 
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Similar study on the cultural difference of the perspective-taking 
found that Chinese people performed better than Western people, which 
may be due to the fact that in the study Chinese participants were new to 
the environment (Wu & Keysar, 2007b). There being greater social 
distance between visiting students from another culture than US-based 
undergraduate students used in the control group.  
The proposal in this thesis is that, in conversation, mechanisms for 
common ground information and mechanisms for integrating 
Theory-of-Mind information are separate. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
Perspective-Adjustment model of language processing rests on the idea 
that some elements of perspective taking are costly, leading to an 
egocentric – first heuristic. This position is supported by numerous studies 
indicating a cost factor for perspective-taking. For example, Brown-Schmidt 
(2009b) demonstrates that performance on perspective-taking task 
correlates with inhibition control ability. Similarly Lin, Keysar & Epley, (2010) 
show that working memory plays a big role in the task. Other research, 
such as Apperly et al., (2006) and Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, (2009) 
speak to a cost for similar tasks. Could it be that these are costs inherent in 
integrating Theory of Mind inferences into on-line processes? The results in 
this thesis should make one wary of drawing that conclusion. Here I have 
argued that, in fact, social cognitive mechanisms for common ground may 
in some ways make the task more difficult. Working memory and inhibition 
control may be called on to a greater extent in these tasks precisely 
because one has to discount salient referents provided by common ground 
mechanisms. To test this hypothesis, one could design a study to see 
whether Inhibition control abilities play a greater role in conditions where 
attention is shared more to the private object. 
Contrary to the assumptions behind the Perspective-adjustment 
model, the results of Experiment 3 demonstrate very rapid integration of 
Theory of Mind inferences (about the speaker’s ignorance). Thus we would 
be disinclined to align the proposals in this thesis with any apparently 
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similar proposals that compartmentalise abilities for perspective-taking into 
a costly set and an automatic, low-cost set. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
there is evidence that Theory of Mind information can be integrated rapidly 
in language comprehension (Ferguson & Breheny 2011). We have no 
reason to believe that there is any in principle delay in integrating Theory of 
Mind inferences in language processing. Thus, when not coming into 
conflict, the mechanisms for common ground and for Theory of Mind 
inferences can in principle have an effect in the same timecourse. 
The proposals in this thesis have implications for research into 
Theory of Mind more generally. This research has often focussed on the 
false-belief task and found that for children, it is difficult to pass explicit 
versions before the age of four (Perner 1991; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer 
1987; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001) and that for adults the task does 
pose problems (Apperly et al. 2006). At the same time, infants can pass an 
implicit version of the false-belief task soon after their first birthday (Onishi 
& Baillargeon, 2005; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2007). 
Recently it has been demonstrated that 3 year-old children pass explicit 
versions of the false belief task in Rubio-Fernandez & Geurts (2013). In 
that study, it is shown that younger children perform better when their 
perspective is not interrupted by that of the experimenter. It is also shown 
in Rubio-Fernandez (2015) that adults performance on versions of the 
false-belief task is subject to interference where perspective in ‘interrupted’.  
The proposals in this thesis suggest that one hitherto 
uninvestigated factor in explicit versions of the false belief task relates to 
the interference of common ground. In a typical false belief task, the child 
and an experimenter watch the target object be placed in one location by 
one character and then it is moved to the so-called ‘true belief’ location. In 
many such studies, the experimenter demonstrates the story to the child 
themselves. This form of interaction would strengthen the common ground 
information shared about the target object. When it comes to testing the 
child, mention of the object may prime shared information about that object 
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to an extent that it becomes difficult to ignore for younger children. Thus we 
make a prediction that the extent to which information about the true 
location is common ground between the child and experimenter when the 
question is asked will determine the rate of error/interference in this task. 
We aim to test this hypothesis in future research. 
The results reported in this chapter also have implications for the 
research on the development of children’s use of discourse markers. For 
instance, Matthews et al., (2006) show that 2-year olds but not 3- or 4-year 
olds have difficulty providing full descriptions of a character in an event to 
an experimenter who cannot see the event. Since the experimenter is 
co-present and generally interacts with the child while she watches the 
events, it may be that the younger children find it more difficult to ignore the 
cues to shared attention, or to integrate this information with the fact that 
the experimenter does not know the identities of the character on the video.   
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Conclusion  
The dissertation concerns what cognitive mechanisms play a role in online 
referential processing and how. In particular, we were interested in how 
previously shared information and information about interlocutors’ mental 
states are integrated to resolve referential ambiguities in language 
comprehension. According to Clark & Marshall (1981), common ground is 
common-knowledge of discourse relevant facts and it serves as the main 
constraint on definite referential processes. The first chapter argues that, 
viewed from the perspective on on-line processing, mechanisms for 
common ground cannot be the main constraint on definite reference, due to 
the phenomenon of accommodation. Chapter 1 also outlines and motivates 
an alternative view of common ground. This view is conceptually simpler, 
since it does not involve common knowledge but rather shared attention. 
Shared attention has been argued to provide a basis for the specifically 
‘open’ nature of human communication (Barwise, 1988/1989; Peacocke, 
2005) and its development has clear links to the development of 
communicative abilities in pre-linguistic infants (Csibra, 2010; Tomasello et. 
al., 2005). Although abilities to represent shared attention involve abilities 
to represent intentions (Peacocke, 2005; Carpenter & Liebal, 2011), it 
emerges prior to more full-fledged Theory of Mind abilities that manifest 
themselves in the second year. The proposal about common ground says 
its operation is supported by lower-level cognitive biases triggered by social 
cues such as eye-contact, contingent behaviour and self-directed speech. 
These cues trigger an enhanced processing in terms of greater attention to 
the shared stimuli and deeper integration in memory. Thus when previously 
shared information is cued for recall, its salience or availability is greater 
than if it had not been shared. 
In line with the idea of graded salience of common ground 
(Brown-Schmidt, 2012), the second chapter explored how domain-general 
memory mechanisms interface with social cognition in the process of 
making previously shared information available for referential processing. 
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We tested the memory-based account of shared information due to Horton 
and colleagues (Horton & Gerrig, 2005). We found evidence consistent 
with the predictions in this model that low-level or automatic effects of 
memory associations influence on-line referential processing. However, we 
also found evidence that memory-based mechanisms are influenced by 
shared attention at the coding phase. 
According to the proposals in this thesis, keeping track of common 
ground should be low in cost. Yet some studies demonstrate a difficulty in 
in perspective-taking tasks (for example, Keysar et al. 2000). The difficulty 
may come from the access to theory of mind, or other task-related factors. 
The thesis argues that research using the perspective-taking task has not 
to date specifically examined whether Theory of Mind inferences are 
integrated in early phases of referential processes. All widely discussed 
studies do not distinguish between the role of common ground and 
inferences about the speaker’s ignorance of certain objects. So the third 
experiment intended to test the role of Theory of Mind inferences in 
perspective taking task.  
In the third experiment, participants received a conjecture 
regarding the category of their privileged objects before the referential task 
started. There were two types of conjecture, one asked by the speaker, and 
the other just presented on the screen. Despite only difference in the 
presentation types, participants less resorted to their privileged ground 
when the speaker asked the category of the objects, because the 
speaker’s question implied their ignorance of the participants’ privileged 
ground. In contrast, when participants read the conjecture on the screen, 
they were suffered interference from their privileged competitor objects. If 
we assume that the procedure in the guessing condition makes the 
director’s ignorance of the private objects’ identities more salient than in the 
non-interactive test condition, then the very early influence of this 
manipulation (from 300ms after the onset of the critical word) reveals that 
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Theory of Mind inference can be integrated into referential processes in the 
perspective-taking task from the earliest stages. 
But as discussed, the different interactivity may have had an effect 
on the results. That is, larger interactivity in the guess condition led to a 
better performance. So a follow-up study, Experiment 4, examined this 
possibility.  
Experiment 4 was also designed to explore an additional 
hypothesis that emerged from the proposals in this thesis: that some part of 
the difficulty in perspective taking studies results from the fact that the 
existence of privately viewable objects is common ground, even though 
their specific identities are not. Based on work in the social-cognition 
literature (Knoblich et. al., 2011) and the developmental literature (Moll et. 
al., 2011) we conjectured that the co-presence of the speaker increased 
the degree to which the existence of private objects was shared attention. 
The fourth study intended to test whether the co-presence of the speaker 
influenced the perspective taking as predicted, and also provide a baseline 
for the interactivity of the experiment 3. In the same referential task as 
experiment 3, the interactivity of speaker was manipulated in three ways: 
interactive, low-interactive and non-interactive conditions. The interactive 
and low-interactive condition were in parallel to the guess and test 
condition in the experiment 3, because they were different in whether the 
confederate spoke to participants in a pre-test phase. The non-interactive 
condition was different with the first two on whether the confederate was 
co-present. The results did not found any effect on the interactive and 
non-interactive condition, indicating that results of the experiment 3 were 
less likely due to the interactivity between interlocutors. But it showed that 
the Interactivity influenced participants’ perspective taking.  
In sum, the dissertation proposed two relevant levels of 
social-cognitive processing in the perspective taking task: a lower-level 
memory bases system for ‘common ground’ and a system that integrates 
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information about speaker’s mental states into referential decisions. Both 
mechanisms are separate. The former one relied on automatic memory 
retrieval of previous shared experience, while the latter one was based on 
a higher order theory of mind mechanism.  
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Note: 
The present thesis draws on three papers that are either under review or in 
prep now. Chapter 2 draws on Zheng & Breheny (under review). Chapter 3 
draws on Zheng & Breheny (in prep). Chapter 1 draws on Breheny & 
Zheng (under review). 
